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Summary
This PhD thesis proposes new frameworks and methods which give new insights
to qualiﬁcation and reliability assessments of new subsea systems. The subsea
oil and gas industry is an industry with strict requirements to the reliability of
their equipment. The provision of new subsea technology with an acceptable
level of reliability is a prerequisite to achieve high production availability, low
maintenance costs and less consequences such as oil spills to the environment or
other types of accidents.
Before a new technology or a new system is accepted for use, the equip-
ment supplier must convince the operator that the reliability of the new technol-
ogy/system is suﬃciently high. This may be accomplished through a technology
qualiﬁcation program (TQP).
The objective of this PhD project has been to develop systematic approaches
that contribute to the reliability qualiﬁcation of new subsea equipment and to the
following-up of reliability in the operational phase.
The main contributions from this PhD project are:
• A technology qualiﬁcation framework which is integrated with a product de-
velopment model, and highlights the key features of commonly used TQP
approaches.
• A method for reliability prediction of new subsea equipment based on com-
parison with similar topside equipment and using the available ﬁeld data.
• An approach for how to consider and monitor human and organizational fac-
tors (HOFs) inﬂuencing common cause failures (CCFs) in the operational
phase. Along with suggestion of supplementary questions to be added into
the IEC 61508 approach for determining CCF factor.
• An approach for failure rate updating during various product’s life cycle.
• An approach for reliability prediction of oﬀshore oil and gas equipment op-
erating in arctic environment based on proportional hazard model and the
levels of data availability.
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• An approach for outlining the reliability improvement process for subsea
equipment that can be integrated with the product development process of
Murthy et al. [57].
The results of this thesis may academically be used by researchers with in-
terest in the same research ﬁeld and practically be used by producers, suppliers,
end users, decision-makers and other organizations within the ﬁeld of subsea
equipment and oil and gas industry. The generic principles from the proposed
frameworks, or methods with minor modiﬁcations can also be applied for other
new equipments in other industry sector where high reliability is a requirement,
such as military, aviation, and so on.
Therefore, it is important to share the contributions and ideas for further work
with others. The contributions have been presented in eight articles, where two
have been published in international journals, one have been submitted for pub-
lication, and ﬁve have been presented at conferences and have been published in
conference proceedings.
Currently, there are several TQP approaches have been suggested, but only
two of these approaches are mainly used in the Norwegian oﬀshore oil and gas
industry; one proposed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) in their recommended
practice DNV-RP-A203 and one based on NASA’s technology readiness levels
(TRLs) approach. Combinations of the two approaches are also used. This PhD
thesis presents and discusses the main TQP approaches highlights challenges re-
lated to methodological and procedural issues and provides a set of suggestions
for improvement. Criteria are established to facilitate comparison and identiﬁ-
cation of strengths and weaknesses of the TQP approaches. These results, com-
bined with a thorough literature review, have been used to develop a framework
that is practical for qualifying new subsea systems.
As part of the TQP, reliability analyses and predictions are performed in the
early stages of product development process. Currently, no practical method is
available that can be used to extrapolate the available reliability data from similar
and known systems and come up to a failure rate prediction for new systems op-
erating in a diﬀerent environment. This PhD thesis suggests a practical approach
on how to predict the failure rate of new subsea systems that has been adapted
(i.e., “marinized”) from known topside systems.
The reliability assessment should not ﬁnish when the equipment enters the
operating phase, but should be followed-up during the operational and mainte-
nance phases. Safety-instrumented systems (SISs) are important safety barriers
in many technical systems in the subsea industry. CCFs represent a serious threat
to the reliability of SISs. For quantitatively incorporating the eﬀects of CCFs, the
beta-factor model is often used. During the operational phase of SIS, the hard-
ware architecture and the components will usually remain unchanged. Therefore,
any changes in CCF might be as a result of factors including environmental expo-
sure or human and organizational acts. This PhD thesis highlights the importance
of HOFs in estimation of β for SISs during the operational phase.In addition this
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PhD thesis suggests a set of supplementary questions to the existing methods of
beta estimation for SIS such as IEC 61508 approach, for more accurate determi-
nation of beta-factor. HOFs are diﬃcult to predict, and susceptible to be changed
during the operational phase. Without proper management, changing HOFs may
cause the SIS reliability to drift out of its required value. This PhD thesis also
proposes a framework to follow the HOFs eﬀects and to manage them such that
the reliability requirement can be maintained.
Failure rate prediction provides a quantitative basis for decision-making re-
garding the adequacy of a design from the early phases in the life cycle. In real-
life operation and maintenance, the operating and environmental conditions may
change compared to what was assumed by the producer in the design and de-
velopment phases. Changes in these conditions and unexpected disruptions may
make the current predicted failure rate inaccurate and updating is required as a
response to such disruptions and changes. This PhD thesis discusses the need for
failure rate prediction in the various phases of a product’s life cycle and proposes
a framework for updating the failure rate prediction to obtain a more realistic
prediction.
As the oﬀshore oil and gas industry is currently considers moving into the
arctic region. The harsh arctic environment will have an unavoidable inﬂuence
on the reliability of the equipment operated in it. To understand this inﬂuence is
of vital importance to ensure the reliability of the equipment and the production
availability of the systems. Several types of data, such as data on design, produc-
tion, usage intensity, and operating environment are required to assess and verify
the reliability of the equipment. This PhD thesis proposes a framework for re-
liability assessment based on proportional hazards modeling and various types
of data. It presents important arctic factors inﬂuencing the physical performance
and discusses how these may inﬂuence the reliability of the equipment.
Developing a product with high reliability cannot be achieved overnight and
the subsea industry has to adopt a long-term improvement strategy and needs to
learn from other industries that are exposed to similar strict reliability require-
ments, such as the nuclear, aviation, and space industries. This PhD thesis out-
lines how to integrate continuous reliability improvement into the various phases
of the development of new subsea equipment, according to the product develop-
ment model of Murthy et al. [57].
The areas for further research regarding this PhD project and proposed frame-
works and method can be classiﬁed into three categories: (1) Development and
improvement of proposed frameworks and method, (2) Practical implementation
of them into existing industry practices, and (3) Handling of uncertainty.
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1Introduction
This chapter provides the background for this PhD thesis in order to provide a
broader context for the work. The articles discuss important issues and results,
but the background chapter is meant to put the topics in the articles into a larger
context.
Some concepts that are frequently used in the subsea and oil and gas industry,
and also used in this thesis and articles, have been described. The thesis objec-
tives are deﬁned at the end of this chapter, along with the delimitations and the
research challenges and questions.
1.1 Background
Subsea production equipment range in complexity from one single satellite well
with a ﬂow-line linked to a ﬁxed platform, or an onshore installation, to sev-
eral wells on a template or clustered around a manifold, and transferring to a
ﬁxed or ﬂoating facility or directly to an onshore installation [6]. The explo-
ration and exploitation of reservoirs in deep/ultra-deep water conditions, and in
other new frontiers are usually either technically unfeasible or uneconomical by
using traditional surface facilities, such as steel jacket platforms. In this context
the development of subsea systems is often inherently dictated by environmental
conditions.
The subsea oil and gas industry is moving more and more of the traditional
topside ﬂuid processing systems to the seabed. This strategy has the potential
to give increased production from low-energy reservoirs and may also lead to
signiﬁcant cost saving. In addition, the oil and gas industry is currently exploring
new challenging areas, such as ultra-deep waters and the Arctic region.
To obtain these, several new technical products are required. Such products
are being developed at an ever-increasing pace. Many of them are based on new
technological solutions and may contain new materials and/or unproven compo-
nents.
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Subsea technology in oﬀshore oil and gas production is a highly specialized
ﬁeld of application with speciﬁc demands. The deployment of such systems re-
quires specialized equipment and processes and implies a very high cost. Any
requirement to repair or intervene the subsea equipment is normally very ex-
pensive and this type of expense may result in economic failure of the subsea
technology development.
Reliability is an important factor in the development of subsea oil and gas
equipment. But several factors inﬂuencing the reliability of an equipment, for
instance, the environmental conditions will change signiﬁcantly as time passes
(e.g., reduced pressure, changed gas/oil ratio, more produced water, diﬀerent
chemical content). The equipment must be reliable enough to safeguard the en-
vironment, and make the exploitation of the subsea hydrocarbons economically
feasible for a rather long period.
Therefore before an operator accepts to install a new subsea system, he must
be convinced that the new system has a suﬃciently high reliability and a pre-
requisite is that failures requiring subsea repair interventions must not occur. A
subsea intervention requires an intervention vessel and often a long production
down-time at a cost of several million US dollars. The time to the ﬁrst planned
intervention may be in ﬁve years, and even longer, and it is important that the
installed system is able to survive at least this period without failure.
In the subsea oil and gas industry, as for other industries with highly reli-
able products such as the space industry and the aviation industry, it is required
to demonstrate that new products are ﬁt for purpose before they are accepted
for use. The framework for this demonstration process and the management of
its progress is referred to as a technology qualiﬁcation program (TQP). A well-
designed TQP is an aid in developing a desired product and reduces the likeli-
hood of ending up with a product that does not ﬁt the purpose [3, 16].
A qualiﬁcation process must be addressed prior to and in parallel with the
product development process. This means that an eﬃcient and practical qualiﬁ-
cation process needs to be based on an adequate product development model
In 2001, Det Norske Veritas (DNV) developed a recommended practice for
qualiﬁcation of new technology, called DNV-RP-A203. It is intended for the
subsea oil and gas industry, but its main principles can also be used in other ap-
plication areas. More recently, DNV issued a second edition of DNV-RP-A203
[23] based on the experiences gained from the application of the ﬁrst edition. The
main changes include support for the management of the TQP and an outline of
the iterative nature of the TQP work-ﬂow. An alternative qualiﬁcation procedure
based on technology readiness levels (TRLs) was introduced by NASA. TRL is
a metric or measurement system that is used to assess the development status
and the maturity of a speciﬁed technology or product [91]. The concepts readi-
ness and maturity are used interchangeably in the literature, and are discussed
thoroughly and compared by Tetlay and John [96].
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Some other existing TQPs in the literature are Andersen [3], Ardebili and
Pecht [8], Engel [26], API-RP-17N [7], NATO AVT-092 [59], SEMATECH [89],
which brieﬂy have been described in Section 1.1.4.
As part of the TQP, reliability analyses and predictions need to be conducted
from the early stages of the product development at various system levels and
degrees of detail, in order to evaluate, determine and improve the dependability
measures of an item [27]. Reliability prediction must to be performed in order
to:
• Identify potential design weaknesses
• Compare alternative design solutions, materials, etc.
• Determine early estimates of life-cycle costs
• Provide failure rates and other input parameters for system reliability and
availability assessments
• Establish requirements and objectives for reliability testing
Successful reliability prediction generally requires developing a reliability
model of the system considering its structure. The level of detail of the model
will depend on the level of design detail available at the time.
Most of the methods for reliability prediction for electronic equipment are
based on the parts count technique (prediction at reference condition) and the part
stress technique (prediction at operating condition) presented in MIL-HDBK-
217F [56] and similar approaches such as IEC 61709 [41], Telcordia SR332
[95], Siemens SN 29500 [90], FIDES [29].
For mechanical equipment regression-type models can be used. The most
commonly used models for reliability analysis fall into two categories [50]. The
ﬁrst category is called accelerated failure time models, and the second category
includes models from the proportional hazards family [48], which Section 1.1.5
brieﬂy describes them.
The reliability assessment will not end when the equipment enters the oper-
ating phase, but should be followed-up during the operational and maintenance
phases. When entering the operational phase, the conditions may not fully com-
ply with the assumptions made in the design and development phases. The in-
ﬂuencing factors need to be identiﬁed, monitored, handled and quantiﬁed. In
addition, the actual values of the predicted measures from the design phase have
to be updated accordingly.
The terms product, equipment, and technology are frequently used in this
thesis. Technology can be deﬁned as “the scientiﬁc study and use of applied
sciences, and the application of this to practical tasks in industry” or as “applica-
tion of knowledge to practical purposes” [23]. Equipment and product therefore
denote any physical technical items, components or systems.
This PhD thesis addresses this background and suggests new frameworks,
and methods that mainly can be used by researchers, reliability analysts, design
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engineers, and end users for their joint eﬀort in building and operating new sub-
sea systems.
The next sections brieﬂy describe important concepts regarding technology
classiﬁcation, qualiﬁcation, its approaches, commonly used qualiﬁcation pro-
cesses and prediction methods.
1.1.1 Classiﬁcation of technology
How detailed and comprehensive the TQP must be, depends on the level of new-
ness of the technology. Several classiﬁcation systems for the newness of technol-
ogy have been developed to assist in prioritizing TQP activities. Examples are
given in this section.
In the aerospace industry [99], new technology is deﬁned as that which (i)
has never been previously characterized, (ii) has limited space heritage, or (iii) is
commercial oﬀ-the-shelf technology (COTS).
In the DNV guideline [23], technology is new when it is not proven. Tech-
nology is said to be proven when it has a well-documented track record from
the actual environment and application. Such documentation must provide con-
ﬁdence in the technology from practical operations, with respect to the ability of
the technology to meet the speciﬁed requirements [23, 43].
The equipment to be qualiﬁed can be classiﬁed according to: (i) the newness
of the technology and (ii) the amount of experience from previous applications
of similar technology in the actual operational and environmental context. Based
on these factors, the DNV guideline [23] classiﬁes technology (and products)
in four categories with three levels for technological maturity and two levels
(proven and new) for the application area. The specialized DNV guideline [22]
distinguishes between three levels of application as listed in Table 1.1. This gives
nine diﬀerent combinations of maturity level and level of experience. These are
again classiﬁed in four degrees of newness:
1. No new technical uncertainties. This is the least demanding category, where
proven (i.e., well known) technology is used in a known application.
2. New technical uncertainties. This category has two subcategories:
a) Technology with a limited ﬁeld history (i.e., partly known) that is used
in a known application.
b) Proven (i.e., well known) technology that is used in a new application
for the company/user.
3. New technical challenges. This category has three subcategories:
a) New or unproven technology that is used in a known application.
b) Technology with a limited ﬁeld history (i.e., partly known) that is used
in a new application for the company/user.
c) Proven technology that is used for a new application for the whole in-
dustry.
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Table 1.1. The degree of newness of technology [22].
Level of technology maturity
Experience with the Limited ﬁeld history or not New or
operating condition Proven used by company/user unproven
Previous experience 1 2 3
No experience by company/user 2 3 4
No industry experience 3 4 4
4. Demanding new technical challenges. This is the most demanding category
where:
a) New or unproven technology is used in a new application both for the
company/user and the industry.
b) Technology with limited ﬁeld history that is used in a new application
for the industry.
This classiﬁcation applies to the totality of the applied technology as well as
to each of its parts, functions, and subsystems. It is used to highlight where care
must be taken due to limited ﬁeld history. Technology in category 1 is proven
technology where proven methods for qualiﬁcation, tests, calculations, and anal-
ysis can be used to document margins. Technology in categories 2 to 4 is deﬁned
as new technology, and must be qualiﬁed according to a qualiﬁcation procedure.
By distinguishing between 2, 3, and 4, it is possible to focus on the areas of
concern.
1.1.2 Qualiﬁcation
DNV [23] deﬁnes qualiﬁcation as “conﬁrmation by examination and provision
of evidence that the new technology meets the speciﬁed requirements for the in-
tended use.” A more goal-oriented deﬁnition is given by Hother and Hebert [35]
who state that TQP is a systematic process aiming to:
1. Reduce the risk and increase the probability of product success.
2. Ensure that the product is ﬁt for purpose before being put into operation.
The qualiﬁcation can, according to DNV-RP-A203 [23], be performed by the
producer, the customer/operator, or a third party. The TQP sets the scene for the
qualiﬁcation of a new technology and serves the following purposes:
• The producer, who oﬀers the new product/technology to the market, needs to
provide a proof of ﬁtness for purpose.
• The system integrator, who integrates the new technology into a larger sys-
tem, needs to evaluate the eﬀect on the total system reliability and to use as
input to the reliability assessment of a larger system.
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• The end-user of the new technology must optimize the beneﬁts of her invest-
ment through selection between competing products/technologies, and to use
as acceptance for implementation/start-up phase.
When we claim that a product is qualiﬁed, this should not be misunderstood
as a property of the product, rather it implies that according to the provided evi-
dence, our belief is that the product is ﬁt-for-purpose and can start its operational
phase.
Performance criteria for the product and/or the technologies must be speciﬁed
by the producer, regulatory bodies, or by the customer and may be related to
various reliability measures based on the time-to-failure probability distribution
and/or some deﬁned margins against speciﬁed failure modes (e.g., see [23, 38]).
1.1.3 Qualiﬁcation approaches
Qualiﬁcation of new technology can be performed from several perspectives as
described in the following.
Proactive versus reactive approach
Gerling et al. [32] study electronic products and distinguish between two diﬀer-
ent approaches for qualiﬁcation of new technology: a reactive and a proactive
approach. In the reactive approach, the close to ﬁnal product is examined as a
black box by comparing the product’s properties with speciﬁed requirements as
a ﬁnal inspection at the manufacturing site (or as incoming inspection by the
user). The approach is reactive in the sense that it adds an additional phase to
the development, and hardly diﬀerentiates in giving focus on those issues that
really need to be qualiﬁed. In this approach, reliability is mainly qualiﬁed by
means of stress-tests at elevated conditions. The objective is usually to test for
the existence of known failure modes that have been observed earlier in similar
products.
A proactive approach considers qualiﬁcation as an integrated part of the de-
sign and development with early involvement in this process. In this approach,
technology and design properties common to all products or product elements
are identiﬁed and results gained on similar products are considered.
Qualiﬁcation by analysis versus qualiﬁcation by testing
The analytical approach is a proactive approach without testing, and has, accord-
ing to Sunde [94], the following key features:
• Reliability and quality assessments are part of every phase of the product
development process.
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• Development of reliability models covering degradation is done in parallel or
prior to the product development.
• Reliability and development data are used to demonstrate the qualiﬁcation of
the product.
• Qualiﬁcation plans and their assessment are explicitly based on requirements
from customers (this mainly applies for specialized, custom-built products)
The main reason for this type of qualiﬁcation is the need to reduce the time
and cost associated with the design and development of new products as high-
lighted and exempliﬁed by the NATO report Qualiﬁcation by analysis [59].
Qualiﬁcation solely by analytical methods may not be appropriate to verify
the reliability and safety of products in high-risk industries such as nuclear power
plants and oﬀshore oil and gas platforms. For these industries, it may be more
relevant to qualify products on the basis of analysis combined with testing, and
by using historical data from tests and ﬁeld service.
IEC 61508 [43], also distinguishes between functional requirements and reli-
ability (i.e., safety integrity) requirements. Both these requirements should met,
for the equipment to be qualiﬁed, and qualiﬁcation of the functional aspects,
mainly relies on the physical testing (in a relevant environment).
The experimental approach typically involves testing under deﬁned condi-
tions on the test site, and sometimes also ﬁeld testing. Tripsas and Johnson [101]
study electronic devices and claim that the most eﬃcient way in qualiﬁcation for
such products is with statistically designed experiments.
While the experimental approach does have certain advantages, such as ease
of application and comparable data sets for diﬀerent products and technologies,
the disadvantages are becoming more apparent [72]. Some limitations of the
experimental approach are:
• Increasing eﬀorts related to stress-testing of complex products.
• Questionable deﬁnition of the resulting internal stress levels for complex
products.
• Excessive testing time required for high-reliability products.
• Sample size inconsistent with reliability targets.
• Complicated and time-consuming root cause analysis of products in case of
failures.
• Risk to overlook new failure mechanisms.
• Reliability results generated at the end of the development process.
Pecht [70] argues that the TQP should not be based solely on testing and it
depends on the risk level, various risk-reducing factors, the ability or inability
to test large one-of-a-kind systems, operational environment, and regulatory re-
quirements. Therefore, a combination of analytical methods with experiments is
recommended. The main advantages and disadvantages of analytical and exper-
imental qualiﬁcation are discussed in NATO AVT-092 [59].
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Physical versus actuarial approach
In the physical approach, the focus is on analyzing the physical phenomena re-
lated to the strength of the item and the loads applied to it. It is mainly used
for analysis of structural elements. Loads and strengths are modeled as random
variables, and failure takes place when the load exceeds the strength [18].
In the actuarial approach (also called statistical approach), the explicit loads
and strengths are of little interest. Instead, it pays attention to the eﬀects of the
interaction between the physical variables [83]. Here, the reliability is expressed
in terms of a probability distribution for the time-to-failure, which is often se-
lected based on the properties of the failure rate function. For multi-component
systems, the actuarial approach is usually the most appropriate approach.
A combination of statistical methods based on physical analysis will be ap-
propriate for many new products or technologies.
1.1.4 Qualiﬁcation guidelines
Several qualiﬁcation processes are described in the literature.
NATO AVT-092 [59] presents a qualiﬁcation process for military aircrafts
aiming at reducing the time and cost of their production. This is achieved by
increasing the use of analyses, integration of tools, and by ﬁnding a balance
between analysis and testing, in all design and development phases. It is also
claimed that this may improve the quality of the ﬁnal product.
Blanchard [13] gives a generic description of the qualiﬁcation process and
describes a categorization of tests that are typically performed in the diﬀerent
development stages.
The guideline by Andersen [3] is tailor-made for oil and gas well technol-
ogy and describes how to perform the qualiﬁcation as a parallel activity with the
product development process. This guideline also describes how qualiﬁcation ac-
tivities can be linked to traditional product development activities. The guideline
further discusses operational readiness and gives requirements for manufactur-
ing and operational planning [19].
SEMATECH [89] provides a qualiﬁcation guideline intended to be used by
producers and users of semiconductor equipment. It is based on a continuous im-
provement process referred to as the reliability improvement process. The guide-
line has three parts: (1) the equipment lifecycle and the reliability improvement
process; (2) the management responsibilities for establishing and implementing
the process, including the various activities associated with each step of the re-
liability improvement process and each phase of the lifecycle; and (3) activities
and tools used in applying the reliability improvement process. The reliability
activities are classiﬁed as engineering, data-related, and testing. Many activities
require tools coming from various disciplines, such as probability, statistics, and
reliability engineering.
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API-RP-17N [7] presents a structured approach which aims to help opera-
tors, contractors, and suppliers to gain a better understanding of how to obtain
and manage an appropriate level of reliability throughout the lifecycle of subsea
oil and gas projects. The approach is based on the same twelve key reliability pro-
cesses that are used in ISO 20815 [45] for production assurance and reliability
management. The focus of API-RP-17N is project execution, which is described
as a number of integrated reliability and technical risk management activities
that are derived from the key reliability processes. These activities are arranged
into a cycle of four basic steps: deﬁne, plan, implement, and feedback. These are
applied during each project stage and also for each reliability assessment.
Ardebili and Pecht [8] divide the qualiﬁcation process for mass-produced
electronic products into three stages: (i) virtual qualiﬁcation, (ii) product quali-
ﬁcation, and (iii) mass production qualiﬁcation. Virtual qualiﬁcation, also called
design qualiﬁcation, is the evaluation of the functional and reliability perfor-
mance of the product design without any physical testing of the product. Prod-
uct qualiﬁcation is the evaluation of the product based on physical testing of
manufactured prototypes. Product qualiﬁcation tests are often performed under
accelerated stress conditions (known as accelerated testing [24, 62]) and verify
whether the product has met or exceeded its intended quality and reliability re-
quirements. After virtual and product qualiﬁcation, the electronic packages are
mass-produced. During and after the manufacturing process, the products are in-
spected and tested to evaluate their quality and defective parts are screened out.
This process is referred to as quality assurance testing or screening.
Engel [26] presents a comprehensive set of veriﬁcation, validation and testing
activities and methods for implementation throughout the entire life cycle of
products. The approaches are based on a generic product life cycle model that
extends the well-established V-model [55] that portrays project evolution during
the development portion of the product life cycle.
Grady [33] presents the steps and procedures needed to implement a quality
check of the product being proposed based on the V-model. The approach can be
applied to high rate production, low volume - high cost production, and one of a
kind production.
The DNV guideline [23] deﬁnes a set of activities that should be iterated
through the three stages: (a) concept evaluation, (b) pre-engineering, and (c) de-
tailed engineering. Each stage should to be successfully concluded before going
on to the next stage. The activities are illustrated in Fig. 1.1.
The qualiﬁcation basis must, according to Sunde [94], comprise all the steps
in the process, with deliverables, methods, responsible people, schedule, man-
hours, and cost. It must further take into consideration the qualiﬁcation limita-
tions, the functional requirements, the product and environmental characteristics,
and the product reliability requirements [23].
Qualiﬁcation methods must be selected to ensure that all potential failure
modes are identiﬁed and addressed in a satisfactory manner, so that the margins
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Fig. 1.1. The DNV qualiﬁcation process.
to failure are documented and the reliability of the product can be proven. The
most commonly applied qualitative methods are FMECA [39], HAZOP [42], and
fault tree analysis [40]. Other qualitative methods are also available and most of
them are presented in Rausand and Hoyland [83].
Some companies in the oil and gas industry, for example, FMC Kongsberg
Subsea AS, have developed their own tailor-made TQP based on the DNV-RP-
A203. The FMC procedure introduces several improvements concerning both
the speciﬁcation of requirements to which the technology is to be qualiﬁed, and
a ﬂow diagram to ensure that the process is carried out in a structured way. The
main activities of the FMC procedure are described by Sunde [94].
The FMC procedure has the potential for signiﬁcant cost saving, since the
qualiﬁcation process is more streamlined and eﬃcient with reduced requirements
for physical testing—such that tests are only performed when strictly necessary.
Potential deﬁciencies and malfunctions should be revealed during the design and
qualiﬁcation phases, such that the number of in-service failures is reduced. This
is particularly important for subsea oil and gas production systems that are not
accessible for normal maintenance and repair, other than through high-cost ves-
sel operation.
Another commonly used qualiﬁcation process is based on the TRL method.
The TRL method was introduced in the late 1980s by NASA, and has been used
routinely since the early 1990s within the NASA organization [54]. The levels are
developed as part of an overall risk assessment process, to support the assessment
of a particular product and provide a consistent comparison of maturity between
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Table 1.2. Deﬁnition of the TRLs.
TRL Deﬁnitions
0 Basic principles observed and reported
1 Technology concept and/or application formulated
2 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof of concept
3 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
5 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment
6 System prototype demonstration in an operational environment
7 Actual system completed and "ﬂight qualiﬁed" through test and demonstration
8 Actual system “ﬂight proven” through successful mission operations
Source: U.S. Department of Defense [103]
diﬀerent products. In 1999, the TRL method was adopted by the U.S. Department
of Defense and by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory [91].
The TRL method is a systematic metric/measurement system that supports
assessment of a particular technology/product and a consistent comparison of
maturity between diﬀerent types of technologies/products.
The Subsea Processing Community (SPC) adopted and modiﬁed the TRL
method to make it applicable for equipment used in subsea production systems.
Since then, the TRL method has been used to determine the qualiﬁcation status
for several new technologies/products. The TRL assessment may be carried out
in two diﬀerent ways:
• As a continuous evaluation of the qualiﬁcation status of the project.
• As a methodology to assess the qualiﬁcation status before the project is going
to the next phase in the development process.
The TRL method has nine levels (TRLs), ranging from zero to eight. TRL 0 is
the lowest level of product maturity, while TRL 8 represents the proven product.
These TRLs are determined by tangible evidence identiﬁed during the product
development. Obviously, the tests at each level have to be successful to claim
that a level is reached [12]. A summary of the TRLs is given in Table 1.2.
A more comprehensive readiness assessment should move from an individ-
ual technology context to a system context, where interplays between multiple
technologies are also involved. The concepts of system readiness level (SRL)
and system maturity have been introduced and discussed in [86, 87]. The SRL
approach deﬁnes nine maturity steps from user requirements to system valida-
tion. Each of the SRL steps aligns to key outputs across a set of systems disci-
plines, such as training, safety and environmental, or reliability and maintainabil-
ity. SRLs are given scores between 1 and 9, demonstrating the project’s progress
against the systems engineering V-diagram [5].
Tetlay and John [96] deﬁne “system maturity” as veriﬁcation within an itera-
tive process of the system development lifecycle and focus on the design maturity
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of a system. The system is only veriﬁed against the system requirements if it is
successfully implemented as intended by the design.
Technical performance measurement (TPM) is another concept within this
area that determines how well the system or system element is satisfying speci-
ﬁed requirements [85].
In some of the qualiﬁcation procedure such as API-RP-17N [7], Engel
[26], IEC 60300-3-15 [37], SEMATECH [89], the qualiﬁcation tasks and the
tasks during the product design and development phases are merged. In other
qualiﬁcation procedures (e.g., DNV-RP-A203 [23], Smith and Simpson [91])
the evaluation tasks are speciﬁed and may be carried out independently of the
producer’s design and development tasks.
1.1.5 Reliability prediction
System reliability requirements can be expressed with quantitative measures,
such as the failure rate, the survivor probability, and the mean time to failure
(MTTF) [38]. In the oil and gas industry, reliability data are collected and pub-
lished through the Oﬀshore reliability data (OREDA) handbook [68].
The failure rate of mechanical products is often assumed to be bathtub-
shaped as illustrated in Fig. 1.2, consisting of three distinct periods [83]:
(i) Burn-in period with a decreasing failure rate,
(ii) Useful life period with a nearly constant failure rate,
(iii) Wear-out period with an increasing failure rate.
Many of the items covered in OREDA are subject to some maintenance or
replacement policy. The items will therefore often be replaced or refurbished be-
fore they reach the wear-out phase. The main part of the failure events in OREDA
database will therefore come from the useful life phase, where the failure rate is
close to constant. All the failure rate estimates presented in OREDA are therefore
based on the assumption that the failure rate function is constant and independent
of time, in which case the failure rates are assumed to be exponential distributed
with parameter λ [68].
In this thesis, we also make the same simpliﬁcation for failure rate for use
during the design and development of the subsea system, and denote this by
λ(S ). Burn-in phase and wear-out phase is not considered in the analysis, so the
analysis assumes that the failure rate follows the “useful life phase”. But the
failure rate may in average be somewhat higher, since documented failures in
the burn-in phase and wear-out phase is included in the experience data. The
corresponding survivor function is R(S )(t) = exp(−λ(S )t) and the mean time to
failure is MTTF(S ) = 1/λ(S ).
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Table 1.3. Commonly used reliability prediction guidelines for electronic items.
Reliability prediction
guideline
Description
MIL-HDBK-217F [56] Contains two prediction methods, parts count and parts stress
technique, limited to ambient temperatures between 0◦C and
125◦C.
Telcordia SR332 [95] Is based on the principles of MIL-HDBK-217F and reﬂects Bell-
core ﬁeld experiences, limited to ambient temperatures between
30◦C and 65◦C
IEC 61709 [41] Presents stress models and values as a basis for conversion of the
failure rate data from reference conditions to the actual operating
conditions.
Siemens SN 28500 [90] Is based on IEC 61709 concept and provides frequently updated
failure rate data at reference conditions.
FIDES [29] Is based on physics of failure and is supported by analysis of test
data, ﬁeld returns, and existing modeling.
Reliability prediction methods
Several models and methods for reliability prediction have been proposed in the
literature. For electronic equipment, reliability prediction is well established and
is often based on the parts count technique (prediction at reference condition)
and the part stress technique (prediction at operating condition) in MIL-HDBK-
217F [56] and similar approaches [41, 95, 90, 29]. Table 1.3 summarizes a num-
ber of approaches that have been commonly used for electronic items.
For mechanical and electro-mechanical equipment, there is no generally ac-
cepted method for reliability prediction. This may be due to the higher number
of, and more complex failure mechanisms. Several studies have shown that the
reliability of mechanical equipment is sensitive to loading, operating mode, and
utilization rate [63, 31].
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Foucher et al. [31] classify the reliability prediction methods into three cate-
gories: (1) bottom-up statistical methods, (2) top-down similarity analysis meth-
ods based on an external failure database, and (3) bottom-up physics-of-failure
methods. The ﬁrst two categories are based on statistical analysis of failure data,
while the last category is based on physics-of-failure models. Foucher et al. [31]
compare these methods and conclude that the best prediction is achieved by a
combination of diﬀerent methods, depending on the phase of the system’s life-
cycle and objectives and assumptions of the manufacturer or the customer.
Most reliability data sources assume that the items have constant failure rates
and that failures in a population of identical items occur according to a homo-
geneous Poisson process (HPP) where the time t is the accumulated time in ser-
vice. Design variations and operational and environmental conditions may be
accounted for by including covariates into the model. In some application ar-
eas (including the subsea oil and gas industry), the covariates are sometimes
referred to as reliability-inﬂuencing factors (RIFs). A RIF is a relatively stable
condition, which by being changed will increase or reduce the failure rate of the
item. Ascher & Feingold [9] list 18 RIFs that inﬂuence the failure behavior of
a repairable system. NSWC-11 [63] considers the eﬀects of the environmental
RIFs at the lowest part level of mechanical systems.
To obtain application-speciﬁc failure rate estimates, various models have
been suggested [4], such as the proportional hazards (PH) model [20] and the ac-
celerated failure time model [28, 51] where the RIFs are included as covariates.
A RIF may be a continuous variable, a discrete variable taking several values, or
a binary variable.
The most commonly used models for failure rate prediction are; proportional
hazards (PH) models, and accelerated failure time (AFT) models [50]. In a PH-
model, the actual, application-speciﬁc failure rate is determined by multiplying a
baseline failure rate by a positive function of the covariates (RIFs). The approach
in MIL-HDBK-217F [56] is a special and simple case of a PH-model, where the
predicted failure rate λ is given by λ = λ0 × π1 × π2 · · · , where λ0 is the baseline
failure rate that is determined for normal (speciﬁed) conditions and the factors
π1, π2, . . . are the covariates that are used to adjust the baseline failure rate to the
actual temperature, humidity, and so on. The numerical values of π1, π2, . . . are
given in MIL-HDBK-217F.
The covariates do not change the baseline failure rate (or the form of the
failure rate function in the more general case), but rather change its scale
by multiplying the baseline failure rate with a factor that is determined by
the covariates. The most common functional form is the Cox PH-model λ =
λ0 exp
(∑n
i=1 βi xi
)
, where x1, x2, . . . , xn are the covariates (or functions of covari-
ates) and β1, β2, . . . , βn are parameters that have to be estimated. The Cox PH-
model is easy to use since we, by taking logarithms, obtain a linear regression
model [20].
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The AFT-model assumes that the eﬀect of a covariate is to multiply the time
by some constant, such that the time runs faster or slower. The AFT-model can
be used together with parametric life models such as the exponential [28, 51],
Weibull, log-normal, and extreme value distributions [49]. Under an accelerated
failure time model, the covariates are assumed to be constant and multiplicative
on the time scale, that is, the covariate impacts on survival by a constant factor
(acceleration factor).
The BORA approach [105] and the approach suggested by Brissaud et al.
[17] are both based on a PH-model. The BORA project is concerned with re-
liability assessment of safety barriers on oﬀshore oil and gas installations, and
is based on a set of generic RIFs related to human and organizational factors.
The RIFs to be used for the speciﬁc assessment are selected by expert judgment
from the set of generic RIFs. The state of each RIF is classiﬁed into one out of
six possible states and a scoring and weighing process is used to determine the
eﬀect of each RIF.
The approach by Brissaud et al. [17] is based on a set of RIFs that are clas-
siﬁed according to life-cycle phases. The estimation of the application-speciﬁc
failure rate is comparable to the approach in MIL-HDBK-217F [56], but the de-
termination of the multiplicative factors is done in another way by a scoring and
weighing procedure.
1.2 Challenges and questions
Based on a thorough literature review of both academical studies and published
technical reports by industrial organizations and companies, overall challenges
have been divided into three main categories:
1. Challenges regarding TQPs: evaluation, key features, challenges, improve-
ments, new developments.
2. Challenges regarding Reliability/failure rate: prediction methods, new en-
vironment, new system, using available ﬁeld data, follow-up in operational
phase, continuous improvement, new developments.
3. Challenges regarding CCFs as threat to reliability: identiﬁcation of main
inﬂuencing factors, monitoring and handling the inﬂuencing factors, quan-
tiﬁcation, suggestions, new developments.
More speciﬁcally, the following speciﬁc challenges related to the qualiﬁcation
and reliability assessments have been identiﬁed.
1.2.1 TQP for new subsea systems
For new products, and known products based on new technology with high-
reliability requirements, it is necessary to assure that they have the required
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quality and reliability before they are put into operation. The operator will usu-
ally specify strict reliability requirements for the new system and require the
supplier to follow an agreed TQP during the design, development, and manufac-
turing phases of the system. The purpose of such requirement is to reduce the
uncertainty and the risk associated with the use of the new equipment.
Several TQP approaches have been proposed, but no approach has yet been
generally accepted within the subsea industry.
Currently, some producers in the oil and gas industry who use these ap-
proaches encounter diﬃculties, and they try to overcome them by merging seem-
ingly attractive features from diﬀerent TQP approaches to their own products,
but this has not always given a practical and cost-eﬃcient approach. The main
challenges regarding currently used TQPs are required to be highlighted and re-
duced.
Relevant research questions to address are therefore:
• What are the main features and common challenges of the currently used
TQPs?
• How can the identiﬁed challenges be considered and rectiﬁed?
• What is the most suitable TQP for the subsea industry?
• What criteria should be used to judge the suitability?
1.2.2 Reliability prediction of a new subsea system
As mentioned in Section 1.1, as part of the TQP, reliability analyses and predic-
tions are performed from the early stages of the product development process.
There are several approaches for predicting the reliability.
Obtaining a point value for the reliability, is not the single purpose of such
an analysis. The analysis should help designers to compare alternative designs,
identify potential design weaknesses and give advice on how the design can be
improved. Such improvements may be related to physical design changes, estab-
lishing requirements and objectives for reliability testing, and so on. An impor-
tant objective of reliability analysis is therefore to provide a decision basis which
is possible to comprehend by design engineers [53].
To predict the reliability of an equipment, the industry usually tries to use
the ﬁeld data as much as possible. For subsea equipment there are not much
data available. Most of the new subsea systems are adapted from similar, well
known topside (i.e., on the platform) systems. Reliability information for topside
systems is available from OREDA [68]. This information cannot be used directly
for new subsea systems, because their designs have been modiﬁed and there
are diﬀerent environmental stresses, and diﬀerent maintenance. The reliability
information in OREDA [68] is presented as a constant failure rate, together with
additional information related to failure modes, failure descriptors/mechanisms,
and components that contributed to the system failures.
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Fig. 1.3. Main parts of a SIS.
Currently, no practical method is available that can be used to extrapolate the
available reliability data from similar and known systems and come up with a
failure rate prediction for new systems operating in a diﬀerent environment.
Relevant research questions to address are therefore:
• What kind of reliability modeling and calculation approaches are suitable for
complex subsea systems?
• How can a more realistic reliability prediction be achieved for new subsea
technologies where no ﬁeld data are available?
• How can ﬁeld data from similar topside systems be used to predict the pre-
liminary failure rate of new subsea systems?
1.2.3 HOFs inﬂuencing CCFs in the operational phase
Safety-instrumented systems (SISs) are used in the subsea industry and many
other industrial sectors to detect hazardous events and prevent such events from
developing into accidents. The main parts of a SIS are illustrated in Fig. 1.3. One
SIS application is the high integrity pressure protection system (HIPPS) which
is installed on a subsea oil/gas pipeline to avoid loss of containment and prevent
over-pressure [93].
SISs like other subsea systems have high reliability requirement. Redundancy
is often introduced to improve the reliability of SISs, but it is well known that
common cause failures (CCFs) may violate the intended reliability gain [92].
During the operational phase of SIS, the hardware architecture and the com-
ponents will usually remain unchanged unless there is a call for modiﬁcation
(modiﬁcations are not quite relevant for subsea system, since interventions are
avoided). Therefore, any changes in CCF might be as a result of factors including
environmental exposure or human and organizational acts. A number of studies
have also shown that CCFs are generally inﬂuenced by a range of human and
organizational factors (HOFs) [88, 66, 61, 60].
The most commonly used CCF-model for SISs is the beta-factor model [30].
This model has also been highlighted and described in IEC 61508 [43]. Due to
the lack of data, most of the methods for predicting the beta-factor are based on
checklists [36, 46, 43]. In the process industry, the approach described in part 6
of IEC 61508 [43] is dominating and is therefore used in this research.
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These checklists, however, mainly focus on technical issues, rather than
human-related issues. In the checklist questions in IEC 61508, only about 20%
of the questions concern human and organizational factors. Such a low focus on
human and organizational factors is not in line with the lessons learnt from the
ICDE project [79]. Several studies have shown that HOFs are among the main
factors inﬂuencing β, but the estimation procedures do have not enough attention
to the eﬀects of HOFs.
In the design phase, the beta-factor is predicted (denoted βP) based on sev-
eral assumptions about the conditions in the operational phase. When entering
the operational phase, these conditions may not fully comply with the assump-
tions made in the design phase. The actual beta-factor in the operational phase
(denoted βA) may therefore be diﬀerent from the predicted βP, and this diﬀerence
may cause the required reliability to not meet the required SIL.
The events that lead to CCFs may be introduced both during the design and
the operational phase. For design, checklists have been developed to ensure that
measures are taken to reveal and avoid introducing CCFs. It seems such tools
and checklists be missing in the operational phase.
In addition, the SIS end-user needs to have enough awareness about the ef-
fects of the HOFs in order to manage them such that the actual beta-factor does
not exceed the acceptable limit that are determined by the required SIL.
There are not enough procedures and work practices for monitoring and con-
trolling reliability inﬂuencing factors in order to maintain the reliability as pre-
dicted. Insuﬃcient attempt regarding monitoring and controlling the HOFs re-
lated CCF in the operational phase.
Relevant research questions to address is therefore:
• How to highlight the importance of HOFs inﬂuencing CCFs in the opera-
tional phase?
• How can HOFs be incorporated into the β-factor model?
• How can HOFs be monitored and handled during the operation and mainte-
nance phases?
1.2.4 Non-constant failure rate of mechanical products
The producer needs to predict the failure rate of new products as input to
decision-making related to design options, requirements for testing, and so on.
Failure rate predictions will be used to evaluate the need for environmental con-
trols, introducing redundancy, or trading oﬀ other reliability enhancing tech-
niques against cost, space or volume, and other resource limitations [84]. The
user/operator of the product also needs to predict/update the failure rate to fulﬁll
the requirement and to get a realistic understanding of the performability of the
product in the operational phase.
Design weaknesses should be identiﬁed and improvements should be made
as early as possible in the product life cycle. If ﬂaws are revealed and corrected in
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the early design phase, their consequences are much less signiﬁcant than having
to redesign after clients discover the problems. The need for failure rate predic-
tion in various phases of product’s life cycle should be clariﬁed.
Mechanical products like subsea system may deteriorate with time, due to
wear, fatigue, or other stress-related mechanisms, and their reliability can not
always be modeled assuming constant failure rates. What constitutes a failure of
a mechanical product depends on its application. Lack of a clear deﬁnition of a
failure delimits the usefulness of the reliability data available [63]. This usually
has been neglected by producers and end users.
Most of the failure rate prediction methods are based on analyses of ﬁeld
data, which are used to estimate parameters of life distributions reﬂecting deteri-
oration characteristics [100]. Failure rate predictions in design and development
have to be based on assumptions about the operational and environmental condi-
tions the product will be exposed to in actual operation. In real life applications,
however, these conditions are not constant, the product has to adapt to diﬀerent
conditions, and this has a direct impact on its reliability in the operational phase
– which is also called the actual reliability. Most of the reliability methods are not
well adapted to estimating system reliability under non-uniform and dynamic op-
eration and maintenance conditions. Several reliability prediction methods have
been developed for electronic components, but none of these can directly be ap-
plied for mechanical products.
The non-constant failure rate of mechanical items like subsea equipment
needs to be highlighted and guidances on how to take that into account in the
failure rate prediction during the product operational phase should be provided.
Relevant research questions to address are therefore:
• Why is failure rate prediction needed in diﬀerent phases of product life cycle?
• How can we take the non-constant failure rate into account and what are the
challenges in this regards?
• How can failure rate prediction of subsea system in operational phase be
more realistic?
1.2.5 Reliability prediction in a new environment (Arctic)
The oﬀshore oil and gas industry is currently exploring new areas in the southern
part of the Arctic and is contemplating moving even further to the North. The
boundaries of the Arctic region have several deﬁnitions [102]. In principle the
Arctic is deﬁned as the region north of the Polar Circle. In other words Arctic is
a region located at the northern-most part of the Earth (latitude 66 ◦ 30’ north).
Several arctic characteristics inﬂuence the reliability of the equipment oper-
ated in such an environment. To understand this inﬂuence is of vital importance
to ensure the reliability of the equipment and the production availability of the
systems.
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The arctic environment, however, represents a new challenge for much of
the equipment and further research is often required before the equipment is
qualiﬁed for use.
To consider this fact, the producer needs to identify quality problems and
potential failures early in the development process to be able to implement im-
provements in a cost-eﬀective way. Among the reliability prediction methods,
the proportional hazard model (e.g. Cox model [20]) is an important supplement
to the traditional tools for reliability analysis, as it provides the opportunity for
incorporating the eﬀect of factors inﬂuencing reliability. However, the industry
seems to lack a common approach to how ﬁeld data can be utilized for reliability
prediction.
Relevant research questions to address are therefore:
• What environmental factors inﬂuence the reliability of equipment?
• Which methods can be used to address the inﬂuencing factors for reliability
prediction?
• How the level of data availability inﬂuence the reliability prediction?
1.2.6 Reliability improvement during the product life cycle
There is no magical trick that can be used to develop reliable products overnight
nor is there a single technique that can optimize the reliability in a short period
of time. The success lies in conscious, systematic eﬀorts conducted all over the
design and development process of the product.
The reliability improvement process will reveal deﬁciencies caused by the
design, manufacturing process, and/or operation and correct/remove these deﬁ-
ciencies instead of during operation. It is also cost-beneﬁcial over the product
life-cycle, since it reduces maintenance and spares [98].
Reliability improvement process takes time and a commitment to change and
continuous development seems to be required. It must be an inseparable part of
the design and development process strategies. The implementation of a reliabil-
ity improvement process should start by carefully including reliability into the
subsea system requirements. It will inﬂuence the design process and the way re-
liability is managed during the design and manufacturing in the subsea industry.
It will also inﬂuence the way systems are selected with increased emphasis on a
supplier’s reliability management capability [14].
Subsea producers and system integrators still seem to lack guidance on what
reliability activities and how they have to consider within their current work
processes, tools, and procedures.
A relevant research question to address is therefore:
• How can reliability improvement be continuously achieved through a product
development model?
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1.3 Objectives
The main objective of this PhD Project is:
“to develop systematic approaches that contribute to the reliability qualiﬁca-
tion of new subsea equipment and to the following-up of reliability in the opera-
tional phase”
However, the main focus of the thesis is on the reliability qualiﬁcation of
new subsea equipment in order to assure that the equipment has an acceptable
maturity level, while the following-up of reliability in the operational phase is
treated more brieﬂy.
Based on the main objective and the research challenges, the more speciﬁc
objectives are:
1. Discuss and review the main approaches regarding technology readiness,
veriﬁcation and validation, and reliability prediction.
2. Propose a qualiﬁcation framework considering the best features and reducing
the challenges within the currently used qualiﬁcation processes such as DNV
guideline [23], technology readiness assessment (TRA) and so on.
3. Identify the key factors that inﬂuence the reliability of new subsea equipment
in their application area, and determine how the eﬀects of these factors can
be included in the calculations.
4. Propose a practical approach for prediction of reliability of new subsea sys-
tems by using the available ﬁeld data from similar, known systems from the
topside environment.
5. Consider the non-constant characteristics of the failure rate of subsea sys-
tems and propose an updating framework for failure rate prediction for use
during the operational phase.
6. Demonstrate how the eﬀects of human and organizational factors on com-
mon cause failure factors, and indirectly on reliability measures can seriously
lead to drift out of its required reliability value, and improve the awareness,
understanding, and controlling of HOFs during the operational phase.
The aim in this thesis is contributing to the research challenges to fulﬁll the
speciﬁc objectives and therefore the main objective.
1.4 Delimitations
The main focus of this PhD project is on new technologies developed by the oil
and gas industry (subsea and oﬀshore), and therefore more practical examples,
terms, and concepts come from this industry sector.
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An assumption that is considered in my research and also applies to the most
of subsea systems in the oil and gas industry, is that the new subsea systems
are developed from similar topside oﬀshore systems, and “marinized” of topside
technology.
The production constraints of the oil and gas equipment, makes it impossible
to perform operational testing of a complete product prototype in a real environ-
ment. Therefore, simulations are used in order to test the virtual product. How-
ever, some operational testing may still be performed under similar operational
conditions.
Reliability qualiﬁcation of new technologies does not usually take the sen-
sitivity of the environment in which the technology operates in it, into account.
Thus, tasks such as measuring the eﬀects of the technology on the environment,
avoidance of creation of polluting substances, and reduction of the risk to the ma-
rine environment are not the purposes of reliability qualiﬁcation and not within
the scope of this thesis. However, reliability qualiﬁcation indirectly considers en-
vironmental issues since its purpose is to assure that the technology does not fail
and to have least consequences i.e. hydrocarbon leakage to the environment.
The eﬀects of environmental factors such as pressure, temperature, and so
on are necessary to be considered and analyzed on the reliability of technology.
However tasks such as improving the layout or design of facilities to cope with
these factors are not considered in this thesis.
Some conﬂicting requirements related to the environment, and design of
equipment are also relevant to reliability, maintenance and intervention and
should be addressed and resolved. It is important that the installed system is
able to survive this period without failure.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The thesis has two main parts; Part I Main report and Part II Articles. A list of
abbreviations is provided at the end of the thesis.
Part I gives a brief introduction to the topics covered by the thesis, a pre-
sentation of research challenges, objectives, description of the research methods
applied, the main results, and ideas for areas of further research. This part com-
bines the main content of the publications found in Part II into a totality that
serves to fulﬁll the objectives of the thesis. Additional details are found in the
articles in Part II.
Part II includes the articles that have been submitted, published, or presented
during the PhD project, in international journals, in conference proceedings, in
conferences. This thesis includes the following publications:
• Article 1:
Rahimi, M. and Rausand, M. (2013), Technology qualiﬁcation integrated
with product development, Journal of Quality Engineering (in review)
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• Article 2:
Rahimi, M. and Rausand, M. (2013), Prediction of failure rates for new sub-
sea systems: A practical approach and an illustrative example, Journal of Risk
and Reliability,
(Available online:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748006X13492954)
• Article 3:
Rahimi, M. and Rausand, M. (2013), Monitoring human and organizational
factors inﬂuencing common-cause failures of safety-instrumented system
during the operational phase, Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
(Available online:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2013.03.004)
• Article 4:
Rahimi, M. and Rausand, M. (2012), Failure rate prediction in various life
cycle phases: A framework for updating. In International Conference on In-
dustrial Engineering and Engineering Management: Proceedings of the 2012
IEEE, IEEE conference proceedings 2012, pp. 762-766.
• Article 5:
Rahimi, M., Rausand, M. and Wu, S. (2011), Reliability prediction of oﬀ-
shore oil and gas equipment for use in an arctic environment. In Proceedings
of 2011 International Conference on Quality, Reliability, Risk, Maintenance,
and Safety Engineering, IEEE Press 2011, pp. 81-86.
• Article 6:
Rahimi, M., Rausand, M. and Lundteigen, M.A. (2011), Management of fac-
tors that inﬂuence common cause failures of safety instrumented system in
the operational phase. In Advances in Safety, Reliability and Risk Manage-
ment - proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference, ES-
REL 2011. CRC Press 2012, pp. 2036-2044.
• Article 7:
Rahimi, M. and Rausand, M. (2013), Continuous reliability improvement of
subsea equipment, In Proceedings of 26th International Congress of Con-
dition Monitoring and Diagnostic Engineering Management, KP-Media Oy
2013, pp. 426-433.
• Article 8:
Rahimi, M. and Rausand, M. (2013), Qualiﬁcation of new technology: Ap-
proaches, challenges, and improvements, In Proceedings of 26th Interna-
tional Congress of Condition Monitoring and Diagnostic Engineering Man-
agement, KP-Media Oy 2013, pp. 381-388.
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This chapter considers the aspects of the research design process that were ap-
plied during this research project, including the research method, and the selected
research approach.
2.1 Research approach
Diﬀerent types of research approaches can be found in the literature [106, 65,
47]. However according to OECD [65] we may distinguish between three types
of research approach based on the intended use:
a) Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to
acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and
observable facts, without any particular application or use in view.
b) Applied research is original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new
knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a speciﬁc practical aim
or objective.
c) Oriented basic research is research carried out with the expectation of pro-
ducing a wide range of knowledge. This form the background to the solution
of recognized or expected, current or future problems or possibilities.
While the main purpose of basic and oriented basic research is to acquire new
knowledge, the main purpose of applied research is to solve a particular problem.
The research performed in this PhD project can be classiﬁed as oriented ba-
sic research, since its focus is mainly on the development of new frameworks
and methods for fulﬁlling the current needs, and forming the basis for further
research and aiming to meet the needs of the future.
Many of the scientiﬁc studies in the ﬁeld of reliability and safety engineering
are related to the development of models, methods, and frameworks for reliabil-
ity and safety analysis. As this research focuses on oil and gas industry, it aims
to develop new frameworks and methods meant for practical applications in this
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industry. The new models, frameworks, and methods have been developed based
on the existing literature within qualiﬁcation and reliability assessment.
In this context, veriﬁcation and evaluation can be problematic because per-
forming experiments or empirical veriﬁcation like classic natural science is not
often possible. From a classical point of view, the usefulness of models should
be empirically veriﬁed, for example, by experiments or by collecting ﬁeld data.
Empirical veriﬁcation may be impossible in the reliability and safety engineer-
ing ﬁeld, where we deal with analyzing and modeling of unexpected events such
as failures, accidents and catastrophes. These events occur infrequently. In addi-
tion, the analyzed objects especially in subsea industry are often one-of-a kind
or customized and have expensive constructions with a long lifetime. It is very
costly and time-consuming to carry out experiments and collect data to conﬁrm
the models and modeling results. Thus, the evaluation and veriﬁcation of the sci-
entiﬁc work and the models must be done by approaches other than empirical or
experimental methods.
Launching the Model Evaluation Group in 1992 [71] was an attempt to over-
come this problem. The group suggested a model evaluation process, consisting
of the following three main elements: scientiﬁc assessment, veriﬁcation, and val-
idation. The scientiﬁc assessment should include a comprehensive description
of the model, an evaluation of the scientiﬁc content, limits of applicability, ad-
vantages and limitations of the model. Veriﬁcation was deﬁned as “the process
showing that a model has a sound scientiﬁc basis, that any assumptions are rea-
sonable, that equations are being solved correctly, and more generally, that the
model presented to the user actually does what the document claims” and valida-
tion as “the process of assessing a model so that its accuracy and usefulness can
be determined”. The latter often involves comparison with other models [67].
In regards to taking decisions about the quality of one’s research, great care
must be given to issues surrounding the validity of the approach taken. The ve-
racity and accuracy of any conclusions will at best be questionable, at worst
be indefensible. In other words, a good piece of research meets accepted stan-
dards of validity in a range of dimensions. Croom [21] distinguishes six types of
validity; (1) internal validity, (2) external validity, (3) construct validity, (4) de-
scriptive validity, (5) interpretive validity, (6) theoretical validity. These types of
validity are intended mainly for quantitative type of research, but some general
principles can be applied here as well.
This PhD project contributes to the scientiﬁc evaluation of the presented work
by a detailed description of the model, an assessment of the content, and a de-
scription of the limitations and beneﬁts of the model. According to the above
mentioned deﬁnition, one aspect of validation is to compare with other models.
If there are similar models for the same application, a comparison of the results
provides proof that the model has a sound scientiﬁc basis, the assumptions are
reasonable and the equations are solved correctly.
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In this PhD project, the development of frameworks and methods is based
on reasoning. Such reasoning can be interpreted as the process where formal
logic arguments, existing methods, and knowledge are used as building blocks to
derive new relationships or insight. Here, the validity of the method is conﬁrmed
by assessing the validity of the underlying building blocks. If some of the initial
assumptions are incorrect or the formal logic used to support the new method
is wrong or incorrectly used, it can be concluded that the method is not valid at
all or only valid within a more narrow application area than originally planned.
It is also possible to perform case studies where the method can be tested for a
speciﬁc application. In this case, the results may be validated qualitatively or by
expert judgments, or preferably, compare the results with outcomes from other
recognized and comparable methods [52].
In this PhD project, I have customized the assumptions used in method de-
velopment. By peer review, the arguments, and assumptions have been veriﬁed.
Furthermore, when was possible, I give an example to illustrate how the method
can be applied. However, additional case studies should be performed to obtain
more insight on how the results may be applied on subsea systems. The formal
validation has been performed by reviewers. I have been able to get feedbacks to
my ideas and results from other researchers, via e-mails, meetings and at confer-
ences.
Finally, the research resulting to this PhD thesis is not performed in a vac-
uum, but in cooperation with other researchers and people from the industry. The
research quality improves from the interaction between researchers, and between
researchers and the industry. New ideas form the basis for new knowledge, and
may often occur unexpectedly when a problem or a system is viewed from dif-
ferent angles and perspectives. The fruitful discussions with my main supervisor,
who has challenged me on the quality of reasoning and the application of theory
along with participating in several related activities, made me able to raise my
understanding of reliability and qualiﬁcation related guidelines and identify new
research areas.
2.2 Research design and research method
There is no best research method which is absolutely preferred in every context.
High quality research requires a documented and logical design of the research
project. A research project is a sequence of activities or work packages that build
into each other. It starts with the deﬁnition of research basis and research ques-
tions and ends up with the research results. Fig. 2.1 illustrates my research design
which I have used for completing my PhD research and also related articles. My
research process has four main stages (derived from [2]): (1) research plan, (2)
literature review, (3) model development, and (4) research results.
1. Research plan:
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Research plan
Model 
development
Research 
results
* Identification of 
   research concepts 
   and perspectives
* Identification of 
   research questions
* Detail definition and 
  recognition of problem
   
* Scope
* Objectives
* Time plan
* Discussion of relevant 
   reasearch problem and 
   associated research
   question
* Discussion of all the 
   related models
* Description of 
   theoretical basis
* Identification of main 
   assumptions
 
* Description of new 
   methods/models 
* Discussion of 
   methods/ models
   in application areas
   and constraints
* Illustrative example
* Reasoning of new 
   model
 
* Main conclusion
* Ideas for further work
Literature
 review
Continuous improvement
Fig. 2.1. Research design
A research plan development starts early in the PhD research process, in
order to deﬁne research challenges and to provide a format for further in-
vestigation. The research plan describes the principles of research, stating its
importance and how it will be conducted.
The research plan should be written to address the following questions [2]:
• What is intended to be done?
• Why is the work important?
• What has already been done?
• How should the work be done?
A typical research plan includes (derived from [2]):
A. Speciﬁc aims: The speciﬁc aims are statements of the objectives and
milestones of a research project. The purpose of this part is to clearly
and concisely describe what the proposed research is intended to accom-
plish.
B. Background: The background section states the research problem includ-
ing the proposed rationale, current state of knowledge and potential con-
tributions and signiﬁcance of the research to the ﬁeld.
C. Research design and methods: The research design and methods are de-
scribing how the research will be carried out. This section is critical in
order to demonstrate that the study design is developed under a clear,
organized and thoughtful scheme.
2.2 Research design and research method 31
The PhD research plan resulted in an initial state of the art description, for-
mulation of research questions, and a research execution plan. The research
questions have selected from identiﬁed or already stated research gaps and
partly based on subjects where I would like to increase my skills and knowl-
edge.
2. Literature review:
The initial research activity has brieﬂy reviewed the literature and developed
research questions. The literature review spanned the body of journals, ab-
stracts, relevant book sections, published reports and recommended practices
by industry, and within the scope of reliability qualiﬁcation, subsea systems,
and other relevant subjects. It is necessary that existing sources of evidence,
especially systematic reviews, are considered carefully prior to undertaking
research [21].
Review of literature, ongoing research and development (R&D) reports, and
industry practices are carried out in order to obtain enough knowledge about
the state of the art both in the scientiﬁc and the practical point of view.
In regards to qualiﬁcation program, academic studies are scant, and the de-
velopment of the existing approaches has mainly been done by industry or-
ganizations and companies. The results of which have primarily been pub-
lished as technical reports and industrial guidelines, and they mainly formed
the basis for this subject (See articles [77, 78]).
The general basis for this PhD project and the topics it addresses have been
established through literature surveys. These surveys provide a starting point
for the research and support all the further activities. In addition, the profes-
sional experience from my main supervisor has contributed valuable input in
the identiﬁcation and solution of problems.
3. Model development:
Developing models are a good way to start distilling all the information we
have gathered so far. A model can be described as an analyst’s attempt to
represent a system and only is a simpliﬁcation of the reality it is designed to
represent[1, 69]. The model is therefore strongly dependent on the properties
of the system and the analyst’s competence. The analyst has to struggle with
the trade oﬀ between the need to simplify and accuracy. Creating model has
iterative process until an appropriate model has been developed.
The level of detail or suitability of a model is restricted by the time, approx-
imation formulas and software solutions availability. Diﬀerent models may
be used to analyze a system and none of these models is clearly more correct
than the others [97].
Choice of model forces the analyst into a system structure that more or less
is in accordance with the real life system. Due to the limitations in including
the natural variability in the real life system, a model will at its best only
be an approximation [58]. Model uncertainty will therefore, up to a certain
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degree, always exist. Standards, guidelines and internal company policies
may often require or recommend speciﬁc types of models.
By discussing all the models and methods related to this subject and to
achieve the objectives of research, a new framework would be developed un-
der speciﬁc assumptions, aiming to overcome the shortages and challenges
have found in the earlier steps.
4. Research results:
Research results should include the application area of the developed mod-
els, methods, or frameworks, discussion about constraints, and also sugges-
tions for new perspectives and ideas for future works.
Usually the case study or illustrative example will be used for systematic
description of the situations regarding how and why events occur and also for
demonstration of framework/model usability. The information acquisition is
based on open data. But in the context of developing a new subsea system,
the industry is highly conﬁdential and therefore presenting any real case is
not possible. In addition, subsea systems are complex, and it is diﬃcult to
cover all of their components or failure modes and so on in the case study
and into the calculations/models.
The research results are presented to the academia and the industry through
publication in international journals and proceedings of the conferences with
referees and double blind peer review process. In addition, the reasoning of
the models has been conﬁrmed by sharing research ideas and results at in-
ternational conferences. The purpose of the communication of the research
results is both for spreading the results, and for getting comments and feed-
backs from others who have the same ﬁeld interest.
These principles have contributed to the evaluation and quality assurance of
the research results, since the input from the “outside world” has inﬂuenced
the research work and thus inﬂuenced the results presented in this thesis.
On all the topics that are covered in my articles and their related areas, I
have held lectures. Holding lectures lead me to improve my understanding of
fundamental issues and methods within reliability assessment. Furthermore,
the presented material is subject to a quality check by the participants.
5. Continuous improvement:
The development of this thesis has been an iterative process as new results,
ideas and insights have been obtained from the research articles and other
related activities, like participation in conferences and seminars.
A research project should provide answers to the initially stated questions,
provide new methods, highlight their application areas, and suggest new per-
spectives and ideas for further work.
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The PhD main report (thesis) describes the research basis, research questions,
and research approach, and outlines the main results from the research articles.
The research articles have been developed following the same research design.

3Main results
This chapter gives a summary of the main results from the research articles. More
speciﬁc information about the results are presented in the research articles in part
II of the thesis.
Six research challenges were stated in Section 1.2. The purpose of this chap-
ter is to evaluate to what extent these challenges have been considered. The re-
lationships between the articles and the research challenges are summarized in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Research challenges and related contributing articles
No. Research challenges Article ref.
1 TQP for new subsea systems 1, 8
2 Reliability prediction of a new subsea system 2
3 HOFs inﬂuencing CCFs in operational phase 3, 6
4 Non-constant failure rate of mechanical products 4
5 Reliability prediction in a new environment (Arctic) 5
6 Reliability improvement during the product life cycle 7
3.1 Contributions to research challenge 1
The ﬁrst challenge concerns the strengths and weaknesses of currently used
TQPs and addresses the need for producers and system integrators to perform
a more practical TQP for new product. The research questions associated with
the challenge are discussed in Section 1.2.1 and articles 1 [77] and 8 [78] took
them into account.
As mentioned in chapter 2, there are not many academic studies related
to TQP approaches. Therefore, technical reports and industrial guidelines pub-
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lished by industrial organizations and companies have been used and they mainly
formed the basis of the research in this area.
A thorough literature survey on commonly used TQP approaches has been
conducted. The initial focus was on the two mostly used approaches, i.e. the
DNV and the TRL approaches. Ambiguities and challenges related to these ap-
proaches which were encountered by several companies, were highlighted. Sev-
eral companies have tried to integrate the two TQP approaches to overcome the
challenges, but they are still facing problem. Several suggestions for improving
the performance of the merged TQP are proposed. By implementation of sug-
gested principles, some of the identiﬁed challenges can be eliminated and the
stakeholders will be more conﬁdent about the TQP results.
To perform a more systematic evaluation of the TQPs, six main questions
(that can also be seen as criteria) are introduced to determine the main character-
istics of an eﬃcient TQP. The questions are based on the following issues:
1. Integration of TQP and the product development process
2. Clear deﬁnition of TQP approach, steps, and tasks to be performed in each
step
3. Criteria deﬁnition for each step
4. Uncertainty quantiﬁcation of the new product
5. Uniﬁed language between producers, suppliers, and end-users.
6. Feedback generation and improvement
These six questions have been developed based on a careful literature study
and a scrutiny of the existing TQPs. The TQP approaches have been evaluated
based on these questions. A brief description of considered TQPs were stated in
Section 1.1.4. Answers to each question have been obtained based on a careful
scrutiny of approaches. The answers give a clear overview of the strengths and
weaknesses of each approach.
From the obtained answers, it can be concluded that none of the existing
TQPs fulﬁll all the six deﬁned criteria and some of them have signiﬁcant po-
tentials for improvement. A new TQP approach is therefore proposed, aiming to
overcome the weaknesses of the existing approaches.
Identifying potential problems and failures at an early stage of the product de-
velopment process is important for the producers, due to the high cost of making
modiﬁcations later in the development process. Several authors [3, 8, 13, 26, 33,
54] and guidelines [7, 89] argue that the qualiﬁcation process must be addressed
prior to and in parallel with the product development process. Most producers
have developed their own product development model comprising a number of
consecutive phases, where the required development tasks and analyses are listed
for each phase. The models are generally rather similar, but the number of phases
may vary with the complexity of the product. The proposed approach is based
on the product development model suggested by Murthy et al. [57].
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The new TQP approach consists of six steps as; Concept qualiﬁcation, Sys-
tem qualiﬁcation, Design qualiﬁcation, Component qualiﬁcation, Product quali-
ﬁcation, Production qualiﬁcation.
A thorough list of methods and tools for qualiﬁcation of the product has
provided in the diﬀerent development phases. Several qualiﬁcation tasks are per-
formed in each phase of the model, and before proceeding to the next phase, the
output needs to be evaluated to assure that the desired outcome is obtained. If
problems are identiﬁed, the next phase should not be initiated until the required
corrective actions have been taken.
The key features of the proposed approach, related to the six questions, are
as follows:
a) The proposed approach is closely linked to the product development pro-
cess. The steps are aligned with the product development model proposed
by Murthy et al. [57], but can easily be adapted to any step-based product
development process. The tasks in product development and the tasks for
qualiﬁcation have reciprocating characteristics. The inputs to the proposed
approach usually are the results of tasks in the new product development
process and the results of the qualiﬁcation tasks in each step may give feed-
back to them. This makes the qualiﬁcation process suﬃciently interlinked to
the product development process.
b) In order to avoid ambiguities, each step of the new TQP approach is ex-
plained and the tasks required in each step are identiﬁed and described. The
relevant methods and tools for the various tasks are listed and references to
recommended literature given.
c) The objective of each step has been clariﬁed and can be attained with a
proper implementation of the deﬁned tasks of each step. A set of criteria
can be deﬁned, in order to decide whether or not the objectives have been
met.
d) The proposed approach can be seen as a uniﬁed language between producers,
suppliers, and end-users regarding the qualiﬁcation status of the new product.
When the product is complex, this feature of the TQP approach becomes
crucial.
e) The proposed approach along with the product development process tries to
get feedback from the implementation of tasks in each step and to improve
the revealed weaknesses as early as possible in the product life cycle.
f) Finally, the new TQP approach will, through analysis and testing, produce
quantitative results related to the uncertainty of the new product; results that
can be useful for all stakeholders to the product.
It is not possible to formally verify a TQP program. Its value can only be eval-
uated based on long-term use where the cost-eﬃciency of the program is com-
pared with the actual reliability of the products in operation.
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3.2 Contributions to research challenge 2
The second challenge addresses the need for a reliability prediction method for
new subsea systems which no data is available for them. Currently, no practical
method is available that can be used to extrapolate the available reliability data
from similar and known systems and come up with a failure rate prediction for
new systems operating in a diﬀerent environment.
The research questions associated with the challenge are discussed in Section
1.2.2 and article 2 [76] took them into account.
Within the related literature survey, the commonly used models and methods
for reliability prediction that have been proposed in the literature, have been
considered and discussed. The considered approaches are such as;MIL-HDBK-
217F [56], proportional hazard models [48], the approach by Brissaud et al. [17]
and the BORA project [11]. However, none of them can be used directly for the
failure rate prediction of a new subsea system.
Using PH-model requires extensive data for determining covariate values and
related parameters. The approach by Brissaud et al. [17] has diﬃculties to ﬁnd
the inﬂuencing functions for the indicators of each inﬂuencing factor. The BORA
project [11] mainly focuses on human and organizational factors that inﬂuence
the risk of hydrocarbon releases. To use the available ﬁeld data from topside
systems, this approach needs some extension in diﬀerent levels, such as scoring
and failure analysis. However, the general principles of these approaches have
been used for development of a new failure rate prediction method, aiming to
overcome some of the shortcomings of the existing approaches.
An approach for predicting the failure rate of new subsea systems has there-
fore been suggested. The new approach is based on a detailed comparison with a
similar topside system, for which reliability data is available. The failure rate is
intended to be used in the design phase of the new system as a basis for design
and allocation decisions. The failure rate will, in addition, be an important input
parameter to the TQP of the new system.
The new approach has eight distinct steps. Each step is described in detail
and emphasis has been put on making each step transparent and veriﬁable, such
that it should be easy for the operator/client to check the relevance and realism
of each step - an important feature of any qualiﬁcation program.
The new and the known systems are compared with respect to structural,
operational and environmental conditions, and failure modes and failure causes
(incl. failure mechanisms) that may contribute to each failure mode; and similar-
ities and diﬀerences are recorded. The new and the known system may not have
exactly the same failure modes, and diﬀerences must be listed and described. A
set of RIFs that are relevant for the new subsea system will be selected based
on the physical insight combined with expert judgment. The eﬀects of each RIF
on the subsea system are then compared with the eﬀects of the same RIF on the
topside system and then scored according to the suggested tables. The failure
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rates for the failure modes of the subsea system are determined by adjusting the
corresponding failure rates for the topside system based on the inﬂuences of the
RIFs.
The approach is illustrated by an example of a subsea pump. The reliability
data used in the illustrative example is from the OREDA [68] handbook. Devel-
opment of new technology for the subsea industry is highly conﬁdential and we
were therefore not able to present any real case. The information about the “new”
system has therefore to be based on open sources. In addition, subsea systems
are complex, and the number of failure modes, failure causes, and RIFs can be
so high that we are not able to cover all of them. The purpose of providing an
example is to illustrate the approach, not to present a complete and realistic case
study, therefore it does not come to a ﬁnal result which expresses the realistic
reliability.
The suggested approach is stepwise and can be easily used and applied. How-
ever it is subject on several assumptions and limitations, which are described in
[75] in more detail. The approach is a proposal and has not been formally veri-
ﬁed. A possible way of verifying the approach would be to use the approach to
estimate the failure rate of a subsea system, from which we have an adequate ex-
perience basis. This is, however, not a straight forward task, since the judgments
of the experts will likely be biased because of the knowledge that have about
the subsea system. The suggested approach has been tailor-made for new sub-
sea systems, since this currently is a very relevant challenge for the oil and gas
industry. The approach can, however, easily be adapted to estimating the failure
rate of other types of new systems.
3.3 Contributions to research challenge 3
The third challenge addresses HOFs inﬂuencing CCFs and how they may be
catered in the operational phase. The research questions associated with the chal-
lenge are discussed in Section 1.2.3 and articles 3 [75] and 6 [79] took them into
account.
During the design phase, the manufacturer has to predict the reliability of
the SIS and check that the predicted reliability complies with the speciﬁed SIL
requirements. This prediction is based on a set of assumptions about the opera-
tional, maintenance, and environmental conditions that the SIS will experience
when it is put into operation. These conditions may not be fully known and the
prediction is based on a certain set of conditions, historical data, etc.
In the operational phase, the parameters that were predicted in the design
phase can be updated by using data from the actual operating performance of the
SIS. In this phase, the SIS hardware architecture and the components will usually
remain unchanged unless there is a call for modiﬁcation. The main changes in
the likelihood of CCFs are therefore the result of factors related to HOFs and
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a changing operational environment. The actual beta-factor in the operational
phase may diﬀer from the predicted one and with proper management the beta-
factor can be kept below an acceptable upper limit throughout the operational
phase.
How HOFs can aﬀect the CCF of SIS during the operational phase has been
considered and how those factors can be incorporated into the beta-factor mod-
els has been discussed. Awareness of such factors is necessary since their eﬀects
during the execution of functional tests and inspections could increase the pos-
sibility of doing some prevention actions. In addition awareness and knowledge
about these aspects will be beneﬁcial in order to manage the human and organi-
zational factors such that the likelihood of CCFs is reduced.
A literature review on the recently published checklists [36, 43, 46, 15] for
the estimation of beta factor showed that their focus is more on technical issues,
rather than human related issues. For example, among the 37 questions provided
in IEC 61508 [43] for determining βP only about 20% are related to HOFs, which
is very low and not in line with the lessons learnt from the ICDE project. In this
regards, a set of suggested questions has been provided in four main categories;
dependency and similarity, omission and wrong action, accessibility, and train-
ing. It can help the existing methods of beta estimation for SIS such as IEC 61508
approach, for more accurate determination of β factor.
Furthermore, a framework to manage the factors inﬂuencing beta-factor of
SISs in the operational phase has been proposed to help the SIS users in main-
taining the required SIS reliability. The basis for the proposed framework is the
simple beta-factor model, and the beta-factor is assumed to be determined based
on answers to the questions in IEC 61508, possibly with some additional ques-
tions.
The proposed method is based on observed values of indicators that provide
information about the changing status of HOFs and at planned times. We con-
tinue to monitor and check deviation from the previous measurement and check
for trends. It is suggested that the deviations be categorized by expert judgment
into three categories: large, medium, and small deviation. These categories are
depending on the SIL requirements. The approach is in line with an approach
suggested by Øien [66] for follow-up of organizational factor that inﬂuence risk
on oﬀshore oil and gas installations.
Still, I think the contribution needs further development. The questions and
how they can be quantiﬁed should be discussed with the industry and in par-
ticular with end users. The discussions may lead to new questions, and perhaps
modiﬁcation of the existing ones.
The new framework is not theoretically complicated, but includes small mod-
iﬁcation to existing practices that may increase the awareness, competence, and
treatment of CCFs. By implementing this framework, we are able to follow up
the assumptions that were taken during the SIS design phase and to avoid that
the attention to CCFs ends when the SIS design has been completed.
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Regarding the adoption of the framework in the industry. It seems to me that
implementation and follow up of new initiatives may be diﬃcult due to limited
resources.
3.4 Contributions to research challenge 4
The fourth challenge concerns the need for clariﬁcation of the non constant fail-
ure rate of mechanical products like subsea systems during the operational phase,
and the need for an updating framework. The research questions associated with
the challenge are discussed in Section 1.2.4 and article 4 [73] took them into
account.
The literature related to the characteristics of the failure rate of mechanical
products has been reviewed and the main failure rate prediction methods have
been presented. Further the need for failure rate prediction in the various phases
of a product’s life cycle has been discussed.
For planning of preventive maintenance and for maintenance optimization,
during the operational phase, the predicted failure rate may not be suﬃcient.
However, obtaining the actual failure rate at time t seems rather diﬃcult.
A framework for updating the failure rate prediction to obtain a more real-
istic prediction has proposed. As a prerequisite to the proposed framework, a
predicted constant failure rate from the design phase is required. This can be ob-
tained based on the available methods in the literature or the proposed method
which contributed to research challenge 2 (also mentioned in Section 1.1.5).
Updating the failure rate will be performed at speciﬁed times (milestones).
Milestones can be set based on required input to decisions related to required
reporting, changes in maintenance plans, and so on. Signiﬁcant failures or acci-
dents may also trigger an updating of the failure rate. In the operational phase,
milestones can be the inspection times, or they can be decided based on the up-
dated failure rate. This evaluation can be done based on a simpliﬁed approach as
described by [34] or a procedure based on experience data [104].
In each phase, the relevant RIFs from the previous period have to be updated
and, if necessary, supplemented. When a milestone has reached, we can update
the status of a set of reliability inﬂuencing factors (RIFs). The failure rate updat-
ing is based on the data acquired during the period since the previous updating
and changes of the status of RIFs. We check whether the acquired data are suﬃ-
cient to predict or update a non-constant failure rate (e.g., Weibull distribution’s
parameters), or we have to suﬃce with a constant failure rate. The eﬀects of
changes of RIFs’ status will be considered and the previous predicted failure rate
will be adjusted.
The approach is mainly for use in the operation and maintenance phase, but
its generic steps can also be used in other life cycle phases.
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The proposed methodology has not yet been evaluated. The main focus of
this paper is on mechanical products which can be useful for diﬀerent industry
sectors, such as oil and gas, military, and so on.
3.5 Contributions to research challenge 5
The ﬁfth challenge concerns how to take the new environmental factors into the
consideration for reliability prediction. The research questions associated with
the challenge are discussed in Section 1.2.5 and article 5 [80] took them into
account.
The new operating environment is the region which has arctic conditions.
The Arctic region can be deﬁned as the area where the July isotherm is below
10 ◦C. The infrastructure from oil and gas industry in these areas is limited with
low population density. The four categories of the arctic environment challenges
have been discussed as: (1) The harshness of the arctic climate, (2) The impact
of ice, (3) The sensitivity of the environment, and (4) The remoteness of the
location.
Most of the failure rate prediction methods for products (especially electron-
ics) are based on the parts count technique (prediction at reference condition)
and the part stress technique (prediction at operating condition) presented in
MIL-HDBK-217F [56].
The main limitation of these methods is that the predictions are limited to
temperatures higher than 0 ◦C, and therefore not directly applicable to the arctic
environment. Therefore, other methods that consider the eﬀects of factors inﬂu-
encing the equipment reliability, referred as reliability-inﬂuencing factors (RIFs)
have to be used.
The characteristics and important arctic conditions that inﬂuence the reliabil-
ity of topside oﬀshore oil and gas equipment has outlined. The scope of work
was delimited to the physical performance of equipment. Therefore, inﬂuences
of the environmental factors on the physical performance of the equipment has
only considered.
A framework for reliability prediction of equipment operating in an arctic
environment is proposed based on the Cox model. It has been discussed how
the Cox model can be used for reliability prediction of equipment based on lev-
els of data availability. The development of the framework has been based on
theoretical studies and experience from OREDA and the BORA project. To use
failure data from non-arctic environments, it is necessary to carefully compare
the equipment with the equipment used in another environment. The results of
the comparison are classiﬁed in three levels: experience from identical, similar,
or diﬀerent equipment. Determination of the covariates and parameters is there-
fore diﬀerent in each level. In case where no data is available, several approaches
have suggested for estimation of the eﬀects of the RIFs.
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The proposed methodology has not yet been evaluated. A limitation to this
approach is that human performance has not been considered, even though the
Arctic’s environmental factors have great inﬂuence on human performance and
therefore on the reliability of the equipment.
The focus was on oﬀshore oil and gas facilities operated in an arctic envi-
ronment, but the approach should be applicable also in similar cases in other
industry sectors.
3.6 Contributions to research challenge 6
The sixth challenge concerns how reliability improvement can be considered
continuously during the product life cycle. The research question associated with
the challenge is discussed in Section 1.2.6 and article 7 [74] took it into account.
A framework that integrates the reliability improvement into the product de-
velopment process proposed by Murthy et al. [57] has been proposed. The frame-
work provides the required reliability related tasks in each phase of the product
development process. This will also give insights into some of the tools and
techniques that are necessary in achieving the right strategy for highly reliable
products such as subsea equipment. All the tools and techniques that are related
to the provided tasks in each phase are not explained. However, the relevant tools
are listed and references to recommended literature given.
By lessons learned from reliability activities in various phases of a product’s
life-cycle, the understanding of failures will increase, and therefore the product’s
reliability can continuously improve.
The improvement of equipment reliability should not ﬁnish when the equip-
ment starts operating. The reliability improvement can still continue during the
operational and maintenance phases. It requires thorough studies and develop-
ment of suitable strategies that can be considered as further research areas. Some
of the candidates are; maintenance strategy, asset care and failures analysis plans,
reliability based spares strategy.

4Conclusions and further work
This chapter describes the main contributions of the PhD thesis in order to close
the research project. Thereafter, several topics for further research are suggested.
4.1 Main conclusions
The main contributions of this thesis with regards to each research challenge are:
a) Contributions to research challenge 1
The ﬁrst challenge is related to practical TQPs for new subsea systems and
has been discussed in section 1.2.1 in more detail. The main contribution
with regards to this research challenge are:
• Review of currently used TQP approaches.
• Identiﬁcation of challenges regarding the two mostly used TQPs, i.e.,
DNV guideline and the approach based on TRA.
• Suggestion of improvements for companies that trying to use an inte-
grated approach of the two mostly used TQPs.
• Identiﬁcation of six main criteria for evaluation of TQPs.
• Evaluation of eight commonly used TQPs based on the identiﬁed criteria.
• Development of a technology qualiﬁcation framework which is inte-
grated into the product development process and considers identiﬁed
challenges.
• Suggestion of the relevant methods and tools for the various tasks of the
framework and given references to the recommended literature.
The more detailed contributions have been discussed in section 3.1.
b) Contributions to research challenge 2
The second challenge is related to the reliability prediction of a new subsea
system and has been discussed in section 1.2.2 in more detail. The main
contributions in terms of this research challenge are:
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• Review of currently used reliability prediction methods.
• Development of a practical approach for reliability prediction of new sub-
sea systems based on comparison with similar known topside system.
The proposed method can be used for extrapolating the available relia-
bility data from similar and known systems and come up with a failure
rate prediction for new systems operating in a diﬀerent environment.
• Demonstration of how the proposed approach can be performed by giv-
ing an illustrative example of subsea pump.
The more detailed contributions have been discussed in section 3.2.
c) Contributions to research challenge 3
The third challenge is related to the HOFs inﬂuencing CCFs during the op-
erational phase and has been discussed in section 1.2.3 in more detail. The
main contributions in terms of this research challenge are:
• Identiﬁcation of factors inﬂuencing CCFs during the operational phase.
• Identiﬁcation of main HOFs that contribute to CCFs of SISs.
• Discussion on how insights from HOFs can be used to provide a more
realistic estimate of the beta-factor in the operational phase of a SIS.
• Suggestion of several questions and aspects that can be added to the IEC
61508 approach for determining β .
• An approach for monitoring and controlling HOFs inﬂuencing CCFs in
the operational phase. It is based on monitoring the identiﬁed human
and organizational indicators and check for trends or deviation from their
previous measures.
The more detailed contributions have been discussed in section 3.3.
d) Contributions to research challenge 4
The fourth challenge is related to the non-constant characteristics of me-
chanical products’ failure rates in operational phase and has been discussed
in section 1.2.4 in more detail. The main contributions with regard to this
research challenge are:
• Clariﬁcation of the need for failure rate prediction in the various phases
of the product life cycle.
• Clariﬁcation of non-constant characteristics of failure rate of subsea sys-
tems.
• Review of mainly used failure rate prediction methods.
• Suggestion of a failure rate updating framework during various product’s
life cycle based on the data we can acquire and the changes in the sta-
tus of reliability inﬂuencing factors (RIFs) at speciﬁed times named as
milestones.
The more detailed contributions have been discussed in section 3.4.
e) Contributions to research challenge 5
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The ﬁfth challenge is related to the reliability prediction of equipment in a
new environment (Arctic) and has been discussed in section 1.2.5 in more
detail. The main contributions with regard to this research challenge are:
• Outlining the important arctic conditions that inﬂuence the reliability of
topside oﬀshore oil and gas equipment.
• Suggestion of a procedure for reliability prediction based on Cox model
and levels of data availability.
The more detailed contributions have been discussed in section 3.5.
f) Contributions to research challenge 6
The sixth challenge is related to the reliability improvement of subsea sys-
tems during their life cycle phases and has been discussed in section 1.2.6 in
more detail. The main contribution in terms of this research challenge are:
• Outlining a reliability improvement process for subsea equipment that
can be integrated with the product development process of Murthy et al.
[57]. The framework will help the subsea equipment producers to fo-
cus on reliability needs, forecast and allocate resources, set direction for
reliability activities, and consistently deliver improved reliability perfor-
mance throughout the product development process.
The more detailed contributions have been discussed in section 3.6.
The results of this thesis may practically be used by producers, suppliers, end
users, decision-makers and (other types of) organizations within the ﬁeld of sub-
sea equipment and oil and gas industry. The generic principles from the proposed
frameworks, or methods with minor modiﬁcations can also be applied for other
new equipments in other industry sector where high reliability is a requirement,
such as military, aviation, and so on.
Another target group for this thesis are researchers with interest in the same
research ﬁeld to develop new rules and regulations, enforce implementation of
more eﬃcient solutions, and implement regular evaluations.
This thesis combines the existing theory and methods in a new way and pro-
poses new solutions. The work is based on established standards for scientiﬁc
work and research in the disciplines of reliability engineering. Furthermore, the
results are useful in solving the concerned problems. Thus, it can be stated that
the thesis’ main objective: “to develop systematic approaches that contribute to
the reliability qualiﬁcation of new subsea equipment and to the following-up of
reliability in the operational phase” is fulﬁlled within contribution to the deﬁned
research challenges.
The frameworks and methods that are proposed in this thesis nevertheless
need practical examples of their implementations. Further work should concen-
trate on speciﬁc decision situations and evaluate the results from use of the sys-
tematic approach suggested in this thesis.
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4.2 Further work
In this section, some overall recommendations for further research are given.
More speciﬁc suggestions for further research are indicated in each of the ar-
ticles. The areas for further research regarding this PhD project and proposed
frameworks and method can be classiﬁed into three categories:
a) Development and improvement
b) Practical implementation
c) Uncertainty analysis
Development and improvement of proposed frameworks and methods for
qualiﬁcation and reliability assessments are required to account new technolo-
gies and new ways of operating facilities. Methods which consider certain phases
of product life cycle, can be extended for other phases of product life cycle.
In regards to the proposed TQP some starting points for extension and im-
provement are:
• A detailed qualiﬁcation of manufacturing processes, systems, and environ-
ment is required to be linked into the proposed qualiﬁcation process. A
promising activity has here been initiated by the Stevens Institute of Tech-
nology Sauser et al. [87] (See also DoD [25]).
• The producer’s business processes indirectly aﬀect the quality of the product
and a maturity assessment of these processes should therefore be interfaced
with the proposed TQP.
• Consideration of time and costs as limitation in the proposed qualiﬁcation
process. However, with rapid analysis and testing capabilities, the qualiﬁca-
tion process will be signiﬁcantly reduced. Optimization of the TQP with time
and cost constraints should be pursued.
In regards to the proposed reliability prediction method, some topics for im-
provement are:
• The combination of information of subsystems and maintainable items from
diﬀerent topside systems instead of using the information of a single and
generic topside system.
• Incorporation of experiences and data from the items that previously have
been used in other subsea systems into the proposed reliability prediction
calculation for a new subsea system.
• Development of strategies/ policies for determining the values of parameters
or for making decision about the eﬀects of diﬀerent factors, which in the
proposed method this mainly relies on the expert judgments.
• Human and organizational factors are not included within the factors inﬂu-
encing reliability of subsea equipment, since the focus was only on technical
factors. Further research is needed in order to consider them into the calcula-
tion and ﬁnd out their eﬀects on the total reliability.
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• For new subsea system, which ﬁeld data is rather rare, the role of expert judg-
ments has increased in providing information into the reliability assessment
and safety related decision making. The use and elicitation of expert judg-
ment are also required in the quality assurance of the assessment or the deci-
sion. Therefore, improvements or new developments of methods supporting
the use of or aggregating the expert judgments in speciﬁc decision contexts
seem necessary.
Recommendation for further development and improvement regarding HOFs in-
ﬂuencing CCFs in operational phase can be:
• Development of a formula for calculating the actual beta-factor during the
operational phase. This has to be obtained based on the amount of changes
in the states of HOFs and their eﬀects on the beta-factor. It may be necessary
to check the relevancy of the answers to the IEC 61508 questions used for
estimation of the beta-factor and actual SIS operational conditions.
• How the suggested question related to HOFs can be quantiﬁed and be in-
cluded in the IEC 61508 checklist for β determination requires further study
and research. It is better to be done in collaboration with the relevant regula-
tory organization.
Implementation of new frameworks and method from this PhD project into
existing industry practices is another area of further research. This has to be done
in collaboration with the industry, since as mentioned earlier, the available infor-
mation and open data for detail implementation of the method is not suﬃcient.
The implementation should not be necessarily on a large subsea system. There
are new subsystems that need to be qualiﬁed, and their reliability need to be
predicted which the proposed framework and method can be used.
In regards to the proposed frameworks for updating the failure rate in the
operational phase and monitoring HOFs related CCFs in operational phase, im-
plementation is diﬃcult. Since they are involved in the operation and mainte-
nance phase, and the operational phase of subsea systems is long, therefore the
implementation takes a long time.
Another area of further research is related to the handling of uncertainty. Un-
certainty analysis [10, 64, 82] is desired especially for the proposed reliability
prediction method. This should include parametric, model construction and cal-
culation approaches. Sensitivity analyses should be used more frequently in re-
liability predictions, in order to increase the robustness of the calculated results.
An area of further research may therefore be to ﬁnd practical ways to implement
such sensitivity analyses.
A good starting point for developing an overall approach to uncertainty and
sensitivity analysis can be the guidelines developed by ISA on safety integrity
calculation methods [44] that discuss parametric uncertainty and sensitivity anal-
ysis.

5Acronyms
API American Petroleum Institute
AVT Applied Vehicle Technology
BORA Barrier and operational risk analysis
CCF Common cause failure
COT Commercial oﬀ-the-shelf technology
DNV Det norske veritas
DoD Department of Defense
EC European Commission
E/E/PE Electrical, electronic, programmable electronic
E/E/PES Electrical, electronic, programmable electronic system
EN European Norm
EUC Equipment under control
FMEA Failure modes and eﬀects analysis
FMECA Failure modes, eﬀects, and criticality analysis
FSA Functional safety assessment
FTA Fault tree analysis
HAZOP Hazard and operability study
HIPPS High integrity pressure protection system
HOF Human and organizational factor
HPP Homogeneous Poisson process
HSE Health and Safety Executive
ICDE International Common Cause Data Exchange
IEC International Electrotechnical Committee
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ISA Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MIL-HDBK Military handbook
MTTF Mean time to failure
MTTR Mean time to repair
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NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency
NORSOK Norsk sokkels konkurranseposisjon (Eng: Competitive position for
the Norwegian continental shelf)
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology
NUREG US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OLF Oljeindustriens landsforening (Eng: The Norwegian Oil Industry
Association)
OREDA Oﬀshore Reliability Data
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PFH Probability of a dangerous failure per hour
PH Proportional hazards
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority (Norway)
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
RBD Reliability block diagram
RIF Reliability inﬂuencing factor
ROCOF Rate of occurrence of failures
RP Recommended practice
R&D Research and development
SEMATECH Semiconductor manufacturing technology
SFF Safe failure fraction
SIF Safety instrumented function
SIL Safety integrity level
SINTEF Foundation of Science and Technology at the Norwegian Institute
of Technology
SIS Safety instrumented system
SPC Subsea Processing Community
SRL System Readiness Level
TPM Technical performance measurement
TQP Technical qualiﬁcation program
TRA Technology readiness assessment
TRL Technology Readiness Level
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Structured abstract
Purpose- For high-reliability applications, it is necessary to assure that new products, and
known products based on new technology, have the required quality and reliability before 
they are put into operation. To provide such assurance, some industries have implemented a
technology qualification program (TQP) to reduce the uncertainty during the design and 
development of new products. 
Several TQP approaches have been proposed, but no approach has yet been generally 
accepted. Some producers have merged seemingly attractive features from different TQP 
approaches, but this has not always given a practical and cost-efficient approach. The 
purpose of this paper is to highlight important features of TQPs and to propose an improved 
approach that will rectify some weaknesses of the existing approaches.  
Design/methodology/approach- The new TQP approach is proposed based on a critical 
evaluation and comparison of the most commonly used TQP approaches, such as NASA’s 
technology readiness levels (TRLs) and the approach developed by Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV). Criteria are established to facilitate comparison and identification of strengths and 
weaknesses of the TQP approaches. These results, combined with a thorough literature 
review, have been used to develop a framework that is practical for qualifying new high-
reliability products. 
Findings- The paper shows that most of the existing TQP approaches do not meet all 
requirements for an efficient TQP and therefore need improvements. Among the important 
requirements for a TQP is the ability to be integrated into the product development process 
and also a clear indication of the product’s development status that can be used by 
producers, suppliers, and clients. These and several other requirements call for the
development an improved TQP. 
Originality/value- The proposed TQP approach is new in the sense that it combines the best 
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features from several existing approaches and is well structured and easy to implement and 
integrate into the product development process. The ability of being integrated into the 
product development process from the very beginning is an important feature of a TQP in 
order to avoid costly modifications later in the product’s life cycle. The new TQP approach 
is of greatest value to producers of products with strict reliability requirements, such as the 
space industry, the subsea oil and gas industry, and the aviation industry.
Keywords: Technology qualification program, Product development process, Technology
readiness, New product, Reliability
Paper type: Research paper
Introduction
New technical products are being developed at an ever-increasing pace. Many of these 
products are based on new technological solutions and may contain new materials and/or 
unproven components. They have the ability to increase the revenue, but can also lead to 
significant loss, caused by functional mismatch, failures, and malfunctions. Failures may give 
harmful consequences to humans, the environment, and material and financial assets. In some 
industries, such as the space industry, the subsea oil and gas industry, and the aviation 
industry, it is required to demonstrate that new products are fit for purpose before they are 
accepted for use. The framework for the qualification process and the management of its
progress is referred to as a technology qualification program (TQP). A well-designed TQP is 
an aid in developing a desired product and reduces the likelihood of ending up with a product 
that does not fit the purpose (Andersen, 2006; Bratfors, 2005). 
In 2001, Det Norske Veritas (DNV) developed a recommended practice for qualification 
of new technology, called DNV-RP-A203. It is intended for the subsea oil and gas industry, 
but its main principles can also be used in other application areas. More recently, DNV issued
a second edition of DNV-RP-A203 (2011) based on the experiences gained from the
application of the first edition. The main changes include support for the management of 
the TQP and an outline of the iterative nature of the TQP workflow.
An alternative qualification procedure based on technology readiness levels (TRLs) was 
introduced by NASA. TRL is a metric or measurement system that is used to assess the 
development status and the maturity of a specified technology or product (Smith, 2005). The 
concepts readiness and maturity are used interchangeably in the literature, and are discussed 
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thoroughly and compared by Tetlay and John (2009).
Brombacher (1999) proposes a maturity index on reliability (MIR) as a tool for quantifying 
organizational aspects related to products. The MIR index does not consider the reliability of the 
product as such but, rather, the maturity of the business processes of the organization realizing 
or operating the product. The focus of the current paper, however, is on assessing the maturity of 
the products and not the organizational processes.
Identifying potential problems and failures at an early stage of the product development 
process is important for the producers, due to the high cost of making modifications later in 
the development process. Several authors (Andersen, 2006; Ardebili and Pecht, 2009;
Blanchard, 2004; Engel, 2010; Grady, 2007; Mankins, 1995) and guidelines (API-RP-17N, 
2008; SEMATECH, 1995) argue that the qualification process must be addressed prior to 
and in parallel with the product development process. This means that an efficient and 
practical qualification process needs to be based on an adequate product development 
model. Most producers have developed their own product development model comprising a 
number of consecutive phases, where the required development tasks and analyses are listed 
for each phase, and the data flow between the phases is illustrated. These models are 
generally rather similar, but the number of phases may vary with the complexity of the 
product. This paper is based on the product development model suggested by Murthy et al.
(2008). This model can also be seen as a framework for decision-making regarding product 
reliability, and most producer-specific models can easily be translated into the model by 
Murthy et al.
The objective of this paper is to discuss and evaluate existing TQP approaches and 
highlight their key features based on six defined criteria and to propose a new TQP approach
that will rectify the main weaknesses of the existing TQPs. The new approach is seen from 
the perspective of the producer and will be outlined in accordance with the product 
development model of Murthy et al. (2008).
This paper is based on a thorough literature survey. Academic studies on TQP 
approaches are scant, and the development of the existing approaches has mainly been done 
by industrial organizations and companies. The results of which have primarily been 
published as technical reports and industrial guidelines, and they mainly formed the basis of 
this paper. Qualification of new technology is a broad subject that is applicable in many 
different industries and for many categories of products.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe important 
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concepts regarding qualification. Section 3 describes a product development process.  In 
Section 4, we describe commonly used qualification processes. Section 5 discusses about 
the main challenges regarding the approaches presented in section 4, and proposes a new 
qualification framework combined with the product development process, and Section 6
concludes the paper.
Qualification
A. Definition and purpose
DNV-RP-A203 (2011) defines qualification as “confirmation by examination and 
provision of evidence that the new technology meets the specified requirements for the 
intended use.” A more goal-oriented definition is given by Hother and Hebert (2005) who 
state that TQP is a systematic process aiming to (i) reduce the risk and increase the
probability of product success, and to (ii) ensure that the product is fit for purpose before
being put into operation. 
A TQP can be performed by different parties with different purposes:
x The producer, who offers the new product to the market, needs to prove that the 
product is fit for the purpose. 
x The system integrator, who integrates the new product into a larger system, needs 
to evaluate the effect of the product on the total system reliability.
x The end-user of the new product must optimize the benefits of her investment 
through selection among competing products and technologies.
Performance criteria for the product and/or the technologies must be specified by the 
producer, regulatory bodies, or by the end-user and may be related to various reliability 
measures based on the time-to-failure probability distribution and/or some defined margins 
for specified failure modes (e.g., see IEC 60300-3-4, 2007; DNV-RP-A203, 2011). 
B. Verification and validation 
The concepts of qualification and verification are sometimes used with the same meaning in
the literature, but in this paper, we follow IEC 60300-3-15 (2009) and consider the qualification 
process to embrace both verification and validation. Several references (Engel, 2010; IEC 
60300-3-4, 2007; Maropoulos and Ceglarek, 2010) summarize and discuss different 
definitions of verification and validation. API-RP-17N (2008) defines validation as the process 
of ascertaining the appropriateness of data, assumptions, or techniques while verification is the 
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process of determining if a technique or activity has been performed and/or completed, but also 
the extent to which it conforms to internal or global standards of application or operation.
Verification methods can be classified in different ways (e.g., see IEC 60300-3-15, 2009).
Engel (2010) proposes the following classification:
x Analysis, which includes mathematical models, simulations, test algorithms, 
calculations, charts, or graphs. 
x Inspection, which includes the use of human senses, simple physical tools for 
manipulation, or mechanical and electrical gauging and measurements.
x Demonstration. This is similar to a product testing method but is considered a 
softer approach to the verification process, for example, by observing the 
qualitative results of an operation through an exercise performed under a specific 
condition. 
x Testing. Naturally, most system requirements will be verified by means of testing. 
Verification is through the application of established test procedures within 
specified environmental conditions as well as subsequent compliance confirmation 
through analysis of the generated test data.
x Certification. It is based on a signed certificate of compliance (from the producer) 
stating that a delivered item is a standard product that meets all the procurement 
specification, standards, and requirements.  It must indicate the standard/procedure 
to which the testing was conducted and when, where and by which organization 
and under similar operational conditions. 
Several verification methods may be equally appropriate to verify whether or not a
requirement has been met and it can sometimes be beneficial to use two or more of these
methods. In this case, the criticality, and the time and cost required to complete the
verification should be considered.
A product development process
Murthy et al. (2008) developed a new life cycle model to assist producers in obtaining 
the desired product performance. The model consists of three stages (pre-development, 
development, and post development) and three levels (business, product, and component),
and is split into eight phases. 
Phase 1, Front-end phase (product definition), involves identifying the need for a new 
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product or the need for modification of an existing product in accordance with business 
objectives and strategies and the customer needs for the product. 
In phase 2, System design phase (product characteristics), product attributes are 
translated into product characteristics (engineer’s view of the product). The objective is to 
transform the desired performance from phase 1 into a product design, with subsystems and 
components that can be used as basis for comparing the predicted performance with the 
desired reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) performance. 
The term front end engineering design (FEED) is sometimes used in major projects. 
This activity is carried out after the feasibility studies and the conceptual design of the 
product and is partly overlapping with our phase 2. 
Phase 3, Component design (detail design), involves the detailed design (proceeding 
from product to component) of the product, placement of orders for components to be 
purchased, and preparation of initial product construction and testing. All functions 
identified in phase 2 are transformed into a (product) design specification describing the 
individual components and their relevant properties. The design specification is used as 
basis for the specification of components to be purchased. This is the start of product 
development for subcontractors, and may involve new technology development. 
Phases 4, 5, and 6 will be different for products that are developed in high numbers and 
for one-of-a-kind products. 
Phase 4, Component development, deals with product development, from component 
level to the product prototype. The items are tested in a controlled environment to verify that 
the desired performance is achieved. For products to be produced in high numbers, the 
prototype may be a complete product. For a one-of-a-kind product, the prototype may be the 
construction of some selected subsystems that require further testing before the final 
construction of the product is started. 
Phase 5, System development, consists of operational testing, which means the prototype 
is released to a limited number of consumers to evaluate the customers’ assessment of the 
product features. This information is used to assess field safety performance and to make 
design changes, if necessary. Influence from factors such as usage intensity and the 
operating environment may reveal additional hazards, contributing to a more complete 
picture of the actual product field performance.
Phase 6, Production, covers the physical production, starting from component and 
ending with the product for release to customers. This implies large-scale production in the 
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case of standard products, or the final construction of a single product at the target 
application, in case of custom-built product. The production process must not introduce
new failures or have any other negative impact on reliability, safety, operability, or
maintainability characteristics of the product. When the production process is fine-tuned, the
full-scale production of the product can start.
Phase 7, Installation, commissioning and operation, marks the start of the product life
cycle for the customer and is when the product’s RAMS performance, that should be 
integrated from early on in the product development process is challenged and tested in the 
field.
Phase 8, Business impacts, concludes the product development.
The qualification process is initiated in phase 1 and proceeds through all consecutive 
phases up to and including phase 6.
Qualification processes
Several qualification processes are described in the literature. NATO AVT-092 (2009)
presents a qualification process for military aircrafts aiming at reducing the time and cost of
their production. This is achieved by increasing the use of analyses, integration of tools, 
and by finding a balance between analysis and testing, in all design and development
phases.
The guideline by Andersen (2006) is tailor-made for the oil and gas well technology and 
describes how to perform the qualification as a parallel activity with the product (well) 
development process. It also describes how qualification activities can be linked to 
traditional product development activities. The guideline further discusses operational 
readiness and gives requirements for manufacturing and operational planning (Corneliussen, 
2006). 
SEMATECH (1995) provides a qualification guideline intended to be used by producers 
and users of semiconductor equipment. It is based on a continuous reliability improvement
process and is divided into: (1) the equipment life cycle and the reliability improvement 
process; (2) the management responsibilities for establishing and implementing the process, 
including the various activities associated with each steps of the reliability improvement 
process and each phase of the life cycle; and (3) activities and tools used in applying the 
reliability improvement process. The reliability activities are classified as engineering, data-
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related, and testing. Many activities require tools coming from various disciplines, such as 
probability, statistics, and reliability engineering.
API-RP-17N (2008) presents a structured approach aiming to help end-users,
contractors, and suppliers to gain a better understanding of how to obtain and manage an
appropriate level of reliability throughout the life cycle of subsea oil and gas projects. The
approach is based on the same twelve key reliability processes that are used in ISO 20815
(2008) for production assurance and reliability management. The focus of API-RP-17N is 
project execution, which is described as a number of integrated reliability and technical risk 
management activities that are derived from the key reliability processes. These activities 
are arranged into a cycle of four basic steps: define, plan, implement, and feedback. These 
are applied during each project stage and also for each reliability assessment.
Ardebili and Pecht (2009) discuss the qualification process for mass-produced electronic 
products and divide the process into three stages: (i) virtual qualification, (ii) product 
qualification, and (iii) mass production qualification. Virtual qualification, also called 
design qualification, is the evaluation of the functional and reliability performance of the 
product design without any physical testing of the product. Product qualification is the 
evaluation of the product based on physical testing of manufactured prototypes. After 
virtual and product qualification, the electronic packages are mass-produced. During and 
after the manufacturing process, the products are inspected and tested to evaluate their 
quality, and defective parts are screened out. This process is referred to as quality assurance 
testing or screening.
Engel (2010) presents a comprehensive set of verification, validation and testing 
activities and methods for implementation throughout the entire life cycle of products. The 
approaches are based on a generic product life cycle model that extends the well-established 
V-model (Martin and Bahill, 1996) that portrays project evolution during the development 
portion of the product life cycle.
Grady (2007) presents the steps and procedures needed to implement a quality check of 
the product being proposed based on the V-model. The approach can be applied to high rate 
production, low volume - high cost production, and one of a kind production. 
DNV-RP-A203 (2011) defines a set of activities that should be iterated through (a) 
concept evaluation, (b) pre-engineering, and (c) detailed engineering. Each stage should be 
successfully concluded before going on to the next stage. The activities are illustrated in Fig. 
1. 
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Some companies in the oil and gas industry, such as FMC Kongsberg Subsea AS, have 
developed their own tailor-made TQP based on DNV-RP-A203. The FMC procedure 
introduces several improvements concerning the specification of requirements to which the 
technology is to be qualified, and a flow diagram to ensure that the process is carried out in 
a structured way. The main activities of the FMC procedure are described by Sunde (2004).
The FMC procedure has the potential for significant cost saving, since the qualification 
process is more streamlined and efficient with reduced requirements for physical testing,
such that tests are only performed when strictly necessary. Potential deficiencies and 
malfunctions should be revealed during the design and qualification phases, such that the 
number of in-service failures is reduced. This is particularly important for subsea oil and 
gas production systems that are not accessible for normal maintenance and repair, other than 
through high-cost vessel operation.
Figure 1: The DNV-RP-A203 (2011) qualification process.
Another commonly used qualification process is based on the TRL method, which is a 
systematic metric/measurement system that supports assessment of a particular product and 
a consistent comparison of the maturity between different types of products. The Subsea 
Processing Community (SPC) adopted and modified the TRL method to make it applicable 
for equipment used in subsea production systems. Since then, the TRL method has been 
used to determine the qualification status for several new products.
The TRL method has nine levels (TRLs), ranging from zero to eight, from principles and 
Failure mode identification and 
risk ranking
Technology assessment
Qualification basis
Functionality assessment
Data collection
(analysis and testing)
Selection of qualification 
methods
Concept improvement
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concepts to the real product (i.e., the lowest level of product maturity to the proven product).
These TRLs are determined by tangible evidence identified during the product development. 
Obviously, the evaluation at each level has to be successful to claim that a level is reached
(Berntsen, 2008).
In several references (API-RP-17N, 2008; Engel, 2010; IEC 60300-3-15, 2009; 
SEMATECH, 1995), the qualification tasks and the tasks during the product design and 
development phases are merged. Therefore only the producer can perform the qualification 
and it is not possible to outsource to a third party.  In other qualification procedures (DNV-
RP-A203, 2011; Smith, 2005), the evaluation tasks are specified and may be carried out 
independently of the producer’s design and development tasks. 
Model development
A. Challenges related to the commonly used qualification processes
Several authors (e.g., see Corneliussen, 2006, Graettinger et al., 2002, Sauser et al., 2006, 
and Mankins, 2009) indicate strengths and weaknesses of some of the TQPs mentioned in 
the previous section. To perform a more systematic evaluation of the TQPs, we introduce
six main questions (that can also be seen as criteria) to determine the main characteristics of
an efficient TQP. The six questions have been developed based on a careful literature study 
and a scrutiny of the existing TQPs. The questions and their reasons of importance are as 
follows:
Q1. Is the TQP approach well interlinked with the product development process?
o This is important since if a need for modification in the design or development 
is revealed, the modification can be implemented before it becomes too late 
and will have too high impact on time, cost, and quality. The better the TQP is 
integrated into the product development process, the less consequences may 
occur.
Q2. Are the steps of the TQP approach well defined? Are the tasks that should be 
performed in each step clear?
o This is important in order not to misinterpret the steps and the tasks that have 
to be performed, due to ambiguity in definition and description. 
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Q3. Are the criteria for each step of the TQP approach well defined? Are they
attainable?
o Criteria for each step of the TQP must be defined in order to decide whether or 
not the objective of the step has been attained.
Q4. Has the uncertainty of the new product been quantified? Is the quantification basis 
solely analytical – or does it also include physical testing?
o The quantification of uncertainty of the new product is necessary in order to
give confidence to the user of the new product. For some products, such as 
most of the products in the oil and gas industry, time should not be considered
as a limitation; and a qualification based only on analysis may not be 
sufficient. Some testing may also be required.
Q5. Can producers, suppliers, and end-users use the same approach to verify that their 
product requirements are met? Can the approach act as a unifying language to 
indicate the status of the product development?
o The importance of this issue is obvious for a complex product with several 
suppliers and subcontractors, and also for a one-of-a kind product where the 
end-user and the producer are closely interlinked during the development of 
the product (e.g., during development of new subsea oil and gas equipment). 
Q6. Does the process generate feedback that can be used to make improvements?
o Generation of feedback is an important feature of the TQP. To reveal 
weaknesses as early as possible will lead to a better product and a more cost-
efficient development process.
Table 1: The main weaknesses of existing qualification processes.
Qualification processes Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
NATO AVT-092 (2009) P P P P N N
Andersen (2006) P P N N N P
SEMATECH (1995) Y Y N Y N Y
API-RP-17N (2008) Y P P Y N Y
Ardebili and Pecht (2009) P P N P P P
Engel (2010) Y Y N Y N P
DNV-RP-A203 (2011) P Y N Y P Y
TRL (Smith, 2005) P P P P Y P
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Each of the TQP approaches in the previous section has been subject to a thorough 
scrutiny based on the six questions. The questions are answerd by “yes” (Y), “no” (N) or 
“partly” (P). The answer “no” indicates that the TQP approach has a potential weakness and 
the answer “partly” indicates that the approach has not sufficiently considered the related
issue. The answers, presented in Table 1, clearly shows that none of the existing TQPs fulfill 
all the six criteria and some of them need major improvements in order to fully serve their 
purpose. 
B. A new TQP approach
This section presents a new TQP approach that is integrated into the product 
development model of Murthy et al. (2008), as illustrated in Figure 2. The same ideas can,
however, be adapted to any company-specific product development model.  
Several qualification tasks are performed in each phase of the model in Figure 2, and 
before proceeding to the next phase, the output needs to be evaluated to assure that the 
desired outcome is obtained. This evaluation should be based on a set of defined criteria.
If problems are identified, the next phase should not be initiated until the required 
corrective actions have been taken, as illustrated in Figure 3. SEMATECH (1995) and API-
RP-17N (2008) indicate similar strategies, but from a different perspective and based on 
different models.
The new TQP approach has six main steps that are numbered according to the six first 
phases of the product development model of Murthy et al. (2008). Each main step is 
outlined in detail in the following together with the objectives of the step and the tasks that 
are required to meet the objective. Figure 4 illustrates this framework. Methods and tools 
that are required for the various tasks are mentioned and references to recommended 
literature are given.
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Figure 2: TQP integrated in the product development model of Murthy et al. (2008).
Figure 3: Qualification evaluation in each phase of the product life cycle.
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Figure 4: The proposed qualification framework.
Step 1: Concept Qualification
The objective of concept qualification is to ensure that the product requirements and the
proposed product concepts accurately reflect the needs of the end-user(s). A complete
understanding of the requirements, the concepts, and the operational context is therefore 
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required. The concept qualification comprises the following tasks:
x Product introduction. The new product must be described as completely as 
possible, through drawings, text, data, and other relevant documents. In most cases, 
only the main functions of the product are known at this stage. Further details will 
become known as part of the product development process.
x Application and environment analysis. The intended application of the product 
must be clearly defined and the operational and environmental conditions must be 
specified. Potential and realistic deviations from the intended application must be 
identified and recorded. DNV-RP-A203 (2011) suggests that this is done by a 
critical items list, specifying key issues, such as dimensioning loads, capacities, 
and functional requirements. A suggestion of what may be included in the 
description of the product and the environment is provided in IEC 60300-3-
4(2007). 
x Requirement analysis. This analysis should be done to identify the resources that 
are necessary to satisfy the product needs (Grady, 2006). Requirements must be 
actionable, measurable, testable, and related to identified business needs or 
opportunities. Requirements should be defined prior to any efforts to develop a 
design for the product. 
It is suggested to define the requirements according to NATO AVT-092, (2009) by
flowing-down to the basic subsystems needed to build the system. The common 
flow-down of requirements are: mission requirements, system requirements, and
technical requirements. Reliability requirements are important to meet corporate
safety and business goals and should be defined in phase 1 and refined during phase 2 
(e.g., see BP, 2002).
A requirement verification matrix (RVM) is recommended in order to determine (i) 
the method of verifying the requirements, (ii) when it should be done in the product
life cycle, and (iii) the specific procedure according to which the verification should be
accomplished (Wasson, 2005).
Step 2: System Qualification
System qualification is carried out to ensure that the technical concept and the
architecture of the system are appropriate. The term “product” signifies an existing 
physical item and we therefore use the term “system” in this and the next step. This step
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includes the following tasks:
x Verification of the system architecture. The relationships between the various 
entities of the system should be verified in order not to neglect any entities or any 
relationships between them (Crawley et al., 2004). It is suggested to apply the IEC 
60300-3-15 (2009) approach and select a set of criteria for system integration and 
for new system developments involving interactions of system functions consisting 
of hardware, software, and human elements.
x Verification of the system failure modes identification. An FMECA (IEC 60812, 
1985) should be carried out to systematically address all the potential failure modes 
in the design, including their causes and probability of occurrence. The FMECA 
does normally not address multiple failures, and it may therefore be necessary to 
carry out a fault tree analysis (IEC 61025, 2006). For complex systems, a HAZOP 
study (IEC 61882, 2001) is suggested to identify potential deviations from the 
design intent, and examine their causes and consequences. If FMECA reports are 
provided by subcontractors (e.g., component producers), the correctness of these 
reports should be assessed.  
An alternative approach can be anticipatory failure determination (AFD) which
provides a systematic way of identifying either potential future failures or root causes 
for already manifested failures. This methodology offers several strategies to identify 
failure scenarios (Kaplan et al., 1999). The risk in early design method can also be
used to identify critical failures and hazardous events (Grantham Lough et al., 2009). 
x Verification of predicted reliability, availability, and maintenance (RAM). To 
verify the predicted RAM requires evidence of reliability achievement. Such 
evidence depends on the phase of the product life cycle and generally takes the 
form of data collection related to prior field performance, reliability analysis, 
calculation, expert opinion, and tests (BP, 2002). A preliminary reliability 
prediction is possible by using methods, such as reliability block diagrams, fault 
tree analysis, or Markov analysis (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
x Verification of component requirements and environmental performance.
Component requirement analysis is used to discover, understand, document, 
validate, and manage the requirements of the components. Its objective is to 
produce complete, consistent, and relevant requirements that a component should 
have, as well as the programming language, platform, and interfaces related to the 
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component. Component requirement analysis can be done according to the 
approach suggested by Beydeda and Gruhn (2005) that consists of four main steps: 
requirements gathering and definition, requirement analysis, component modeling, 
and requirement validation. 
x Design review. A design review of the proposed design is essential for evaluating 
the design and providing assurance about how well a new design reflects the 
desired product performance. The design review should focus on the intended use 
as well as foreseeable misuse. In general, the results from the design review 
document justify design decisions (for more detail see Blanchard, 2004; IEC 
61160, 2005; SEMATECH, 1995).
Step 3: Design Qualification
The objective of the design qualification is to ensure that the components and their
interactions are appropriate. This phase comprises the following tasks:
x Verification of the component failure modes identification. Component failure 
modes identification can be performed in the same way as system failure modes 
identification.
x Quality assurance of the designed product and the components. Quality assurance 
involves all the planned and systematic activities implemented within the quality 
system that can demonstrate that a product or service will fulfill the requirements 
for the desired quality (Yang et al., 2003). For quality assurance, it is necessary to 
formulate a set of design parameters in order to deliver the product’s intended 
functions. By using axiomatic design terminology (Suh, 2001), product design is a 
mapping from the function space to the design parameter space. Therefore, the key 
task for quality in design is to ensure that the designed product is able to deliver the 
desired product functions over its useful life.
The quality methods used in this stage include robust design (Taguchi, 1986), design 
of experiment (DOE), response surface methods (RSMs) (Myers and Montgomery, 
1995), design for X (Huang, 1996), axiomatic design, theory of inventive problem 
solving (TRIZ) (Terninko et al., 1998), and specific methods in reliability 
engineering.
It is sometimes possible to capture the system design weaknesses and strengths and 
detect the failures by using virtual prototyping. Technological advances make it 
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possible to virtually define system designs in completely integrated and associative 
parametric representations that are directly suitable for functional verification and 
accurate sensitivity design studies (Engel, 2010). Accurate system modeling permits 
identification of how external parametric changes affect not only a single component 
of the product but also the integration of various components into the final product. 
x Quality control of received components. Quality assessment is used for evaluating 
the received materials, parts, and components from suppliers to decide whether or 
not the items are acceptable with respect to the product’s desired performance 
requirements. The assessment may include continuous checking of the items 
against workplace standards and specifications for conformance. Understanding 
how the received items relate to the current operation and how they contribute to 
the final quality of the product will help to establish a better set of acceptance 
criteria (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1998).
Several methods can be used to evaluate purchased items, see, for example, the
discussion in SEMATECH (1995). The evaluation may also include a request for
reliability information/data from the suppliers, and performing tests on the 
components, such as life testing and environmental stress screening. Other alternatives 
are IEC 61508-2 (2010) and IEC 61508-3 (2010) that suggest the following approach; 
The needed requirements along with the reasoning behind them (to make them more 
understandable) should be documented. Then a description in the form of 
“argument/solution” should be provided on how each requirement is met by listing a
set of verification activities and test cases relevant to that requirement. For full 
traceability, each argument and verification/test activity should be linked with the 
evidence document showing the results of the work.
Another possible approach is based on API-RP-17Q (2010), which recommends that
the supplier or original equipment manufacturer (OEM) maintains a failure mode 
assessment (FMA) and a standard product qualification sheet (PQS) for each 
component with a unique component identifier. The PQS states the design parameters, 
size, rating, testing records, and limits of qualification of the component, but does not 
include end-user-specific data. The end-user should also develop her own PQS for 
each component to be used. The PQS should cover field-specific service conditions, 
parameters, and applicable standards and specifications and requirements. To judge 
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the suitability of a supplier’s component for deployment in a given project, the end-
user can request a PQS from the supplier and compare the information from the 
supplier-prepared PQS to their actual service conditions as documented in the end-
user-prepared PQS.
x Compatibility and interface analysis. The ability of two or more subsystems or 
components to perform their required functions while sharing the same hardware or 
software environment is referred to as compatibility (Wasson, 2005), and the 
relations between elements of the system architecture is referred to as interface 
(Grady, 2006). Compatibility and interface analyses are important to obtain an 
optimal architecture for the system before commitments are made related to its 
design. For hardware and software interface testing, see Engel (2010).
Step 4: Component Qualification
Component qualification is carried out to verify that the requirements are met for the
components. The step includes the following activities:
x Component prototype testing. Here, the components are tested over a wide range
of controlled conditions, usually in a laboratory. The tests are useful in order to 
determine the validity of design and calculation methods. The objective of the tests 
is to ensure that the best of several alternative designs is chosen, and that the
component will perform satisfactorily at other than nominal conditions when
integrated into the product. If the component is to be applied to a major part of a
product, a more comprehensive test program must be developed. For some
components, testing may not be feasible, especially seen in relation to the required
time and cost. The components should be prioritized and tested according to the 
criticality of the components, the criticality of the potential failures, and our 
uncertainty related to them.
Problems associated with component testing include: simulating realistic equipment
environments, and determining the number of tests required to demonstrate reliability.
Several reliability testing methods with different purposes are required. One type of 
reliability testing is life testing, which is used to estimate and demonstrate the 
numerical reliability of a part; that is its useful life or reliability. Life testing can also
be performed in the further phases of life cycle (Lloyd and Lipow, 1991).
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A special type of reliability testing is accelerated testing which is similar to life testing,
but can be used to obtain reliability data in a shorter period of time, by exposing the 
component to high stresses, but nonetheless representative, during normal operation 
(Nelson, 1990). Another required type of testing is environmental stress screening 
(ESS), which can be used to stimulate failures by stressing the component,
considering environmental inputs such as: thermal, electrical, and so on. ESS is 
usually performed to detect and remove latent defects and to find defects not found 
with inspection or electrical testing. The tests performed at component level can have 
stronger stresses, with no damage to the product and it results in a higher defect 
detection rate and lower repair cost later in the life cycle, which is desirable (MIL-
STD-810G, 2008). 
Among standards used for reliability testing are: IEC 61163-1 (2006), IEC 61163-2
(1998), (SEMATECH, 1995), MIL-HDBK-781A (1996), MIL-STD-810G (2008) and 
many parts of IEC 60068 (1988).
x Verification of predicted RAM. The RAM analysis is updated and reviewed based 
on new information and data from component prototype testing and component 
failure modes identification. RAM characteristics can be verified by engineering
analysis, analogy, laboratory testing, functional mock-ups, or model simulation
(U.S. Air Force, 2000).
Step 5: Product Qualification
Product qualification is performed to ensure that components can be combined properly 
into a complete product and to verify that the prototype has the required quality. This step
includes:
x Prototype testing. Prototype tests are intended to explore the effects of component 
interactions under relevant loading and environmental conditions. Tools and 
standards that can be used for prototype testing are mentioned in step 4. For some 
products, such as subsea equipment, it is not possible to perform operational testing 
of a prototype in a real environment. Instead virtual product testing by means of 
simulation can be performed. However, some operational testing may still be 
performed under similar operational conditions.
Integration testing is required to prove that the product elements interact properly.
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Several integration testing strategies may be used, and the most relevant among these 
are; (1) top-down integration testing, (2) bottom-up integration testing, (3) sandwich 
integration testing and (4) big-bang integration testing; see Engel (2010) for details 
about these strategies.
x Verification of predicted RAM. Verification includes reviewing the reliability, 
maintainability and operability analysis with new information and data from test 
results. RAM characteristics should be tested by using the approaches of
engineering analyses, analogy, reliability test, functional mock-ups, or model 
simulation.
Step 6: Production Qualification
The last step of the new TQP approach, production qualification takes place when the 
physical product is ready to be qualified and goes into the operational phase. This step 
includes:
x Quality assurance of the manufacturing process. This is an important task since 
ensures that the processes are able to produce the real product consistently, 
economically, and free of defects. A process FMECA, and manufacturing process 
control are suggested to be performed before the manufacturing development. They 
can be done according to AFD-100630-068 (2010). A process FMECA is 
necessary when there is a new process, a modification to an existing process, or 
when an existing process is used in a new environment or location. 
Another quality method that can be used in this stage is statistical process control 
(SPC) (Wetherill and Brown, 1991) which verifies the processes are running as 
planned. Manufacturers (e.g., in the aerospace industry) who have low quantities of 
final products, can use the approach by Bothe (1991) based on SPC method. Even 
with a single product, there may be processes that are repeated many times, such as 
drilling, that would lend themselves to SPC. Six-sigma (Gordon, 2002) is another 
method which aims to improve the quality of process outputs by identifying and 
removing the causes of defects (errors) and minimizing the variation in manufacturing 
processes.
Other quality methods that can be used in this stage include, manufacturing 
troubleshooting and diagnosis, and the Shainin method (for more detail see Yang et 
al., 2003). 
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x Quality assurance of manufactured product. The purpose of this task is to ensure 
that the manufactured product is consistent with its design; that is, the product 
design on paper or computer can be realized in the manufacturing process. It 
should be done based on the quality policies, the statement of producer 
commitments, quality manuals (including documentation system), need for 
registration according quality standards such as ISO, and IEC, and acceptance 
inspection for suppliers (Yang et al., 2003). 
x Quality assurance of commissioning. Verification of commissioning is required to 
avoid commissioning errors. This task along with the following tasks may not be 
relevant for mass produced products.
x Verification of predicted RAM. The final RAM requirements, as specified in the 
product specification, the requirements documents, and so on, need to be verified 
by testing for the types of products that testing is possible. 
x Factory acceptance test (FAT). It is performed to verify the correct operation of the 
product and to formally approve the product, before the product is moved to its 
final destination. The level of detail involved varies widely depending on customer
requirements, but all aspects of source inspections are normally covered during
tests (SEMATECH, 1995). A test conducted to determine and document that the 
product’s hardware and software operate according to the specification, covering 
functional, fault management, communication, support systems, and interface 
requirements (Corneliussen, 2006). FAT procedures and guidelines are covered in 
several references (e.g., Corneliussen, 2006; Hedberg, 2006; IEC 60300-3-4, 2007; 
Grady, 2007).
x Site acceptance test (SAT). This is the final part of qualification, and is performed
to make sure the delivered product has not been harmed by the transportation and 
has been adequately tested at the end user’s facility and performs to the end user’s 
expectations. This is mainly relevant for one-of-a-kind products such as most of the 
equipment in the offshore / subsea oil and gas industry.
This will help to give the end-users confidence that the product is as they desired, and 
as such is "fit for purpose". Invariably, faults found at this stage of testing are 
expensive to fix, although if the risk-based testing has been performed successfully, 
then these faults will have been found early and thus expenses will be kept to a 
minimum (FAA, 2004).
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Conclusion
This paper has discussed and evaluated eight commonly used TQP approaches. Six 
evaluation criteria, formulated as questions, have been developed and the TQP approaches
have been evaluated based on these questions. Answers to each question have been 
obtained based on a careful scrutiny of the eight approaches. The answers give a clear 
overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. It is concluded that all the 
existing approaches have significant potentials for improvement. 
A new TQP approach is proposed, aiming to overcome the weaknesses of the existing
approaches. The new TQP approach consists of six steps and provides a thorough list of 
methods and tools for qualification of the product in the different development phases. The 
key features of the proposed approach, related to the six questions, are as follows:
a) The proposed approach is closely linked to the product development process. 
The steps are aligned with the product development model proposed by Murthy 
et al. (2008), but can easily be adapted to any step-based product development 
process. The tasks in product development and the tasks for qualification have 
reciprocating characteristics. The inputs to the proposed approach usually are the 
results of tasks in the new product development process and the results of the 
qualification tasks in each step may give feedback to them. This makes the 
qualification process sufficiently interlinked to the product development process. 
b) In order to avoid ambiguities, each step of the new TQP approach is explained 
and the tasks required in each step are identified and described. The relevant 
methods and tools for the various tasks are listed and references to recommended 
literature given. 
c) The objective of each step has been clarified and can be attained with a proper 
implementation of the defined tasks of each step. A set of criteria can be defined, 
in order to decide whether or not the objectives have been met.
d) The proposed approach can be seen as a unified language between producers, 
suppliers, and end-users regarding the qualification status of the new product. 
When the product is complex, this feature of the TQP approach becomes crucial.  
e) The proposed approach along with the product development process tries to get 
feedback from the implementation of tasks in each step and to improve the 
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revealed weaknesses as early as possible in the product life cycle.
f) Finally, the new TQP approach will, through analysis and testing, produce
quantitative results related to the uncertainty of the new product; results that can 
be useful for all stakeholders to the product.
It is not possible to formally verify a TQP program. Its value can only be evaluated 
based on long-term use where the cost-efficiency of the program is compared with the actual 
reliability of the products in operation. 
Several parts of the new TQP can be extended and improved. Candidates for 
improvements are:
x A detailed qualification of manufacturing processes, systems, and environment is 
required to be linked into the proposed qualification process. A promising activity 
has here been initiated by the Stevens Institute of Technology (Sauser et al. 2006).
See also DOD (2010).
x The producer’s business processes indirectly affect the quality of the product and a 
maturity assessment of these processes should therefore be interfaced with the 
proposed TQP.
x Time and costs are not considered as limitation in the proposed qualification 
process. However with rapid analysis and testing capabilities, the qualification 
process will be significantly reduced. Optimization of the TQP with time and cost 
constraints should be pursued. 
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Prediction of failure rates for new
subsea systems: a practical approach
and an illustrative example
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Abstract
In the subsea oil and gas industry, new systems and new technologies are often met with skepticism, since the operators
fear that they may fail and lead to production loss, costly repair interventions, and hydrocarbon leakages to the sea.
Before a new system is accepted, the producer has to convince the operator that it is fit-for-use and has a high reliability.
This is often done through a technology qualification program. An important part of the technology qualification pro-
gram is to predict the failure rate of the new system in its future operational context. Identifying potential problems and
estimating the failure rate at an early stage in the system development process are important owing to the high cost of
design modifications later in the development process. This article presents a practical approach to reliability prediction
of new subsea systems based on available operational data from similar, known systems from the topside environment
and a comparison between the two systems. The application of the approach is illustrated by an example of a subsea
pump.
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Introduction
The subsea oil and gas industry is moving more and
more of the traditional topside fluid processing systems
to the seabed. This strategy has the potential to give
increased production from low-energy reservoirs and
may also lead to significant cost saving. A prerequisite
is, however, the failures requiring subsea repair inter-
ventions will not occur. A subsea intervention requires
an intervention vessel and often a long production
downtime – at a cost of several million US dollars. The
seabed processing systems may be used for: removal
and re-injection of produced water, sand removal,
boosting of well fluids, gas/liquid separation and liquid
boosting, subsea gas compression, and so on. The pro-
cessing systems require electro-power and hence electri-
cal connectors and power distribution systems.
Before an operator accepts to install a new subsea
system, he must be convinced that the new system has a
sufficiently high reliability. The time to the first planned
intervention may be five years, and even longer, and it
is important that the installed system is able to survive
this period without failure.
The operator will usually specify strict reliability
requirements for the new system and require the
supplier to follow an agreed technology qualification
program (TQP) during the design, development, and
manufacturing phases of the system.1,2 As part of the
TQP, reliability analyses and predictions are performed
in the early stages in order to:
 identify potential design weaknesses;
 compare alternative designs;
 determine early estimates of life-cycle costs;
 provide failure rates and other input parameters for
system reliability and availability assessments;
 establish requirements and objectives for reliability
testing.
Reliability requirements may be stated according to
IEC 60300-3-43 and should be based on (1) the
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application of the system; (2) the failure criteria, i.e.
what constitutes a failure of the system with the
intended application; (3) the operating conditions; and
(4) the environmental conditions.
Most of the new subsea systems are adapted from
similar, well known topside (i.e. on the platform) sys-
tems and the industry often talks about ‘‘marinization’’
of topside technology. Reliability information for top-
side systems is available from the OREDA handbook4
and the OREDA database (for the participating com-
panies). This information cannot be used directly for
new subsea systems, because of design modifications,
different environmental stresses, and different mainte-
nance. The reliability information in OREDA4 is pre-
sented as a constant failure rate, together with
additional information related to failure modes, failure
descriptors/mechanisms, and components that contrib-
uted to the system failures. Currently, no practical
method is available that can be used to extrapolate the
available reliability data from similar and known sys-
tems and come up to a failure rate prediction for new
systems operating in a different environment.
The objective of this article is to suggest a practical
approach on how to predict the failure rate of new sub-
sea systems that has been adapted (i.e. ‘‘marinized’’)
from known topside systems. The approach builds on
the reliability information in OREDA and similar relia-
bility data sources, but also on a careful failure analysis
where the subsea and topside systems are compared.
The suggested approach is illustrated by an example of
a new subsea pump. The main application of the sug-
gested approach will be during the product’s design and
development phases, when there is no actual data avail-
able from any equivalent systems.
The approach is developed for a new subsea system,
but can also be applied in a slightly modified form in
other new product-development projects where high
reliability is a requirement.
The approach described in this article and the asso-
ciated discussions are subject to several delimitations.
The new subsea system is, for example, compared with
a single and generic type of topside system, and it is
assumed that relevant data from other subsea systems
is not available.
The article is organized as follows. The next section
describes the alternative reliability prediction methods,
while the section ‘‘Failure rate provision for new sys-
tem’’ presents a new stepwise reliability prediction pro-
cedure. A case study of a subsea pump illustrates the
application of the approach. The final section provides
conclusions and some ideas for future work.
Reliability prediction
System reliability requirements can be expressed with
quantitative measures, such as the failure rate, the survi-
vor probability, and the mean time to failure (MTTF).3
Since OREDA4 only provides constant failure rates, we
assume that the subsea system also has constant failure
rate, and denote this by l(S). The corresponding survi-
vor function is R(S)(t)= exp ( l(S)t) and the mean
time to failure is MTTF(S) = 1=l(S).
Reliability prediction methods
Several models and methods for reliability prediction
have been proposed in the literature. For electronic
equipment, reliability prediction is well established and
is often based on the parts count technique (prediction
at reference condition) and the part stress technique
(prediction at operating condition) in MIL-HDBK-
217F5 and similar approaches.6–9
For mechanical and electro-mechanical equipment,
there is no generally accepted method for reliability pre-
diction. This may be owing to the higher number of,
and more complex, failure mechanisms. Several studies
have shown that the reliability of mechanical equipment
is sensitive to loading, operating mode, and utilization
rate.10,11
Most reliability data sources assume that the items
have constant failure rates and that failures in a popu-
lation of identical items occur according to a homoge-
neous Poisson process (HPP) where the time t is the
accumulated time in service. Design variations and
operational and environmental conditions may be
accounted for by including covariates into the model.
In some application areas (including the subsea oil and
gas industry), the covariates are sometimes referred to
as reliability-influencing factors (RIFs). A RIF is a rela-
tively stable condition, which by being changed will
increase or reduce the failure rate of the item. Ascher
and Feingold12 list 18 RIFs that influence the failure
behavior of a repairable system. NSWC-1110 considers
the effects of the environmental RIFs at the lowest part
level of mechanical systems.
To obtain application-specific failure rate estimates,
various models have been suggested, such as the pro-
portional hazards (PH) model13 and the accelerated
failure time14,15 where the RIFs are included as covari-
ates. A RIF may be a continuous variable, a discrete
variable taking several values, or a binary variable.
The BORA approach16 and the approach suggested
by Brissaud et al.17 are both based on a PH model. The
BORA project is concerned with reliability assessment
of safety barriers on offshore oil and gas installations,
and is based on a set of generic RIFs related to human
and organizational factors. The RIFs to be used for the
specific assessment are selected by expert judgment
from the set of generic RIFs. The state of each RIF is
classified into one out of six possible states and a scor-
ing and weighing process is used to determine the effect
of each RIF.
The approach by Brissaud et al.17 is based on a set of
RIFs that are classified according to life-cycle phases.
The estimation of the application-specific failure rate is
comparable with the approach in MIL-HDBK-217F,5
but the determination of the multiplicative factors is
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done in another way by a scoring and weighing
procedure.
None of the approaches mentioned above can be
used directly to predict the failure rate of a new subsea
system. Using the PH-model requires extensive data for
determining covariate values and related parameters.
The approach by Brissaud et al.17 has difficulties in
finding the influencing functions for the indicators of
each influencing factor. The BORA project mainly
focuses on human and organizational factors that
influence the risk of hydrocarbon releases. To use the
available field data from topside systems, this
approach needs some extension in different levels,
such as scoring and failure analysis. However, the
general principles of these approaches have been used
to develop a new failure rate prediction method, aim-
ing to overcome some of the shortcomings of the
existing approaches.
Failure rate provision for new systems
Required data
How the subsea environment influences a system’s fail-
ure rate will generally depend on the application of the
system and its internal and external environment. Items
that are not directly in contact with the subsea environ-
ment are mainly affected by internal stresses, while
items that are in direct contact with the subsea environ-
ment are also affected by external stresses. Failure rate
estimates for topside systems are available from
OREDA.4 Other sources, such as MechRel10 and the
RIAC handbook18 may also give supplementary infor-
mation. (A list of reliability data sources with links is
provided on http://www.ntnu.edu/ross/info/data.) Our
objective is to use the available topside data to predict
the failure rate of a similar subsea system. Several cate-
gories of data and information are required.
 Technical data are usually supplied by system man-
ufacturers and are necessary for understanding the
system functions and for developing system models.
Based on this type of data, similarities among or
between systems can be identified.
 Environmental data provide information about the
operating conditions for the system and needs to be
incorporated into the reliability analyses. Subsea
environmental meta-data and ocean data can be
used for a better understanding of influencing
factors.
 Operational and maintenance data (field data) are
collected under actual operating conditions by the
customers, and are plant/system specific.
 Expert judgment plays a central role in the provi-
sion of data for new applications. Experts may pos-
sess valuable knowledge that can supplement the
recorded data and provide important input to deci-
sion-makers.
 Reliability prediction methods are required to find
or develop a suitable method for a more realistic
estimation.
Stepwise procedure
A new approach for failure rate prediction of a new
subsea system based on data from a similar topside sys-
tem is described. This approach can be used early in
the product development process, i.e. the design and
development phases. During the operational phase, the
predicted failure rate from previous phases has to be
updated based on the real data that are collected. Table 1
summarizes the steps of the suggested procedure.
Step 1: New system familiarization. The intended applica-
tion of the new subsea system must be clearly defined
and its physical boundaries and operational and envi-
ronmental conditions must be specified. A suggestion
on what may be included in the description of the sys-
tem and its environment is given in BS 5760-4.19 (This
reference is now obsoleted and replaced by BS EN
(IEC) 60300-3-4:2008 IEC60300, but it still includes
some helpful issues that can be used.) It is recom-
mended to represent the system as a hierarchical struc-
ture of subsystems and maintainable items. A
maintainable item is a lowest level item in the system
hierarchy at which maintenance is carried out.4
DNV-RP-A2031 suggests that a critical items list is
prepared, specifying key issues, such as materials,
dimensioning loads, capacities, frequency of operation,
and so on. The description may be in the form of draw-
ings, text, data, or other relevant formats.
Step 2: Identification of failure modes and failure causes. A
failure mode and failure cause analysis of the new sub-
sea system should be carried out. A full failure mode,
effect and criticality analysis (FMECA)20 is not
required, but may already have been prepared for other
purposes at this stage of the system development pro-
cess. All potential failure modes must be considered,
Table 1. The steps of the suggested procedure.
Step Description
1 New system familiarization
2 Identification of failure modes and failure causes
3 Reliability information acquisition for the similar
known system; comparison of the new and the
known system
4 Selection of relevant RIFs
5 Scoring the effects of the RIFs
6 Weighing the contribution the failure causes to
failure modes
7 Determination of failure rate for similar failure
modes
8 Determination of failure rates of new failure
modes, calculation of new total failure rate
RIF: reliability-influencing factor.
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together with the failure causes and mechanisms that
may contribute to each failure mode. The assessment
must cover all operational modes. The failure modes
and failure cause analysis may be based on a worksheet
as shown in Figure 1. Some columns in the worksheet,
such as ‘‘maintainable item’’ or ‘‘function’’, are not used
specifically in the approach or in the calculations, but
they are necessary in order to get insight related to fail-
ures, influencing factors, and so on. It is further recom-
mended to establish an influence diagram21 to illustrate
the potential causes, as shown in Figure 2.
It is important that the failure causes are specified to
be as disjunct as possible, such that a failure mode is
‘‘caused’’ by a failure cause and not mainly by the com-
bined effects of two or more failure causes. For exam-
ple, a failure mode is caused by ‘‘high flow’’ and by
‘‘high sand content in the fluid’’ as two separate failure
causes, but the main cause lies in the combination of
‘‘high flow’’ and ‘‘high sand content’’. In this case, we
should specify ‘‘high flow and high sand content’’ as a
single failure cause, and not as two separate causes.
Step 3: Reliability information acquisition for the similar
known system; comparison of the new and the known
system. It is assumed that data are available from a
known topside system that performs similar func-
tions and has a similar design and structure as the
new system. As much reliability information about
the known system as possible must be acquired from
OREDA and other relevant sources. The data avail-
able from OREDA include:
 failure modes;
 failure rate estimates for each failure mode,
including confidence intervals;
 failure descriptors, i.e. failure mechanisms and
other factors contributing to each failure mode
(quantified);
 maintainable items contributing to each failure
mode (quantified).
Let l(T) denote the constant total failure rate given
in OREDA for the topside system. The failure rate for
failure mode FMi is denoted by l
(T)
i , for i=1, 2, . . . , n,
such that l(T) =
Pn
i=1 l
(T)
i , when the failure modes are
disjoint. If we introduce ai, such that l
(T)
i =ail
(T), the
vector a=(a1,a2, . . . ,an) is the distribution of the n
failure modes. If a system failure has occurred, ai is the
probability that the failure mode is FMi. The failure
modes may not be completely independent (see
Figure 2 or 3), since they can have several failure causes
in common.
The new and the known systems are compared with
respect to structural, operational, and environmental
Description of unit 
Failure mode
Description of failure
Maintainable
 item 
Ref.
no. 
Detection of
failure
Failure cause Function Operational
 mode
Figure 1. Failure mode and failure cause worksheet.
FC1
& Total failure rate
FM1
FM2
FMq
 . 
. .  .
 . 
.
 . 
. .
FC2
FCr
RIF1
RIF2
RIFp
Reliability-influencing
factors
Failure causes Failure modes
FMq+1
FMn
 . 
. .
Figure 2. Factors contributing to the total failure rate of the subsea system.
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conditions, and failure modes and failure causes
(including failure mechanisms); and similarities and dif-
ferences are recorded. The new and the known system
may not have exactly the same failure modes, and dif-
ferences must be listed and described. Figure 3 illus-
trates the comparison of failure modes and failure
causes between the new and the known systems. The
dashed rounded rectangles and arrows indicate that
they belong only to the topside system, the thick
rounded rectangles and arrows indicate that they are
similar for both the offshore and the subsea systems,
and the thin rounded rectangles and arrows indicate
that they belong only to the subsea system.
For failure modes that are not relevant for the
known system, and consequently not available in
OREDA, we may consult other data sources, such as
MechRel or RIAC, or rely on expert judgment.
Step 4: Selection of relevant RIFs. The RIFs influence the
reliability, and when a RIF is changed, the failure rate
of the system may change. Our goal is to determine
how much the failure rate changes by evaluating the
RIFs’ influences on the failure causes. The RIFs that
are relevant for the new subsea system are identified
based on the physical insight obtained in step 3, com-
bined with expert judgment. It is tacitly assumed that it
is possible to measure or evaluate the states of the
RIFs.
Table 2 provides a list of generic RIFs, partly based
on Ascher and Feingold12 and Brissaud et al.17 The gen-
eric RIFs in Table 2 are related to; design and manufac-
turing, operation and maintenance, and environmental
factors. The environmental RIFs are classified as inter-
nal factors (i.e. mainly affecting the internal parts of the
system) and external factors (i.e. affecting the external
parts of the system). The effects of the internal factors
on a subsea system may be similar to the effects on a
topside system, and may sometimes be disregarded in
the further evaluation.
The generic RIFs in Table 2 can be used as a check-
list to establish a set of specific RIFs for the particular
topside and subsea systems. The selection of specific
RIFs should be done by experts. In the same way as
for failure causes, it is important to try to specify the
RIFs as disjunct at possible – so as to guarantee that
the influence is more through the individual RIFs than
through combinations of several RIFs.
The specific RIFs must next be ranked by experts
according to their importance for each failure cause of
the new subsea system. This can, for example be done
as repeated pairwise ranking, by deciding whether or
not RIFj, k1 is more important than RIFj, k2 , for all pairs
(k1, k2), for failure cause FCj. The experts should next
allocate weights to the various RIFs for failure causes
of the subsea system, such that ekj is the weight of RIFk
for FCj. The weights should indicate the relative impor-
tance of the RIFs and be scaled such that
Pp
k=1 ekj=1
for j=1, 2, . . . , r.
The selected RIFs are added to the influence dia-
gram, as shown in Figure 2, to illustrate their influences
on the failure causes.
Step 5: Scoring the effects of the RIFs. The RIFs selected in
Step 4 may be different for the topside and the subsea
system. An example is the frequency of maintenance,
which for the topside system may involve both preven-
tive and corrective maintenance on a regular basis,
while for the subsea system it will only involve correc-
tive maintenance. This should be made clear in order
FC1 FM1
FMq
FMn
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
FCr
FCm
Failure Causes Failure Modes
FMq+1
 . 
. .
 Total subsea
 failure rate 
FMn´
FMq+1FCr+1
FCm´
FCr+1
 . 
. .
 . 
. .
 Total topside
 failure rate 
Figure 3. Subsea and topside system comparison.
Table 2. Generic RIFs.
Category RIFs
Design and
manufacturing
System structure
Materials
Dimensions
Loads and capacities
Quality (manufacturing process,
installation, logistics, assembly,.)
Operational and
maintenance
Functional requirements
Time in operation
Mechanical constraints
Frequency of maintenance
Maintenance policy
Accessibility for maintenance
Type and quality of maintenance
Environmental External Temperature
Location of operation
Pressure
Corrosive environment
Pollution
Internal Pressure
Sand particles in the fluid
Chemical content
RIF: reliability-influencing factor.
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to help comparing the effects of these RIFs on the fail-
ure causes.
Some RIFs may be relevant to only one of the sys-
tems. To indicate which of the p selected RIFs that
influence the failure causes of the topside and subsea
systems, the indicators n
(T)
kj and n
(S)
kj are used, where the
topside indicator n
(T)
kj is
n(T)kj =
1 if RIFk has effecton (topside) failure cause FCj
0 if RIFk has no effecton (topside) failure cause FCj

and the subsea indicator n(S)kj is
n
(T)
kj =
1 if RIFk has effecton (subsea) failure cause FCj
0 if RIFk has no effecton (subsea) failure cause FCj

The effects each RIF has on the subsea system are
then compared with the effects the same RIF has on
the topside system. For each failure cause FCj and
RIFk, an influence score hkj is used to indicate how
much higher/lower influence RIFk has on failure cause
FCj for the subsea system compared with the topside
system. We suggest to use the seven-points scale in
Table 3 to assign the score, but other scoring scales
may be used if deemed more realistic.
With the scales in Table 3, the score hkj= +3 indi-
cates, for example, that RIFk has a much higher influ-
ence on failure cause FCj subsea compared with
topside. RIFs that are only relevant for the subsea sys-
tem and RIFs that have a much higher influence on the
subsea system than on the topside system, may be can-
didates for this score. The score hkj=0 means that the
influence of RIFk on FCj is similar for subsea and top-
side. Some RIFs may have a high impact on the failure
causes of the topside system, but may not be fully rele-
vant for the failure causes of the subsea system. These
RIFs must also be considered, and the comparative
score hkj= 3, which indicates much lower effects for
subsea system compared with topside system, may be a
suitable score.
When n(T)kj =1, all the seven points are applicable
for scoring, while n(T)kj =0, means that only three of the
seven points (i.e. only positive points indicating higher
influence) have to be considered, since it is meaningless
to assign scores indicating a lower effect subsea when
there is no effect topside.
The scoring requires detailed physical and opera-
tional insight and judgments from experts. Table 4 sum-
marizes the information and parameters introduced
above for scoring of the RIFs. The number of RIFs
that influence the failure cause FCj subsea from Table 4
is seen to be
Pp
k=1 n
(S)
kj .
Step 6: Weighing the contribution of the failure causes to fail-
ure modes. The failure causes contributing to a failure
mode of the subsea system may be different or contrib-
ute with different weights compared with the topside
system. How much the failure cause FCj contributes to
failure mode FMi for the topside system is specified as
a weight v(T)ji . The weights can be easily deduced from
the data tables in OREDA.4 In OREDA, it is assumed
that the failure causes are disjoint, such that the sum of
the weights for each failure mode is equal to 1.
The corresponding weights for the subsea system
have to be determined. These weights can be obtained
based on expert judgments, technical reports, opera-
tional data, feedback knowledge, interview of key staff,
and comparison procedure in step 3. In addition, in the
previous step, the RIFs have been identified and evalu-
ated. It is therefore very likely that some of our knowl-
edge about the RIFs is incorporated into the values
given for v(S)ji .
The subsea contributing weight of failure cause FCj
for failure mode FMi is denoted v
(S)
ji . If there is no rela-
tion between the failure cause FCj and the failure mode
FMi according to the influencing diagram, then
v(S)ji =0. The weights should be scaled such that
Xr
j=1
v
(S)
ji =1 for i=1, 2, . . . , q ð1Þ
Table 3. A seven point scale for scoring of RIFs.
23 22 21 0 +1 +2 +3
Much lower
effect
Significantly
lower effect
Slightly
lower effect
No difference Slightly
higher effect
Significantly
higher effect
Much
higher effect
Table 4. Scoring of RIFs based on comparison with the topside
system.
Failure cause
Reliability influencing factor FC1 FC2 . FCr
RIF1 Relevance topside n
(T)
11 n
(T)
12 . n
(T)
1r
Relevance subsea n
(S)
11 n
(S)
12 . n
(S)
1r
Scoring topside/subsea h11 h12 . h1r
RIF2 Relevance topside n
(T)
21 n
(T)
22 . n
(T)
2r
Relevance subsea n
(S)
21 n
(S)
22 . n
(S)
2r
Scoring topside/subsea h21 h22 . h2r
..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
.
RIFp Relevance topside n
(T)
p1 n
(T)
p2 . n
(T)
pr
Relevance topside n
(S)
p1 n
(S)
p2 . n
(S)
pr
Scoring topside/subsea hp1 hp2 . hpr
RIF: reliability-influencing factor.
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where q is the number of failure modes that is similar
for both subsea and topside system (see Figure 3).
Step 7: Determination of the failure rate for similar failure
modes. The failure rates for the failure modes of the
subsea system are determined by adjusting the corre-
sponding failure rates for the topside system based on
the influences of the RIFs. Our approach is somewhat
similar to the BORA approach.16 We assume that the
failure rate for failure mode FMi in the subsea environ-
ment can be expressed by the failure rate for the corre-
sponding FMi in the topside environment as
l
(S)
i = l
(T)
i  (1+ ki) for i=1, 2, . . . , q ð2Þ
where ki. 1 is a constant scaling factor that needs to
be determined.
Since l(S)i depends on the failure causes of FMi and
their weights, the scaling factor ki must depend on the
weights v
(S)
ji of the failure causes. The parameter v
(S)
ji
can also be interpreted as the conditional probability
that if failure mode FMi has occurred, then failure
cause FCj was one of its causes, that is
v
(S)
ji =Pr(The failure is caused by FCjijFMi has occurred)
ð3Þ
The scaling factor ki must also depend on how much
the various failure causes affect the failure modes of the
subsea system compared with the topside system. We
suggest that this influence is determined as a weighted
average of the scores of the RIFs that influence FCj,
and where the RIFs are weighed according to the rela-
tive importance of the RIFs, such that
hj=
Xp
k=1
ekjn
(S)
kj
hkj
3
for j=1, 2, . . . , r ð4Þ
The reason why the weighted average score is divided
by 3 is explained below. The factor 3 comes from the
highest score in Table 3 and used for normalization. If
the scores in Table 3 are changed, this factor must also
be changed accordingly.
We now calculate the scaling factor ki by
ki= ci 
Xr
j=1
v
(S)
ji  hj for i=1, 2, . . . , q ð5Þ
where ci is a constant scaling factor whose value is spec-
ified later in this step.
We first assume that the failure rate l(S)i of the sub-
sea system with respect to failure mode FMi can be
delimited such that
l
(S)
i 2 l(S)Low, i, l(S)High, i
h i
where the boundary values can be determined based on
l(T)i . The boundaries are defined by the two factors
umin, i and umax, i for each failure mode such that
umin, i  l(T)i 4l(S)i 4umax, i  l(T)i ð6Þ
The factors umin, i and umax, i have to be determined
by expert judgment. From equations (2), (5), and (6),
we get
umin, i41+ ci
Xr
j=1
v
(S)
ji :hj4umax, i ð7Þ
Since the values of v
(S)
ji and hj were determined in step
6 and earlier in this step, then ci must be determined as
a function of umin, i and umax, i.
Considering the extreme case of equation (7) where
all the scores of the RIFs, hkj, are given the value +3
(maximum case), and also the extreme case when all the
scores are given the value 3 (minimum case), the val-
ues of hj would be 1 and 21, respectively. Along with
the fact that the sum of the contributing weights for
each failure rate, v(S)ji is equal to 1 (see equation (1)), we
can infer that in the minimum case ci=1 umin, i and
in the maximum case ci= umax, i  1.
We now suggest that
ci=
1 umin, i when
Pr
j=1 v
(S)
ji  hj\ 0
0 when
Pr
j=1 v
(S)
ji  hj=0
umax, i  1 when
Pr
j=1 v
(S)
ji  hj. 0
for i=1, 2, . . . , q
8><
>:
ð8Þ
Then, equation (2) becomes
l(S)i = l
(T)
i  1+ ci 
Xr
j=1
v(S)ji  hj
 !
for i=1, 2, . . . , q
ð9Þ
Equation (8) is determined such that:
 If all hj=0, then ki=0, and therefore l(S)i = l(T)i .
This assumption is important to be considered,
since it shows that if all the RIFs have the same
states as topside, or the negativity and the positivity
of the states of RIFs will neutralize each other’s
effects, the failure rate of the subsea system will be
the same as for the topside system.
 If all hj= +1 (i.e. all hkj= +3), then
ki= umax, i  1, and therefore l(S)i = umax, i  l(T)i (i.e.
the right extreme of the interval in equation (6)).
 If all hj= 1 (i.e. all hkj= 3), then
ki= umin, i  1, and therefore l(S)i = umin, i  l(T)i (i.e.
the left extreme of the interval in equation (6)).
Figure 4 shows ki as given in equations (5) and (8)
and the assumptions mentioned above. It shows how ki
changes when umin, i and umax, i are changed. The para-
meter ki as determined by umin, i, umax, i, and hkj.
In Figure 4, we assume a linear relationship between
the known points (the three points defined by the three
items listed above). We may obviously use other func-
tions depending on how we want to consider the slope;
increasing, decreasing, or constant.
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Another important aspect of this method is the
sensitivity of l(S)i to the values of umax, i and umin, i. If
the experts do not determine these factors properly,
the values of l(S)i may differ significantly even with the
same scores (see equations (5) and (8)). If the expert
judgments could be supported by experience data from
generic databases, such as OREDA,oreda09 the result
would be more trustworthy.
Step 8: Determination of failure rates of new failure modes,
calculation of new total failure rate. The failure rates of
failure modes that are only relevant to the subsea sys-
tem (see Figure 3) cannot be obtained from the avail-
able data sources for topside systems. Therefore, the
values of l(S)q+1, . . . , l
(S)
n have to be determined based
on expert judgments, technical reports, and also lim-
ited operational data from other similar systems that
are operating in subsea environment .
Finally, the total failure rate for the considered sys-
tem can be calculated from equation (10). As mentioned
earlier, even though the contributing failure modes to
the total failure rate are not completely independent,
we consider equation (10) to be a sufficiently accurate
approximation
l
(S)
Total=
Xn
i=1
l
(S)
i ð10Þ
Illustrative example
This section illustrates how the suggested approach can
be applied to a new subsea pump that is used to move
fluids in a pipeline. The pump is made of components
that are normally found in standard topside pumps, but
the design and materials are improved and the applica-
tion is new. Development of new technology for the
subsea industry is highly confidential and we are there-
fore not able to present any real case. The information
about our ‘‘new’’ system has therefore to be based on
open sources. In addition, subsea systems are complex,
and the number of failure modes, failure causes, and
RIFs can be so high that we are not able to cover all of
them in this article. The purpose of this example is to
illustrate the approach, not to present a complete and
realistic case study, therefore it does not come to a final
result that expresses the realistic reliability.
Step 1: New system familiarization. The pump and the
driver (i.e. an electric motor) are integrated in a single
pressure-containing cartridge with static seals towards
the environment. The pump is a multi-stage pump with
several impellers placed in series. This enables a higher
pressure increase within a limited area. Critical features
for this pump are as follows.
 High reliability is required, which means that all
components require special considerations.
 The maintenance philosophy is not standard (i.e.
not similar to topside application).
 The pumped fluid is only partly conventional, and
its properties may change over time.
Step 2: Identification of failure modes and failure causes. All
the failure modes and failure causes for the subsea
pump have to be identified and listed. In this example,
we only consider the most important failure modes, and
the failure causes that have a significant contribution to
these failure modes. The important failure modes and
the failure causes are listed in Table 5. An influence dia-
gram is established in Figure 5, to illustrate relevant
relationships.
Step 3: Reliability information acquisition for the similar known
system; comparison of the new and the known system. The
physical boundary of the known topside pump is speci-
fied in OREDA.4 The subunits of a topside pump are:
pump unit, power transmission, control and monitor-
ing, lubricating system, miscellaneous. All the maintain-
able items related to each subunit are listed in detail in
OREDA.
Several reliability data tables for topside pumps are
provided in OREDA. 4 For each type of pump, a main
data table gives the failure rates for the different failure
modes, together with 90% confidence bounds. Another
table gives information on which part of the system
that failed, and lists the relative contribution from each
maintainable item to the total failure rate, and a third
table lists the relative contribution from each failure
cause to the failure rate.
The subsea pump and the topside pump have to be
compared with respect to technological solutions, fail-
ure modes, and failure causes. The topside lubrication
system is not feasible subsea and a totally different solu-
tion may be required, such as magnetic bearings. To
assess the effect of this difference will require a detailed
analysis and is outside the scope of this article. In this
example, we therefore assume that all the important
failure modes of the subsea pump are found to be
κi
θmax,i -1
θmin,i -1
          
All ηkj are +3
         
All ηkj are -3
Normalized
score for FMi
+1-1
Figure 4. The parameter ki as determined by umin, i, umax, i, and
hkj.
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similar to the topside pump. The failure causes are also
found to be similar, although with different effects.
Step 4: Selection of relevant RIFs. The comparative analy-
sis of the pumps is too comprehensive to be documen-
ted completely in this article and we therefore suffice by
illustrating the approach for three selected RIFs. These
RIFs are selected from the three categories described in
step 4 of the stepwise procedure. The selected RIFs are;
location of operation, frequency of maintenance, and
loads and capacity. Figure 5 illustrates how the selected
RIFs affect the failure causes. The weights of RIFs for
each related failure cause considered as equal.
Step 5: Scoring the effects of the RIFs. Table 6 summarizes
the assessment of the RIFs for the topside and the sub-
sea pump in the format of Table 4. The comparative
scores for the subsea pump are given from the seven
point scale from Table 3 and indicate how much lower
or higher are the effects of RIFs on a subsea pump
compared with a topside pump. For example, the RIF
‘‘location of operation’’ effects on the failure cause
‘‘IFG’’ for both subsea pump and topside pump, and
therefore they both give the value of 1. In addition the
effect of location of operation on IFG for a subsea
pump seems to be significantly lower than a topside
Table 5. Important failure modes and failure causes.
Category Description
Failure modes Fail to start on demand (FTS)
Low output (LOO)
Spurious stop (UST)
Failure causes Mechanical failure-general (MFG)
Blockage/plugged (BLK)
Instrument failure-general (IFG)
Control failure (CF)
Table 6. Scoring of RIFs for subsea pump by comparison with the topside pump.
Failure causes
RIFs Category Interpretation MFG BLK IFG CF
Frequency of maintenance TS Every year Relevance 1 0 1 0
SS Every 5 years Relevance 1 0 1 0
Score 1 0 0 0
Loads and capacity TS Normal Relevance 0 1 0 0
SS Up to 2 times more Relevance 0 1 0 0
Score 0 0 0 0
Location of operation TS Offshore (wind,.) Relevance 0 0 1 1
SS Sea bed (depth,.) Relevance 0 0 1 1
Score 0 0 22 1
RIF: reliability-influencing factor; MFG: mechanical failure-general; BLK: blockage/plugged; IFG: instrument failure-general; CF: control failure; TS:
Topside; SS: Subsea.
MFG
& Total failure rate
FTS
LOO
CF
Location of 
operation
Frequency of 
maintenance
Loads and 
capacity
Reliability Influencing
Factors
Failure Causes Failure Modes
UST
BLK
IFG
Figure 5. Reliability influencing diagram for a subsea pump
MFG: Mechanical failure-general; BLK: Blockage/plugged; IFG: Instrument failure-general; CF: Control failure; FTS: Fail to start on demand; LOO: Low
output; UST: Spurious stop.
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pump, owing to the design of the subsea pump (i.e. it
is located into a capsule), and therefore gives the value
of 22.
Step 6: Weighing the contribution of the failure causes to fail-
ure modes. The contributing weight of each failure
cause to each failure mode for the topside pump are
available in OREDA4 and from step 3. The new contri-
buting weights for the subsea pump have to be deter-
mined. These are summarized in Table 7.
Step 7: Adjustment of old failure rate for each failure mode, cal-
culation of total failure rate. It is assumed that umin, i=0:3
and umax, i=1:1 are relevant for all the failure modes.
Table 8 shows the values of hj calculated based on
equation (4). The values of ki calculated based on equa-
tions (5) and (8) are summarized in Table 9. The failure
rate related to each failure mode for topside pump are
available from step 3. The updated failure rates for fail-
ure modes of the subsea pump are obtained based on
equation (9) and are listed in Table 10. The failure rates
are given per 106 hours.
Step 8: Determination of failure rates of new failure modes, cal-
culation of new total failure rate. Since we have not cov-
ered all failure modes, failure causes, and RIFs, we are
not able to obtain any failure rate estimate for the
subsea pump. In a real case, a subsea pump should be
able to survive five years with a probability of at least
95%. This example has only illustrated the stepwise
approach. Only three RIFs have been considered, while
a complete list of RIFs is very important to be consid-
ered owing to the comparative characteristics of the
approach. Other important RIFs, such as design and
materials, have to be considered.
Discussion
The failure rate that is determined by the suggested
approach is not an ontological property of the new sub-
sea system. At this stage the new system is only a con-
cept and does not exist. The failure rate is therefore an
epistemological entity that only exists ‘‘in our heads’’. It
has therefore no meaning to discuss whether or not the
failure rate estimate is correct. What is important is
that the failure rate estimate reflects our best knowl-
edge about the situation and that the estimate has been
suggested based on a structured procedure where it is
possible to check the relevance of each step.
The suggested failure rate is an important input to
the TQP for the new subsea system. The TQP can never
guarantee that the new system will survive a time inter-
val of, for example, five years. The role of the TQP is
to ‘‘provide evidence that the technology will function
within specified limits with an acceptable level of confi-
dence’’.1 The evidence must be provided based on a
transparent and verifiable procedure. When the opera-
tor/client has confidence in the procedure and the
results produced by using it, the new system is
qualified.
The suggested approach is a proposal and not a
‘‘final one’’ that we claim to be applicable for all new
subsea systems. The approach is subject to a number of
Table 7. The old and new contribution weights of failure causes of failure modes.
Failure causes
MFG BLK IFG CF MFG BLK IFG CF
Failure modes Old contributing weights (v
(T)
ji ) New contributing weights (v
(S)
ji ) Sum
FTS 1 – – – 1 – – – 1
LOO 0.67 0.33 – – 0.75 0.25 – – 1
UST – – 0.50 0.50 – – 0.40 0.60 1
MFG: mechanical failure-general; BLK: blockage/plugged; IFG: instrument failure-general; CF: control failure; FTS: fail to start on demand; LOO: low
output.
Table 8. Table of the values of hj for each failure cause.
Failure causes MFG BLK IFG CF
hj 0.33 0 20.33 0.33
MFG: mechanical failure-general; BLK: blockage/plugged; IFG: instrument
failure-general; CF: control failure.
Table 9. Table of the values of umin, umax , and ki for each failure
mode.
umin umax Failure modes ki
0.3 1.1 FTS 0.033
0.3 1.1 LOO 0.025
0.3 1.1 UST 0.020
FTS: fail to start on demand; LOO: low output; UST: spurious stop.
Table 10. The old and updated failure rates for failure modes.
Failure modes FTS LOO UST
Failure rates for topside pump 40.73 81.46 101.82
Failure rates for subsea pump 42.07 83.50 103.86
FTS: fail to start on demand; LOO: low output; UST: spurious stop.
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assumptions and limitations. Some of these are briefly
discussed in the following.
 The new subsea system is compared with a single
and generic topside system. The new subsea system
will, in general, have several subsystems and main-
tainable items, which may be found in several dif-
ferent topside systems. How to combine
information from different systems is not described
in the suggested approach.
 The new subsea system may have elements that
have previously been used in other subsea systems
that are influences by the same RIFs as the new
subsea system. How to incorporate experience from
the use of these elements is not described in our
approach.
 The reliability data used in the illustrative example
is from the OREDA handbook.4 The current edi-
tion of the handbook was published in 2009 based
on data collected for systems that were in operation
in the time period 2000–2003. Some of the systems
may have been in use for a long time when the data
was collected. This indicates that the reliability esti-
mates in OREDA come from rather old technology
that may not represent the current state of the art.
The reliability estimates for the new system will
apply for future operation, meaning that there may
be a time span of more than 15 years. This is illu-
strated in Figure 6.
 The topside systems are readily available for pre-
ventive maintenance and are cleaned and lubricated
on a regular basis. When parts of the systems are
worn, they are upgraded or replaced. This may be
an argument for OREDA to assume a constant fail-
ure rate for the topside equipment. The subsea sys-
tems are, however, not available for any preventive
maintenance, and will normally remain untouched
for a long period (e.g. five years). Wear effects will
therefore not be removed, and it may be reason to
believe that the failure rate of the subsea system is
increasing, rather than constant.
 The data in OREDA4 are generic and average val-
ues from several installations, with varying RIFs. In
the suggested approach, we compare these inhomo-
geneous topside RIFs with the specific subsea RIFs.
This comparison may give a significant uncertainty.
 The failure rate estimate for the new subsea system
is sensitive to the minimum and maximum values
(umin and umax). To select realistic minimum and
maximum values will require extensive experience
and knowledge.
 The suggested weighting procedure is a very simple
approach and may be improved. Since the approach
is transparent, it is, however, easy to introduce new
weighting procedures.
 The failure rate estimate for the new system is a sin-
gle value and we have not discussed how to update
this estimate as more information about the new
system becomes available (e.g. from detailed analy-
ses and prototype testing).
Scarcity of data lay heavy reliance on the expert’s
judgments and may significantly affect the results. 22 In
the suggested approach, expert judgment has a very
important role for deciding the effects of different fac-
tors, and determining the parameter’s values such as
the min–max values.
Conclusions
This article suggests an approach for predicting the fail-
ure rate of new subsea systems. The new approach is
based on a detailed comparison with a similar topside
system, for which reliability data are available. The
approach is illustrated by an example of a subsea pump.
The failure rate is intended to be used in the design
phase of the new system as a basis for design and allo-
cation decisions. The failure rate will, in addition, be an
important input parameter to the TQP of the new
system.
The new approach has eight distinct steps. Each step
is described in detail and emphasis has been put on
making each step transparent and verifiable, such that
it should be easy for the operator/client to check the
relevance and realism of each step – an important fea-
ture of any qualification program.
The suggested approach is subject on several
assumptions and limitations, some of which are
described in the section ‘‘Discussions’’.
The approach is a proposal and has not been for-
mally verified. A possible way of verifying the approach
would be to use the approach to estimate the failure
rate of a subsea system, from which we have an ade-
quate experience basis. This is, however, not a straight-
forward task, since the judgments by the experts will
likely be biased because of the knowledge that they
have about the subsea system.
The suggested approach has been tailor-made for
new subsea systems, since this currently is a very
  t1   t2Topside 
 system
  t3 t4 t0
Subsea
system
Time
Time
Actual field data
Predicted data
 t0
Prediction
Figure 6. Predicting data for subsea system using topside
system’s field data.
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relevant challenge for the oil and gas industry. The
approach can, however, easily be adapted to estimating
the failure rate of other types of new systems.
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Safety-instrumented systems (SISs) are important safety barriers in many technical systems in the
process industry. Reliability requirements for SISs are speciﬁed as a safety integrity level (SIL) with
reference to the standard IEC 61508. The SIS reliability is often threatened by common-cause failures
(CCFs), and the beta-factor model is the most commonly used model for incorporating the effects of CCFs.
In the design phase, the beta-factor, β, is determined by answering a set of questions that is given in part
6 of IEC 61508. During the operational phase, there are several factors that inﬂuence β, such that the
actual β differs from what was predicted in the design phase, and therefore the required reliability may
not be maintained. Among the factors inﬂuencing β in the operational phase are human and
organizational factors (HOFs). A number of studies within industries that require highly reliable products
have shown that HOFs have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on CCFs and therefore on β in the operational phase, but
this has been neglected in the process industry. HOFs are difﬁcult to predict, and susceptible to be
changed during the operational phase. Without proper management, changing HOFs may cause the SIS
reliability to drift out of its required value. The aim of this article is to highlight the importance of HOFs in
estimation of β for SISs, and also to propose a framework to follow the HOFs effects and to manage them
such that the reliability requirement can be maintained.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Safety-instrumented systems (SISs) are used in the process
industry and many other industrial sectors to detect hazardous
events and prevent such events from developing into accidents.
A SIS generally consists of three main subsystems: input elements
(e.g., sensors, transmitters), logic solvers (e.g., relay logic systems,
programmable logic controllers), and ﬁnal elements (e.g., safety
valves, circuit breakers). The safety functions that are performed
by a SIS are referred to as safety-instrumented functions (SIFs).
Some failure modes of a SIF are dangerous and may result in
severe accidents and cause damage to humans, the environment,
and material assets. SIFs are classiﬁed according to how often they
are demanded, and it is distinguished between low-demand, high-
demand, and continuous demanded SIFs [10]. A low-demand SIF is
demanded less often than once per year and remains dormant
until it is activated. Proof tests are carried out at regular intervals
to reveal hidden failures. A SIF is classiﬁed as high-demand when
it is demanded more often than once per year and is said to
operate in continuous mode when demands are always present.
The focus of this article is on low-demand SIFs.
The design, construction, implementation, and operation of a
SIS are subject to requirements in the generic standard IEC 61508
[10] and in application-speciﬁc standards, such as IEC 61511 [11]
for the process industry.
Redundancy is often introduced to improve the reliability of
SISs, but it is well known that common cause failures (CCFs) may
violate the intended reliability gain [30]. The importance of CCFs is
documented in a high number of publications, and many of these
also discuss how to incorporate CCFs into reliability assessments,
e.g., see Lundteigen and Rausand [13] and Hokstad and Rausand
[8], and the references therein.
A number of studies have shown that the SIS reliability is
generally inﬂuenced by a range of HOFs. Schonbeck et al. [29] and
Øien [22] discuss the importance of such factors and indicate that
a large fraction of CCFs can be explained by human errors and the
various factors that inﬂuence human performance. For SISs, Carey
[4] proposes a framework for addressing HOFs in IEC 61508, and
deﬁnes the HOFs requirements for a given SIL. HOFs are further
pointed out as important contributors to CCFs in NEA [17] and NEA
[16], but few publications give any details about this relationship.
A high number of CCF models have been proposed to incorpo-
rate the effects of CCFs into quantitative risk and reliability
assessments [8]. The most commonly used CCF-model for SISs is
the beta-factor model [7] and this model has also been highlighted
and described in IEC 61508 [10]. The main advantage of the
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beta-factor model is its simplicity, requiring only one additional
parameter β that can be easily understood and interpreted as
either (i) the fraction of all CCF among all failures of an element, or
(ii) the conditional probability that a given element failure really is
a CCF affecting several components [27]. Most of the methods for
predicting the beta-factor are based on checklists [9,12,10], but in
the process industry, the approach described in part 6 of IEC 61508
[10] is dominating and is therefore the basis for this article.
In the design phase, the beta-factor (denoted βP) is predicted
based on several assumptions about the conditions in the opera-
tional phase. When entering the operational phase, these condi-
tions may not fully comply with the assumptions made in the
design phase. The actual beta-factor in the operational phase
(denoted βA) may therefore be different from the predicted βP,
and this difference may cause the required reliability to not meet
the required SIL.
Several studies have shown that HOFs are among the main
factors inﬂuencing β, but the estimation procedures do have not
enough attention to the effects of HOFs. Among the 37 questions
provided in IEC 61508 [10] for determining βP, only about 20% are
related to HOFs. This is discussed in more detail by Rahimi et al.
[26] who suggest additional questions for incorporation into the βP
determination.
In addition, the SIS end-user needs to have enough awareness
about the effects of the HOFs in order to manage them such that
the actual beta-factor does not exceed the acceptable limit that are
determined by the required SIL.
The objectives of this article are to discuss the main factors
inﬂuencing the beta-factor for a SIF in the operational phase, βA
and to highlight the importance of the effects of HOFs. A frame-
work for incorporating and managing their effects into the beta-
factor model is also suggested.
The structure of the article is as follows. Sections 2 and 3
describe the main attributes of CCFs and discuss about the main
factors inﬂuencing on beta-factor in operational phase and Section
4 discusses about HOF related CCFs and their effects on beta-factor.
Section 5 suggests a framework for incorporating and managing
the effects of HOFs into the beta-factor model and Section 6
concludes the article.
2. Common-cause failures in SIS
2.1. Deﬁnition
Despite the substantial amount of research, there is still no
generally accepted deﬁnition of a CCF. Authors of standards,
guidelines, textbooks, and scientiﬁc articles often make their
own interpretation of CCFs, depending on their application area
(e.g., see [13,8]). The nuclear industry has put considerable effort
into analyzing CCF events through the International Common
Cause Data Exchange (ICDE) project. Results from the ICDE project
are presented in NEA [18,19]. The CCF deﬁnition in IEC 61508 [10]
is commonly used in SIS reliability studies, but this deﬁnition has
some questionable features that are discussed in [26]. This article
therefore uses the CCF deﬁnition of Lundteigen and Rausand [13],
with a minor modiﬁcation to cover incomplete CCFs: “A CCF is an
event that: (i) comprises multiple (complete) failures of two or
more redundant components or two or more SIFs due to a shared
cause, (ii) occurs within the same inspection or function test
interval, and (iii) may lead to failure of a single SIF or loss of
several SIFs”.
In IEC 61508, SIS failures are classifying as random hardware
failures and systematic failures. Random hardware failures are
physical failures caused by wear, tear, and stresses (these are
dependent since an element that is worn is more vulnerable to
tear/stress). These failures are assumed to occur independently of
each other. The systematic failures, however, may occur as a result
of bad design and decisions and action in all phases of the SIS life-
cycle. Such failures are more likely to affect more than one
element (in a multi-element system), such that CCFs are likely to
be a signiﬁcant factor when addressing the SIL of such systems.
Qualitatively, the standard provides suggestions in order to reduce
the occurrence of CCFs:
1. Reduce the number of random hardware and systematic fail-
ures overall.
2. Maximize the independence of the components (by separation
and diversity).
3. Reveal non-simultaneous CCFs while only one, and before a
second, element has been affected, i.e., use diagnostic testing
or proof test staggering.
Quantitatively, the standard suggests the use of the beta-factor
model.
2.2. Beta-factor model
The beta-factor model is the most commonly used CCF-model,
and was originally proposed by Fleming [7]. This model assumes
that a certain percentage of all failures are CCFs. When using the
beta-factor model, we have to assume that each element of a SIS
can fail in two different ways: as an independent failure that only
affects the element considered, or as a dependent failure (CCF)
where all the elements in the subsystem fail at the same time
(or within a short time interval).
The beta-factor model has several weaknesses, the most
notable is that it is not possible to distinguish between a common
cause event involving all elements of a subsystem and a common
cause event involving multiple, but not all, elements. Consider a
subsystem that is conﬁgured as a 3-out-of-4:G system. This system
functions (i.e., is “good” G) when at least three elements are in a
failed state and fail when two or more elements fail. When using
the beta-factor model, it is not possible to distinguish between a
CCF involving all elements and a multiple failure involving two or
three elements [8].
2.3. Prediction of application-speciﬁc β
Due to lack of data, the beta-factor is often estimated by
checklists, such as those given in Humphreys [9], IEC 61508 [10],
Johnston [12], and Brand [3].
One of the ﬁrst methods to determine a beta-factor was
suggested by Humphreys [9]. He identiﬁes eight factors that are
considered to be important for the actual value of β (grouped
in design, operation and environment). The various factors are
weighted based on expert judgment and discussions amongst
reliability engineers. Some other potential factors are not included
because they were found to be too difﬁcult to quantify.
The partial beta-factor method [12] determines β based on
partial beta-factors (PBF) obtained by expert opinions of the
defenses of the system. The different aspects of the model are
broken down into parts (partial β s), and each part is considered
separately. All the different defenses are assigned a numerical
value, and the product yields the β. This model is not the most
rigorous, quantitatively speaking, but it might be helpful if there is
no information available regarding CCFs.
The uniﬁed partial method (UPM) [3] is developed for the
British nuclear power industry. UPM is based on the beta-factor
method in the sense that a CCF disables all components in the
system. The defenses against CCFs are broken down into eight
factors, and ﬁve possible levels across each defense, and scores are
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selected from generic tables that have been deduced based on past
research.
The approach provided by IEC 61508 [10] part 6 is based on
Humphrey' method and provides a “plant speciﬁc” beta-factor [8].
Assumptions about the system conditions in the operational phase
are combined with engineering judgment to answer 37 different
questions. The parameter β is determined based on a weighing and
scoring procedure described in IEC 61508. The procedure is an
entirely subjective “degree of belief” approach.
The checklists mentioned above are mainly developed for use
during the design phase, since most of the questions are related to
technical issues in the design phase. In addition these checklists
are not properly justiﬁed and they lack a scientiﬁc basis, have
structural ambiguities. Therefore it is not possible to add any
operational phase inﬂuencing factor or modify parts of them and
these methods solely cannot be used for updating of β during the
operational phase.
3. β in the operational phase
During the design phase, the manufacturer has to predict the
reliability of each SIF and check that the predicted values comply
with the speciﬁed SIL requirements. These predictions are based
on assumptions about the operational, maintenance, and environ-
mental conditions that the SIS will experience when it is put into
operation. These assumptions are used to answer the questions
listed in IEC 61508. The predicted beta-factor βP is then deter-
mined based on these answers and a simple calculation procedure.
When the SIS is installed, the actual beta-factor, βA, will be
affected by several inﬂuencing factors and conditions that do not
fully comply with the assumptions made in the design phase.
The actual value of the beta-factor βA may be different from the
predicted value βP made in the design phase. This has been
illustrated in Fig. 1. The main inﬂuencing factors are described
later in this section.
An inﬂuencing factor is here a relatively stable condition that
inﬂuences the beta-factor. It may change with time, but does not
show rapid ﬂuctuations. Examples of inﬂuencing factors are
operating conditions, environmental conditions, maintenance pol-
icy, stafﬁng level, maintenance competence, and so on.
During the operational phase, the technical properties of the
system, such as hardware architecture and component selection,
usually remain unchanged unless there is a call for modiﬁcation. In
operation, the SIS reliability will mainly be inﬂuenced by: (i) the
environmental conditions, (ii) the operational and maintenance/
testing procedures, and (iii) the actual human interactions into the
systems. By monitoring and managing these inﬂuencing factors, it
is possible to determine how much they affect the βA and some-
times prevent βA from increasing.
With an inadequate management of the operational and
maintenance conditions, the beta-factor βA will have a tendency
to increase [5] and, if unattended, the PFD may increase beyond
the set SIL requirement as illustrated in Fig. 2. The system's
speciﬁed SIL provides an upper limit for β, denoted as βU, and βA
should be kept lower than this limit throughout the operational
phase to fulﬁll the SIL requirements.
For the purpose of monitoring CCFs in the operational phase, it
is therefore of interest to split the CCF parameters according to the
two main categories of inﬂuences, i.e., technical and nontechnical
such that
βA ¼ βT þ βN ð1Þ
The two categories of inﬂuences are generally not fully indepen-
dent since a change that inﬂuences technical factors may also
inﬂuence the nontechnical factors. This means that Eq. (1) is only
approximately correct. The nontechnical factors have the potential
Root causes
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factors 
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Fig. 1. Determination of the beta-factor in the design and operational phases.
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Fig. 2. β in the operational phase.
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of being signiﬁcantly increased during operation, this means that
the beta-factor in the operational phase has the potential to be
reduced by these factors. In this section we discuss some of the
main types of inﬂuencing factors.
 Root causes and coupling factors: CCFs are often explained based
on root causes and coupling factors [23,24,21].
A root cause is the most basic cause of a failure of an element.
Identiﬁcation of root causes is an iterative process. Root
causes may often be shared by many similar types of failures.
A corrective action implemented in relation to a particular root
cause, may therefore leads to lower failure rates for similar
types of elements [2,14,24].
To identify root causes is a proactive strategy aimed at ﬁnding the
most appropriate corrective actions. Root causes do not always
result in CCFs, but many of them have a tendency to result in CCFs.
Consequently, management of CCFs requires adequate identiﬁca-
tion of root causes and the associated corrective actions. A number
of methods are available for identiﬁcation of root causes. Many of
them are based on checklists or classiﬁcations of potential root
causes [8], and may build on lessons learnt from historical CCF
events [6,20].
Coupling factors are properties that make multiple components
susceptible to failure from a single shared cause [8] and are
identiﬁed by searching for similarities in technical design, operat-
ing environment, and operation and maintenance practices.
Identiﬁcation of coupling factors is, like identiﬁcation of root
causes, often based on classiﬁcation and checklists. A rather brief
classiﬁcation is proposed by Hokstad and Rausand [8], whereas
Mosleh et al. [15] have a more detailed classiﬁcation of coupling
factors.
 Systematic failures: Systematic failures are mainly caused by
erroneous actions or decisions in all phases of the SIS life-cycle.
IEC 61508 requires that a detailed management system be
developed to avoid, identify, and remove systematic failures in
all life-cycle phases of a SIS. The systematic failures often lead
to CCFs.
In the operational phase, systematic failures mainly stem from
improper management of change applied during manufacture,
speciﬁcation, installation, operation and maintenance. For
example, the latest version of the embedded software in a
transmitter may change according to how the technician
conﬁgures the device. If the maintenance procedure is not
changed, errors may occur during commissioning or mainte-
nance. For this reason, the implementation of a protective
management program is required in order to remove and avoid
systematic failures.
The management program to avoid and remove systematic
failures is an important issue in the follow-up of beta-factors—
and should be discussed thoroughly.
 Human and organizational factors: HOFs point at underlying
conditions that affect human acts, e.g., policies, procedures,
safety culture, supervision, stafﬁng, staff competence, aspects
of the working environment when also individual factors (e.g.,
motivation) are covered by Øien [22].
Table 1 provides a brief preview on how some authors classify
HOFs in their assessments. The HOFs can be classiﬁed according
to the life-cycle phases, working/managerial levels, underlying
factors and so on.
 Operational factors: These factors are including the quality of
inspection,testing, and bypassing. Any poor, incomplete, and
improper actions along with any modiﬁcations in frequency of
use and loading charge/activation threshold may lead to CCF
and therefore affect beta-factor.
 Maintenance factors: The quantity/frequency and the quality of
preventive and corrective maintenance may lead to CCF and
therefore affect beta-factor. For example a SIS element with a
low inherent reliability will fail rather often and will require
frequent maintenance, which again may cause CCFs.
 Environmental factors: It is important that environmental con-
ditions be identiﬁed/anticipated accurately at the beginning of
the design process. During the operational phase, however
these conditions may not remain as anticipated before. Thus
the determined criteria from design phase have to be traced
and the possible effects of change of environmental conditions
on the operational and reliability characteristics of the materi-
als and parts comprising the equipment being designed should
be evaluated.
4. HOFs related to CCF
Several Refs. [17,16,29,22] have pointed out that HOFs are the
main contributors to CCFs, but few publications give any details
about this relationship.
This fact has not been reﬂected adequately in the estimation
methods for the beta-factor, for example in the checklist questions
in IEC 61508 [10].
The IEC 61508 questions that are directly linked to HOFs are
listed in Table 2.
Identiﬁcation of the HOFs that may impact CCFs, starts by
identiﬁcation of the actual or potential, simultaneous or consecu-
tive failures within the redundant, diverse or similar systems,
components or barriers, due to a single or repeated human
performance deﬁciency [17,25]. All underlying HOFs that lead to
this type of human deﬁciencies (errors) are of interest to us.
During the operational phase, which is the focus of this article,
human interaction has a key inﬂuencing role, in controlling,
processing, and especially in maintenance and testing activities.
Many of the ICDE reports also include maintenance and testing
activities as a major contributor to experienced CCFs. It is some-
times claimed that manually performed inspections and tests may
introduce more failures than what is otherwise expected due to
natural degradation. NEA [17,16] indicates that the main HOFs
during the operational phase are related to work practice, resource
management, communication, managerial methods, documenta-
tion, and others.
Many of these factors can be classiﬁed as omission error [16,17]
in which its origin can be related to both personal factors (e.g.,
attitude) and organizational factors (e.g., lack of adequate proce-
dures). In many cases, lack of comprehensiveness and ambiguous
Table 1
Classiﬁcation of HOFs.
Reference Category
Øien [22] Individual
Training/competence
Procedures, guidelines, instructions
Planning, coordination, organization, control
Design
Preventive maintenance program/inspection
Todinov [31] Work environment
Individuals
Management and the organization
NEA [17] Operational phase
Pre-operational phase (design, manufacturing, etc.)
Aven et al. [1] Personal characteristics
Task characteristics
Characteristics of the technical system
Administrative control
Organizational factors/operational philosophy
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statements, and lack of knowledge are mentioned as reasons for
omission errors.
The beta-factor for dangerous undetected (DU) failures which
lie outside the coverage of the diagnostic tests, is more inﬂuenced
by HOFs rather than the beta-factor for detected dangerous (DD)
failures that lie within the coverage of the diagnostic tests which is
mainly inﬂuenced by design issues.
5. Management of βA
5.1. Follow-up based on the questions in IEC 61508
As mentioned in Section 3, the actual β during the operational
phase may differ from predicted β, and this difference may result
in drifting out of the required value. An option for SIS users can be
updating the predicted value of β. An updated prediction may be
determined by revising the answers to some operational phase
related questions in IEC 61508. Another aspect of this approach is
that it is stepwise and therefore always not sensitive to changes of
answers to the questions. This means that improving the system to
get a “positive” answer will not necessarily be credited with a
lower value of the beta-factor.
Another option is to predict a more realistic beta-factor during
the design phase. In this order the relevant β inﬂuencing factors in
operational phase should be taken into the consideration and
therefore a set of supplementary questions be deﬁned to IEC 61508
approach. Rahimi et al. [26] suggested a set of supplementary
HOFs related questions. The main problem here is how we can
consider these questions into the calculation (i.e., their scores)
which is not clearly deﬁned in IEC 61508 approach.
5.2. Safety management system for systematic failures
A more practical approach for controlling the β in operational
phase can be development of a framework for managing the HOFs and
their effects on actual β. A similar approach developed by Øien [22],
who assesses the impact of organization factors on the risk. Here we
got insight from his approach and tried to develop a framework which
is applicable for the beta-factor. The main steps of this framework are
summarized in Fig. 3 and described in the following:
1. Get familiar with the SIS in operation: Determine the relevant
actual operational and environmental conditions. Specify the
SIFs and the application of the SIS.
2. Develop a strategy for identiﬁcation, analysis, etc.: Determine
the requirements and check how the plan complies with the
safety management plan for systematic failures.
3. Identify related HOFs: HOFs that may result in changes on the
beta-factor (i.e., inﬂuence on CCFs) in the operational phase
have to be identiﬁed. Expert judgment and scientiﬁc knowl-
edge are required to determine the inﬂuencing factors. Some
important HOFs related to operational and maintenance con-
ditions are discussed by [26]. The main categories of HOFs
were mentioned in Sections 3 and 4 and more can be found in
[1,17,18,26]. Most often, it is difﬁcult to distinguish between
human factors and organizational factors, since these two
categories are overlapping in some points. An example is
“motivation”, which can be both a human factor and an
organizational factor. Therefore, we consider these factors as
one category (i.e., HOFs) and do not distinguish them any
further.
It is difﬁcult to rank the importance of HOFs in relation to the
beta-factor. For instance, we cannot state that the HOF training
is more or less important than the HOF accessibility. However
an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) [28] might be used in
order to weigh them. The weight of HOF i for β is denoted as ηi.
These weights can be used, when we want to start some
improvements, and we need to start from the important ones.
4. Identify interconnection between HOFs: It is important that the
HOFs are deﬁned such that they are not interlinked with each
Table 2
HOFs related questions in IEC 61508 [10].
No. Questions
1 Were the channels designed by different designers with no communication between them during the design activities?
2 Are separate test methods and people used for each channel during commissioning?
3 Is maintenance on each channel carried out by different people at different times?
4 Is all maintenance of printed-circuit boards, etc. carried out off-site at a qualiﬁed repair center and have all the
repaired items gone through a full pre-installation testing?
5 Have designers been trained to understand the causes and consequences of CCFs?
6 Have maintainers been trained to understand the causes and consequences of CCFs?
7 Is personnel access limited (e.g., locked cabinets, inaccessible position)?
Familiarization Strategydevelopment 
Assessment
Controlling
Planning
Identification
Weighing
Monitoring
Step 1
Step 6
Step 7Step 8Step 9
Step 10-11 Updating
Step 12
Step 3-5Step 2
Fig. 3. Framework of managing HOFs inﬂuencing β.
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other. This means that one HOF should not be a subset of, or a
cause of other HOFs. It is recommended to establish a Bayesian
network to illustrate the potential relationships between the
HOFs and the β, as shown in Fig. 4.
5. Determine status of the various HOFs: For providing information
about the status of HOFs, a set of human and organizational
indicators is required to be identiﬁed for each HOF. Øien [22]
proposes a set of organizational indicators and criteria that
may help experts to select suitable indicators. The indicators
have to be identiﬁed such that: (i) they are not dependent on
each other, and (ii) together they cover the status of the HOFs.
An example of two dependent indicators are “number of
personnel allocated for testing” and “time pressure to perform
testing”. The same indicator may be used for more than one
HOF. An important issue in identifying these factors is the
number of indicators. As the number of indicators increases,
the complicity of accounting their total state and therefore
ﬁnding the status of HOFs will increase.
6. Rate the human and organizational indicators: A weight is given
to each of the selected indicators which represents the
importance of the particular indicator among all the selected
indicators. The weight of indicator j for HOFk is denoted ωkj.
The weights are such that
∑
nk
j ¼ 1
ωkj ¼ 1 ð2Þ
for each HOFk. Here, nk is the number of indicators for HOFk.
Fig. 2 shows the human and organizational indicators and
their weights.
7. Make a plan for monitoring the indicators: Determine how and
how often the indicators need to be monitored. For most
indicators, it is not possible to measure their values continu-
ously and we have to measure them after speciﬁed intervals,
for example, every three months [22].
8. Assess the states of the HOFs using indicators: Some indicators
may be quantitative and have numerical values, and some may
be qualitative and have qualitative values. The indicators are
not characteristically the same and do not have an identical
unit, therefore their values have to be converted such that they
are in a uniform format. The measured values of the indicators
can be rated according to the ﬁve-point scale suggested in
Table 3. Other scoring scales (e.g., a seven point scale) can be
used if supposed more realistic. If a ﬁve point scale is used, the
boundaries of these ﬁve points have to be deﬁned for each
indicator. This requires detailed insight and judgments from
experts. If the value of the indicator is between two bound-
aries, then its value will be converted to the relevant score. Let
θjl denote the upper boundary of point l where l¼ 1;2;…;5 for
indicator j where j¼ 1;2;…; r (see Table 3).
The state of HOFk is denoted Sk and is obtained by
Sk ¼ ∑
nk
j ¼ 1
ωkj  νkj ð3Þ
where νkj is the value of indicator j related to HOFk.
The HOFs are not completely independent, anyhow we con-
sider (3) as a sufﬁciently accurate approximation.
Based on the measured states of HOFs, it can be found whether
the beta-factor affected by HOFs or not. The beta-factor during
the operational phase can be calculated by introducing a
scaling factor that is obtained from the states of HOFs and
their total effect on βA. Obtaining this scaling factor is difﬁcult
and should be based on expert judgments, since no technical
data is available. This is not covered in this article, and instead
of ﬁnding the total new βA during the operational phase, we
use the effects of changes of HOFs on the beta-factor in order
to manage the βA in the operational phase.
9. Monitor the indicators and factors according to the plan:
According to the plan from step 8, the state of each human
and organizational indicators and also HOFs can be calculated
and plotted as illustrated in Fig. 5.
The ﬁrst measurements should be at the beginning of the
operating phase, since we compare the status of each indica-
tor/factor to its previous status. At this stage we cannot say
that certain values will meet the predicted β-value (βP)
10. Evaluate to ﬁnd deviation or trend: We continue to monitor –
and check deviation from the previous measurement – and
Beta in
operational phase 
 . 
. .
HOF2
HOFm
Underlying HOFs
I1
 . 
. .
I2
Ir
νk1
ω11
ω12
ω1r
νk2
νkr
Indicators
HOF1 η1
ηm
η2
S1
S2
Sm
Fig. 4. Inﬂuence diagram for β.
Table 3
A ﬁve-points scale, converted scores and boundaries for indicators.
Indicators Converted scores
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Very
bad
Bad Average Good Very good
I1 Up to
θ11
From θ11 to
θ12
From θ12 to
θ13
From θ13 to
θ14
From θ14
I2 Up to
θ21
From θ21 to
θ22
From θ22 to
θ23
From θ23 to
θ24
From θ24
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
Ir Up to
θr1
From θr1 to
θr2
From θr2 to
θr3
From θr3 to
θr4
From θr4
Sk
 Time
Operational phase 
x
x x
x x
x
* *
x
Small/medium
deviation zone 
Mitigating actions
conducted 
Large
deviation
zone 
No mitigating
actions conducted 
Large
deviation
zone 
Fig. 5. Monitoring the states of HOFk.
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check for trends. It is suggested that the deviations be
categorized by expert judgment into three categories: large,
medium, and small deviation. These categories are depending
on the SIL requirements.
11. Conduct the mitigating actions: If there are signiﬁcant changes,
then mitigating actions need to be identiﬁed and implemented
(see Fig. 5). A generic list of HOF-related CCF mitigating actions
is suggested in the following.
 Operation, maintenance, and testing:
○ Increase the awareness to CCFs in planning O&M
activities
○ Increase the awareness to CCFs in O&M activities
○ Consider CCFs as part of job safety analyses
○ Clarify the complex or difﬁcult O&M and testing
activities
○ Monitor the inhibits and bypasses
○ Deﬁne the procedures comprehensively
○ Customize the procedures
○ Identify the required preparation tasks and set ups
 Management:
○ Clarify the responsibilities and roles
○ Develop suitable strategies for adequate stafﬁng
○ Improve interdisciplinary communication skills (with
colleagues, supervisors, contractors, and other)
○ Avoid too much individual judgment
○ Make the organizational learning more effective
○ Create enough motivation, morale, and competence in
working and in dealing with circumstances
○ Remove time pressure (required times are available)
○ Remove work pressure (productivity vs. safety, or work
overload vs. work underload), including stress, fatigue
 SIS follow-up:
○ Train in CCF awareness
○ Analyses the reported failures
○ Follow-up the identiﬁed CCFs
○ Determine the consequences of failures to follow rules/
procedures
 Supporting tools and processes:
○ Label adequately (clarity of signs, signals, instructions
and other information)
○ Make additional marking of safety critical components
○ Make adequate access restriction
○ Put security access in place (physical, software)
○ Review the approval process (in relation to planning,
restoration, and modiﬁcation)
○ Deﬁne adequate measures to avoid spurious activations
(stress level, human machine interface)
○ Provide appropriate tools for task
○ Provide proper working environment (noise, heat, light-
ing, ventilation, and other)
12. Updating: If new HOFs are revealed during the operating
phase, they should be added to the initial list of HOFs. The
procedure will then have to be updated. In the same way, if
initial HOFs are shown to be non-relevant, they should be
removed from the list. We may also need to update the
weights of the HOFs.
6. Conclusions
This article has proposed a framework to manage the factors
inﬂuencing beta-factor of SISs in the operational phase to help the
SIS users in maintaining the required SIS reliability. In the opera-
tional phase, the SIS hardware architecture and the components
will usually remain unchanged unless there is a call for modiﬁca-
tion. The main changes in the likelihood of CCFs are therefore the
result of factors related to HOFs and a changing operational
environment. The actual beta-factor in the operational phase
may differ from the predicted one and the proposed framework
is therefore intended as a management tool for keeping the beta-
factor below an acceptable upper limit throughout the operational
phase.
The basis for the proposed framework is the simple beta-factor
model, and the beta-factor is assumed to be determined based on
answers to the questions in IEC 61508, possibly with some
additional questions.
The proposed method is based on observed values of indicators
that provide information about the changing status of HOFs—in
line with an approach suggested by Øien [22] for follow-up of
organizational factor that inﬂuences risk on offshore oil and gas
installations.
Further research may be required to ﬁnd a formula for
calculating the actual beta-factor during the operational phase.
This has to be obtained based on the amount of changes in the
states of HOFs and their effects on the beta-factor. It may be
necessary to check the relevancy of the answers to the IEC 61508
questions used for estimation of the beta-factor and actual SIS
operational conditions.
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Abstract—The offshore oil and gas industry is currently moving 
into the arctic region. The harsh arctic environment will have an 
unavoidable influence on the reliability of the equipment 
operated in it. To understand this influence is of vital importance 
to ensure the reliability of the equipment and the production 
availability of the systems. Several types of data, such as data on 
design, production, usage intensity, and operating environment 
are required to assess and verify the reliability of the equipment. 
This paper proposes a framework for reliability assessment based 
on proportional hazards modeling and various types of data. It 
presents important arctic factors influencing the physical 
performance and discusses how these may influence the 
reliability of the equipment. 
Keywords-reliability prediction; proportional hazard model; 
arctic environment 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The offshore oil and gas industry is currently exploring new 
areas in the southern part of the Arctic and is contemplating 
moving even further to the North. Several arctic characteristics 
influence the reliability of the equipment operated in such an 
environment. To understand this influence is of vital 
importance to ensure the reliability of the equipment and the 
production availability of the systems. 
To identify potential problems and to estimate failure rates 
at an early stage in the process of product development is 
important due to the high cost of making design modifications 
later in the development cycle. Reliability predictions that are 
updated along with the development process can provide 
stakeholders with information in their decision-making. 
Additional objectives of reliability assessments and predictions 
are: 
x to identify potential design weaknesses, 
x to compare alternative designs, 
x to provide data for system reliability and availability 
assessments, and  
x to establish objectives for reliability tests. 
Reliability requirements may be stated according to IEC 
60300-3-4 [1] and should be based on (1) the application of the 
equipment; (2) the failure criteria, i.e., what constitutes a 
failure of the equipment with the intended application; (3) the 
operating conditions; (4) the environmental conditions; and (5) 
the methods intended to be applied for the requirement 
determination.  
Offshore oil and gas installations comprise equipment and 
structural elements, such as well equipment, X-mas trees, 
manifolds, pipelines and risers, floating production, storage and 
offloading (FPSO) vessels, and many more. In some cases, 
equipment might have previously been used in other 
environments and is therefore considered as proven technology. 
The arctic environment, however, represents a new challenge 
for much of the equipment and further research is often 
required before it is qualified for use.  
The influences of the arctic environment on equipment 
reliability will generally depend on the application of the 
equipment and where it is located. Topside equipment and 
connection equipment such as risers and cables might be much 
more influenced by the harsh environment than well and 
seabed equipment, although they might experience similar 
stresses as in southern areas.  
The objective of this paper is to outline and discuss 
important arctic conditions that influence the reliability of 
topside offshore oil and gas equipment, and to present 
approaches to reliability prediction based on levels of data 
availability. The paper focuses on offshore oil and gas facilities 
operated in an arctic environment, but the approach should be 
applicable also in similar cases in other industry sectors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the characteristics of the arctic environment and its 
challenges as an operating environment. In Section III, we 
discuss reliability prediction and current methods, and we 
describe the proportional hazard (PH) model. Section IV 
proposes approaches to reliability prediction for different 
scenarios and identifies a set of arctic factors influencing 
equipment reliability. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 
The Arctic is a region located at the northern-most part of 
the Earth (latitude 66Û
 QRUWK 7KH LQIUDVWUXFWXUH LQ WKHVH
areas is limited with low population density and few industrial 
establishments to support the petroleum industry. 
Until recently, arctic developments have been either 
onshore or in water depths less than 50m in moderate arctic 
conditions. The challenges related to exploration and 
production increase as the activities move to deeper waters, 
where bottom-founded structures may not be feasible, to areas 
with iceberg occurrences and regions with multi-year ice, such 
as the Beaufort Sea, with ice thicknesses up to 8m and ice keel 
depths that regularly exceed 20m [2]. 
The Industry Technology Facilitator (ITF) classifies the 
challenges related to the arctic environment in four categories 
[3]: 
1) The harshness of the arctic climate: The arctic climate 
is characterized by long and cold winters and short and 
cool summers. The winter temperatures can be lower 
than -50Û& RYHU ODUJH SDUWV RI WKH $UFWLF Dnd the 
average summer temperatures can range from about -
10 to +10Û&$GGLWLRQDOO\ IRJ LV FRPPRQGXULQJ WKH
summer. 
2) The impact of ice: Parts of the Arctic have permafrost 
such that the ground is frozen throughout the year. A 
portion of the northern oceans is covered by sea ice for 
at least a part of the year. For example, the average 
extent of Arctic sea ice in December 2008 was 12.53 
million square kilometers. This was 140,000 square 
kilometers more than in December 2007, and 830,000 
square kilometers less than the December average for 
the period 1979 to 2000. Sea ice is the dominant 
surface type throughout the year in the Arctic Basin 
and covers much of the ocean surface at some point 
during the year. 
3) The sensitivity of the environment: The ultimate target 
is zero discharge and emission to the Arctic. Arctic 
ecosystems are especially vulnerable to oil pollution as 
the limited sunlight and cold Arctic climate do not 
allow for rapid decay of organic pollutants. 
Hydrocarbons are likely to remain and concentrate in 
the flat, poorly drained soils and shallow depressions 
of the Arctic landscape. 
During spring melting, contaminants tend to follow the 
run-off, ending up in rivers and oceans. Pollution from 
oil and gas activities can potentially devastate the 
Arctic marine environment. Associated threats include 
water dispersal in the drilling phase, and the actual 
drilling process, which can release oil and chemicals 
into the water. 
4) The remoteness of the location: In the Arctic, 24 hours 
of daylight and 24 hours of night occur at least once a 
year. The distance from the operational field to 
relevant resources is often very long. 
III. RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
Reliability is defined as the ability of an item to perform a 
required function for a stated period of time and under stated 
environmental and operational conditions [4]. The reliability of 
an item can be expressed with quantitative measures such as 
the failure rate function. Some authors prefer to use the term 
hazard rate for the failure rate.  
A. Reliability Prediction Methods 
Several methods for reliability prediction have been 
proposed in the literature. Foucher et al. [5] study the reliability 
of electronic devices and classify the reliability prediction 
methods into three categories: (1) bottom–up statistical 
methods, (2) top–down similarity analysis methods based on an 
external failure database, and (3) bottom–up physics-of-failure 
methods. The first two categories are based on statistical 
analysis of failure data, while the last category is based on 
physics-of-failure models. They compare the methods based on 
eight specified criteria related to accuracy, ease of data 
exchange, amount of devoted resources, time to obtain 
reliability estimate, ease of customization, traceability, 
repeatability and ability for evolution. They conclude that the 
best reliability prediction will be achieved by a combination of 
different methods, depending on the phase of equipment’s 
lifecycle and on the objectives and assumptions of the 
manufacturer or the customer.  
A survey of mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) prediction 
methods is documented in EPSMA [6] where applications and 
limitations of the different methods are also discussed. The 
identified methods provide models for many types of 
components and assemblies and for different environments. 
Most of the methods for reliability prediction of electronic 
equipment are based on the parts count technique (prediction at 
reference condition) and the part stress technique (prediction at 
operating condition) presented in MIL-HDBK-217F [7], which 
provides failure rate estimates for many types of electronic 
components for temperatures between 0 Û&DQGÛ& 
IEC 61709 [8] presents stress models and values for 
electronic components as a basis for conversion of the failure 
rate data from reference (baseline) conditions to the actual 
operating conditions. The stated stress models are generic for 
the different component types and contain constants that are 
averages of typical component values taken from tests or 
specified by different manufacturers.  
The main limitation of these methods is that the predictions 
are limited to temperatures higher than 0Û&DQG WKHUHIRUHQRW
directly applicable to the arctic environment. 
Several factors will influence the equipment reliability, and 
we refer to these as reliability-influencing factors (RIFs). A 
RIF is a relatively stable condition, which by being changed 
will have a positive or negative effect on the reliability of the 
equipment. The RIFs should be identified and should, as far as 
possible, be quantified and monitored. A RIF may be constant 
(e.g., a design or material feature) or may vary (rather slowly) 
in time, such as temperature or ice formation [9]. Ascher and 
Feingold [10] list 18 generic RIFs that influence the failure 
behavior of a repairable system, but they claim that those RIFs 
are usually ignored in reliability analysis. 
The most commonly used models for times between 
failures for repairable systems are renewal processes and 
homogeneous Poisson processes (HPPs). In a renewal process 
the times between failures are assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed. An HPP is a special type of a renewal 
process where it, in addition, is assumed that the times between 
failures are exponentially distributed, i.e., with a constant 
failure rate. This means that repairable systems where the 
observed data indicate any form of trend due to deterioration or 
improvement of the system, these models are not appropriate. 
A model with time-dependent failure intensity, such as a non-
homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) may be a better choice 
[4,11,12]. 
The models mentioned above consider the time between 
failures as the sole variable of interest. This may be too 
restrictive since various RIFs can influence the system 
reliability. In the past, a rule-of-thumb was either to ignore the 
presence of RIFs or to split the data sets into two or more 
subsets based on the major differences in the data sets. 
To obtain more realistic estimates of the reliability 
parameters, various types of regression models have been 
suggested and the RIFs are included in the models as 
explanatory variables. Some of the RIFs are qualitative and to 
include such a RIF into the regression model, it is necessary to 
define one or more measurable indicators that are correlated 
with the RIF. This indicator is called a covariate or 
concomitant variable. A covariate may be a continuous 
variable, a discrete variable taking several values, or a binary 
variable. The binary variable takes the value 1 when a specific 
feature is present and the value 0 when the feature is not 
present. 
The most commonly used regression-type models for 
reliability analysis fall into two categories [13]. The first 
category is called accelerated failure time models, and assumes 
that the effect of a covariate is to multiply the time to failure by 
some constant. In this method, the covariates influence how 
fast the time is running. The accelerated failure time model can 
be used together with parametric life models such as the 
exponential [14,15], Weibull, log-normal, and extreme value 
distributions [16]. The second category includes models from 
the proportional hazards family [17]. 
B. Proportional Hazards Models 
In a proportional hazards (PH) model, the actual, 
application-specific failure rate function, ( )zh t , is determined 
by multiplying a baseline failure rate function, 0 ( )h t , by a 
positive function, ( )g z  , of covariates such that: 
                     0( ) ( ) ( )zh t h t g z .                                    (1) 
Here,  1 2, ,..., nz z z z  is a vector of n covariates (or RIFs). 
The baseline failure rate function 0 ( )h t is obtained for some 
specified normal/known state of the covariates. The covariates 
will, in the PH model, not change the shape of the failure rate 
function, but rather change its scale by multiplying the baseline 
failure rate with a factor that is determined by the covariates. 
Cox [18] used the PH model to estimate the effects of 
different covariates on the times to failures of a system. He 
suggested a new functional form for the proportionality 
function ( )g z  such that  
                       0 1( ) ( ) exp nz j jjh t h t zD  ¦                          (2) 
where 1 2, ,..., nD D D  are unknown parameters that must be  
today the most commonly used PH model in life data analyses. 
By taking the logarithm of (2), a linear expression of the 
covariates 1 2, ,..., nz z z  is obtained, such that the parameters can 
be estimated based on linear regression analysis. The 
regression analysis developed by Cox [18] is based on partial 
likelihoods and the total approach is usually called Cox 
regression analysis. 
The survivor function corresponding to the failure rate in (2) is 
given by 
                          
 1
0( ) ( )
n
j jj
z
zR t R t
D ¦                                 (3) 
where 0 ( )R t  is the baseline reliability function for the specified 
normal states of the covariates and is given by 
                       0 00( ) exp ( )
t
R t h x dxª º  « »¬ ¼³ .                            (4) 
Different functional forms of (.)g , however, may also be 
used other than exponential, for example, a logistic form, 
 log 1 exp( )zD , an inverse linear form,  1 1 zD  , or a 
linear form,  1 zD . More details on the theory and 
applications of the proportional hazards model may be found in 
[18].  
In the PH model as presented above, the covariates are 
constants in time. It is, however, also possible to let the 
covariates vary with a time W  that may be a time concept that 
is different from the time to failure, such as the calendar time 
from production start-up – while the time to failure may be 
measured as the operational time since the equipment was 
installed or replaced. 
The PH model, and especially the Cox-model, has been 
applied extensively in medical research [19] and also in 
reliability applications [17]. 
IV. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
To apply quantitative reliability techniques we need to have 
relevant data available. This section presents some categories 
of data and data sources that are necessary to obtain for 
realistic reliability estimation. Thereafter a framework for 
predicting the application-specific reliability of systems 
operated in an arctic environment is presented.  
A. Data and Data Sources 
Several categories of data are required to model and 
analyze the reliability of a system. A survey of hardware 
reliability data sources is given in [20].  
x Technical data are usually supplied by equipment 
manufacturers and are necessary for understanding 
equipment functions and for developing system models. 
Based on this type of data, similarities among or 
between equipment can be identified. 
x Operational and maintenance data are collected under 
actual operating condition by the customers, and are 
plant/system specific. A commonly used database is 
the OREDA handbook [21], which provides data for 
equipment used in offshore oil and gas production and 
processing. 
x Environmental data provide information about the 
operating conditions for the product and need to be 
incorporated into the reliability analyses. Arctic 
environmental metadata, Arctic ocean data, arctic 
environmental data directory, and real-time polar wind 
data can be used for a better understanding of 
influencing factors. 
x Regulations and standards give requirements to the 
operation of systems and equipment in the arctic 
environment.  
x Expert judgment plays a central role in the provision of 
data for new applications. Experts may possess 
valuable knowledge that can provide important input to 
decision-makers. 
x Test data for parts and components are particularly 
required for new items for which no historical data are 
available, but also true for existing items that are to be 
used in new applications.  
x Ideally, test data are obtained from designed 
experiments conducted under carefully controlled 
conditions. For complex systems, very extensive 
testing would be required [22]. 
B. Framework Development 
Fig. 1 shows a proposed framework for prediction of 
reliability of equipment in an arctic environment. The main 
steps of the framework are described in the following. 
- Equipment description: The equipment should be 
carefully described, including structure, materials and 
functional requirements. The description may be in the form of 
drawings, text, data or other relevant documents. 
- Failure modes and failure causes: All the relevant failure 
modes for the equipment must be identified and described, for 
example, in a detailed FMECA [4]. The causes and the RIFs of 
each failure mode should be identified, with special emphasis 
on failure causes related to the arctic environment. Some 
failure causes are linked to various types of events, such as 
environmental events, construction events, events related to 
human and organization, and removal and reinstallation events 
[23]. Some relevant failure causes and RIFs are illustrated in 
the influence diagram in Fig. 2. The identification and 
evaluation of arctic RIFs require detailed physical and 
operational insight, and judgments from experts in several 
fields. The RIFs identified in Fig. 2 are described briefly in the 
following.  
x Remoteness of location: Combined with the harsh 
climate, the remoteness presents challenges in terms of 
availability of tools and other resources. 
x High humidity and fog may result in ice fog, lack of 
solar radiation, and frosting on windows, visors, and 
glasses of equipment, and may also cause corrosion 
and erosion of the equipment. 
x Cold weather combined with large temperature 
variations and strong wind, may significantly affect 
system reliability if the components and subsystems in 
the system are not properly protected and provisioned. 
Cold weather may also influence welding processes 
and lubrication fluids, and cause more failures [24,25]. 
Materials such as metals, polymers, and concrete may 
fail more frequently in a cold climate due to their 
thermoplastic behavior. Ice and snowdrift on the 
surface of equipment may also increase the weight of 
the structure, which can easily destroy the structure and 
lead to a reduction in reliability. Ice and snow, 
combined with large temperature variation, will cause 
erosion damage. 
Covariates and 
parameters are known
Identify failure modes and 
causes from environment
Publish the result
Equipment descrption 
(functionalities, structurs)
Determining levels of
 data availablity
Estimation of 
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realistic?
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equipment No available 
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Using Cox PH model, and 
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Data from similar
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Figure 1.  Reliability prediction of equipment in an arctic environment 
x Wind loads on the structure refer to the forces induced 
in the part that exerts above the sea level and contains 
equipments that cause drag from the air motion. It may 
indirectly affect the equipment connected to them. 
Arctic has periods of strong wind and with ocean 
currents cause sea ice to move bringing associated 
interaction problems with surface and offshore 
installations. 
x Ice impact: Floating ice sometimes moves in 
unpredictable directions, conditions vary and ice 
fractions change quickly and may impact equipment 
and result in disorientation and fracture [3]. 
x Current can contribute significantly to the total force 
applied in the submerged part of the structure. 
Common categories of current are tidal, circulation and 
currents generated by storm. 
x Wave characteristics such as height, period, and 
directions of loads must be considered to describe the 
sea state conditions of a selected site. 
Having identified all relevant RIFs and quantified them as 
covariates, we can then use expert judgment and physical 
insight to delimit the number of covariates and check whether 
it is relevant to combine two or more covariates or to scale 
some of the covariates, which is essential a process of selecting 
covariates iz . We let  1 2, ,..., nz z z z  denote the set of 
covariates after having combined and/or scaled the initial 
covariates. 
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Figure 2.  Arctic influencing factors on physical performance of equipment 
- Determining the baseline failure rate function 0 ( )h t : The 
Cox model seems suitable for reliability application and 
inclusion of covariates in the oil and gas industry [9,17]. The 
baseline failure rate function, 0 ( )h t , should be chosen as the 
failure rate function for the equipment used in an existing field 
with covariates as close to the actual covariates as possible; 
provided that a sufficient amount of operational data are 
available from this field. In most cases, available data can only 
be used to estimate a constant failure rate. If the time-depend 
failure rate function is desired, it may be possible to use 
knowledge about the deterioration mechanisms to determine 
the shape of the failure rate curve and then to use the estimate 
of the constant failure rate to determine the scale parameter of 
the failure rate function. 
- Determining levels of data availability: To use failure 
data from non-arctic environments, it is necessary to carefully 
compare the actual equipment with the equipment used in the 
non-arctic environment. The comparison should be conducted 
based on the characteristics of the considered equipment 
obtained in the first step, and compared with the characteristics 
of the equipment used in the non-arctic environments. The 
results are classified in three levels: experience from identical, 
similar, or different equipment. For these levels, approaches of 
reliability prediction are discussed in the following: 
a) Available data from identical equipment: There might be 
available data from the same type of equipment, which 
has been operated in this environment. Uncertainty of 
determining both covariates 1 2, ,..., nz z z and parameters 
1 2, ,..., nD D D  is in its lowest since they may be known 
from available data. 
b) Available data from similar equipment: There might be 
available data from a similar type of equipment 
operated in this environment. In this case, the 
covariates depend on the functions of considered 
equipment. Some of the covariates 1 2, ,..., nz z z may be 
known and then the remaining covariates need to be 
determined.  
c) No available data for equipment under consideration: 
There are neither relevant available data from a type of 
equipment in the same industry nor with a similar 
function in this environment.  
- Determining unknown covariates: The unknown 
covariates 1 2, ,..., nz z z need to be quantified for the relevant 
environment. 
- Estimation of parameters: The parameters 1 2, ,..., nD D D  
need to be estimated by expert judgment supported by the 
data/covariates from the other fields and possible analyses of 
these datasets. For each covariate, iz , the experts should study 
the comparable covariates and failure rate functions for the 
other fields and suggest a parameter value iD that represents an 
extrapolation of the results from the other fields.  
The BORA project [26] is concerned with reliability 
assessment of safety barriers on offshore oil and gas 
installations. The approach is based on a set of generic RIFs 
that are classified into the five categories: human factors, task-
related factors, technical factors, administrative factors, and 
organizational factors. The RIFs to be used for the specific 
assessment are selected by expert judgment from this set and 
delimited to maximum six. An influence diagram is then set up 
linking the RIFs to a defined failure mode. The state of each 
RIF is classified into one out of six possible states and a 
scoring and weighing process is used to determine the effects 
of each RIF. Elements from the BORA approach might also be 
used as part of the framework outlined in this paper.  
An alternative approach based on a PH model is suggested 
by Brissaud et al. [27]. This approach is also based on a set of 
RIFs that are classified into five categories: design, 
manufacture, installation, operation, and maintenance. The 
estimation of the application-specific failure rate is comparable 
to the approach in MIL-HDBK-217F [7], but the determination 
of the multiplicative factors is done in another way by a scoring 
a weighting procedure. Several elements of their approach 
might be used as part of the framework in this paper. 
Zuashkiani et al. [28] present a methodology for elicitation 
of expert’s beliefs and experience for estimation of the 
parameters of a PH model with time-dependent covariates 
which is based on case analyses and case comparisons. Each 
case describes a combination of a system’s working age and 
covariate values. This method results in a set of inequalities 
which define a feasible space for the parameter values. The 
empirical prior distribution can be estimated by sampling from 
the feasible space. Then, using Bayes formula and statistical 
data, the posterior distribution can be obtained. 
Mazzuchi et al. [29] use a paired-comparison technique for 
expert judgment to develop a relationship for the probability of 
failure (using a PH model) as a function of influencing factors 
in a new environment. A regression model is fit from the 
failure rate estimates to the environmental variables and is used 
as an estimate of the failure of new environment. 
- Calculation of the failure rate function: The actual failure 
rate for the considered equipment should be calculated based 
on the Cox model in (2).  
- Checking the result: As a final step, the experts should 
review the failure rate function ( )zh t  and see if it is realistic. If 
not, they may have the opportunity to modify some of their 
iD  
estimates. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The producer needs to identify quality problems and 
potential failures early in the development process to be able to 
implement improvements in a cost-effective way. Among the 
reliability prediction methods, the Cox model is an important 
supplement to the traditional tools for reliability analysis, as it 
provides the opportunity for incorporating the effect of RIFs. In 
this paper, a framework for reliability prediction of equipment 
operating in an arctic environment is proposed based on the 
Cox model. It has been discussed how the Cox model can be 
used for reliability prediction of equipment based on levels of 
data availability. Some important arctic reliability-influencing 
factors for offshore oil and gas equipment have been identified 
and their effects have been discussed. The development of the 
framework has been based on theoretical studies and 
experience from OREDA and the BORA project. Several 
approaches to estimate the effects of the RIFs are suggested. 
But the proposed methodology has not yet been evaluated. This 
will be done in a follow-up study, and a thorough case study 
will also be carried out in our future work.  
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Abstract
Subsea oil and gas production and processing are 
specialized applications with particular demands. 
The reliability of subsea equipment is very im-
portant due to the extremely high repair and 
downtime costs, and the potential environmental 
consequences of oil spills to the sea – especially 
now when the industry is moving into more sensi-
tive areas, such as the Arctic region. To develop 
subsea equipment that fulfills the strict reliability 
requirements requires high competence and ana-
lytical skills, and carefully designed procedures. 
This cannot be achieved overnight and the sub-
sea industry has to adopt a long-term improve-
ment strategy and needs to learn from other in-
dustries that are exposed to similar strict reliability 
requirements, such as the nuclear, aviation, and 
space industries. This paper outlines how to inte-
grate continuous reliability improvement into the 
various phases of the development of new subsea 
equipment, and the paper is structured according 
to the product development model of Murthy et al. 
(2008). By lessons learned from reliability activi-
ties in various phases of a product’s life-cycle, the 
understanding of failures will increase, and there-
fore the product’s reliability can continuously im-
prove. 
1. Introduction
The subsea oil and gas industry is an industry 
with strict requirements to the reliability of their 
equipment. The provision of new subsea technol-
ogy with an acceptable level of reliability is a pre-
requisite to achieve high production availability 
and low maintenance costs. The time to the first 
planned intervention may be at least five years, 
and it is important that the system is able to sur-
vive this period without failure. If a critical failure 
occurs during the operational phase, the associ-
ated cost will be extremely high. Therefore, crite-
ria must be prepared with regard to development 
and testing to fulfill safety and environmental re-
quirements. The suppliers of subsea equipment 
are required to verify that their equipment is able 
to meet the end-users’ stated requirements re-
garding functional performance and reliability 
(Andersen, 2006). 
Considering the reliability and reliability improve-
ment from early in the equipment development 
process is crucial, and inadequate attention can 
have significant effects on the whole useful life of 
the equipment (Khan, 2001). 
A reliability improvement process aims to identify, 
correct, and eliminate design and manufacturing 
deficiencies and failure modes. Reliability im-
provement techniques can be applied to a new 
product, to a developed product that the manufac-
turer wishes to make more competitive, or to an 
existing product that is not meeting the end-user’s 
expectations of reliability performance. Presuma-
bly, the latter case should not occur because the 
desired level of reliability should be designed into 
the product before the design is released to pro-
duction. 
The development of highly reliable subsea equip-
ment is not a matter of chance, and a long-term 
reliability improvement plan must be adhered to 
during the design and development phases.  
The implementation of a reliability improvement 
process should start by carefully including reliabil-
ity into the subsea system requirements. It will 
influence the design process and the way reliabil-
ity is managed during design and manufacturing 
in the subsea industry. It will also influence the 
way systems are selected with increased empha-
sis on a supplier’s reliability management capabil-
ity (BP, 2002). 
The reliability improvement process needs to be 
followed continuously as equipment moves 
through its life-cycle phases. 
The objective of this paper is to outline a reliability 
improvement process for subsea equipment that 
can be integrated with the product development 
process of Murthy et al. (2008). 
The framework will help the subsea equipment 
producers to focus on reliability needs, forecast 
and allocate resources, set direction for reliability 
activities, and consistently deliver improved relia-
bility performance throughout the product devel-
opment process. 
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This paper is based on a literature survey of tech-
nical reports published by companies and also 
academic studies. 
The paper focuses on subsea equipment for the 
oil and gas industry, but it is also applicable for 
other industries that require highly reliable prod-
ucts, such as the aviation and space industry. In 
addition, the main principles that are proposed 
based on the product life-cycle model by Murthy 
et al. (2008), are generic and can also be applied 
to other product life-cycle models. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we get familiar with subsea equipment 
and their high reliability requirement, and Section 
3, briefly presents Murthy et al. (2008) product 
development process. Section 4, describes relia-
bility improvement, and Section 5 proposes a 
model for reliability improvement for subsea 
equipment. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Subsea equipment 
Subsea production systems can range in 
complexity from a single satellite well with a 
flowline linked to a fixed platform, to several wells 
on a template or clustered around a manifold, with 
roduction to a fixed or floating facility, or directly to 
an onshore installation (API-RP-17A, 2006).  
The exploration and exploitation of reservoirs in 
deep and ultra-deep waters, and in other 
challenging environments are usually either 
technically unfeasible or uneconomical by using 
traditional surface facilities such as concrete and 
steel jacket platforms. The development of subsea 
systems is therefore inherently dictated by 
environmental conditions. 
Subsea technology in offshore oil and gas produc-
tion is a highly specialized field of application with 
particular demands. In the development of subsea 
oil and gas equipment, the reliability is an im-
portant factor. The equipment must be reliable 
enough to safeguard the environment, and make 
the exploitation of the subsea hydrocarbons eco-
nomically feasible during a rather long period 
where the environmental conditions will change 
significantly (e.g., reduced pressure, changed 
gas/oil ratio, more produced water, different 
chemical content).  
The deployment of such systems requires special-
ized and very expensive equipment. Any require-
ment to repair or intervention into installed subsea 
equipment will necessarily be very expensive. 
This type of expense can result in economic fail-
ure of the subsea development. 
3. A product development process
Murthy et al. (2008) develop a new model to as-
sist producers in accomplishing the desired prod-
uct performance. The model consists of three 
stages (pre-development, development, and post 
development) and three levels (business, product, 
and component). This model has eight phases as 
listed in Table 1 and briefly described in the fol-
lowing:
Phase Definition 
1 Front-end phase (product definition) 
2 System design phase (product characteris-
tics) 
3 Component (detail) design 
4 Component development 
5 System development 
6 Physical production 
7 Installation, commissioning and operation 
8 Business impacts 
Table 1 – Phases of product development model 
by Murthy et al. (2008). 
Phase 1, involves identifying the need for a new 
product or the need for modification of an existing 
product in accordance with business objectives 
and strategies and the end-user’s needs for the 
product. The decisions related to the product at-
tributes (end-user’s view of the product) are made 
from an overall business perspective. 
Phases 2 and 3 are the most important phases 
from a producer’s perspective. In phase 2, the 
product attributes are translated into product 
characteristics (engineer’s view of the product) 
and the desired performance from phase 1 is 
transformed into a product design, with subsys-
tems and components. 
Phase 3 involves detailed design (proceeding 
from product to component) of the product. All the 
functions identified in phase 2 are transformed 
into a (product) design specification describing the 
individual components and their relevant proper-
ties (Murthy et al., 2008). The design specification 
is used as basis for the specification of compo-
nents to be purchased. This is the start of product 
development for subcontractors, and may involve 
development of new technology. 
Phase 4 deals with product development, from 
component level to the product prototype. 
The items are tested in a controlled environment 
to verify that the desired performance is achieved.  
For a one-of-a-kind product, the prototype may be 
the construction of some selected subsystems 
that require further testing before the final con-
struction of the product is started. 
Phase 5 consists of operational testing. Influence 
from factors such as the usage intensity and the 
operating environment may reveal additional haz-
ards, contributing to a more complete picture of 
the actual product field performance. 
Phase 6 covers the physical production of the 
product and deals with the production of products 
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starting from component and ending with the 
product for release to end-users.  
For a one-of-a-kind product, this implies the final 
construction of a single product at the target ap-
plication. The production process has to be 
adapted so that the product achieves the desired 
performance, and it must not introduce new fail-
ures or have any other negative impact on reliabil-
ity, safety, operability, or maintainability character-
istics of the product. When the production process 
is fine-tuned, the full-scale production of the prod-
uct can start. 
Phase 7 marks the start of the product life-cycle 
for the end-user and is when the product’s reliabil-
ity, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) 
performance, that should be integrated from early 
on in the product development process is chal-
lenged and tested in the field. 
Phase 8 concludes the product development. 
4. Reliability improvement
The reliability improvement process provides a 
means for making advancements when it is ap-
plied early in the design stage, or during major 
design upgrades, or for making evolutionary im-
provements to existing equipment (SEMATECH, 
1995). 
The reliability improvement process will reveal 
deficiencies caused by the design, manufacturing 
process, and/or operation and correct/remove 
these deficiencies by testing instead of during 
operation. It is cost-beneficial over the product 
life-cycle, since it reduces maintenance and 
spares (Tomczykowski, 2009). 
For implementing a reliability improvement 
process, it is important to know in which phase of 
the development process the equipment is. In 
different phases, different activities should be 
carried out, and the cost of improvement varies a 
lot from phase to phase. 
The required resources for successful implemen-
tation of a reliability improvement process are 
summarized in the following: 
x Equipment/facility resources and physical 
assets. 
x Craft people and equipment/process operator 
resources. 
x Material and part resources and establishing 
effective materials management processes. 
x Information resources, and effective 
information technology applications. 
x Technical knowledge/craft skills resources, 
and closing the technical knowledge resource 
gap 
Several references (IEC 60300-3-15, 2009; SE-
MATECH, 1995, Levin & Kalal, 2003) show how 
to link reliability related tasks into the product de-
sign and development process. 
Levin and Kalal (2003) consider the reliability im-
provement process as a proactive process and 
present different reliability strategies regarding 
improving product reliability during the product 
development process, starting from early in the 
product concept phase. 
IEC 60300-3-15 (2009) uses “dependability” as a 
collective term, for describing the availability per-
formance and its influencing factors such as relia-
bility, maintainability, and maintenance support 
performance, and provides guidance for system’s 
dependability – and describes a process for reali-
zation of system dependability through the system 
life-cycle to achieve the intended system perfor-
mance and dependability objectives. 
The reliability improvement processes should be 
mainly based on a simple but practical procedure 
of test, analysis, and fix (TAAF) in an iterative 
manner. The term TAAF is often used to describe 
the sequence of activities by which the failure 
modes are identified, analyzed, and corrected, 
and the corrective action finally validated. It 
should be noted that “fix” refers only to correction 
through re-design and modification to eliminate 
the cause of failure and does not imply repair. 
In a similar way, SEMATECH (1995) presents an 
iterative reliability improvement process with five 
basic steps, which is applied at each phase of the 
equipment life-cycle: 
1. Establish reliability goals and requirements 
for the equipment 
2. Apply reliability engineering or improvement 
activities, as needed 
3. Evaluate the equipment or equipment design 
4. Compare the results of the evaluation with 
the goals and requirements and decide to 
move either to the next step or the next 
phase 
5. Identify problems and root causes 
The process then returns to step 2 and steps 2 
through 5 are repeated until goals and require-
ments are met. 
Reliability improvement of an item is through mi-
nor design, process, and task changes, which 
generally classifies as (SEMATECH, 1995): 
x Strengthening the existing design, by testing 
and/or modeling to identify optimal design 
changes to improve reliability. 
x Redesigning part or all of the system, by 
considering redundancy, and incorporating 
error detection techniques. 
x Eliminating known causes of failure, by using 
screening and burn-in procedures to elimi-
nate weak components, and using more reli-
able parts.
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5. Model development
Activities associated with the reliability improve-
ment process may vary as the equipment moves 
from one phase of the product development pro-
cess to the next. This variation results from a 
change in focus from phase to phase, and from 
the fact that an activity performed in one phase 
lays the foundation for activities in subsequent 
phases. Activities will also vary depending on 
whether the improvement process is applied con-
tinuously as equipment moves through its life-
cycle (from the front-end phase to disposal), or 
whether it is applied for the first time to equipment 
that is in some advanced (other than concept and 
feasibility) phase (SEMATECH, 1995). 
For continuous reliability improvement in the sub-
sea product development process, we assume the 
following organizational issues to be available: 
x Training, experience, and education in 
reliability: These are required for effective 
and systematic involvement of reliability in 
equipment design. 
x Research and development: The research 
should be carried out in order to develop 
concepts, tools, and methods to support the 
reliability strategies. 
x Organizational learning: This involves the 
collection and analysis of data and the 
generation of lessons learned into a 
knowledge base, and integrate them to 
improve system practices. 
Fig. 1 shows the proposed framework for continu-
ous reliability improvement within the product 
development process by Murthy et al. (2008). The 
main tasks of this framework are described in the 
following:
Phase 1, Front-end phase 
This phase includes the following task: 
1) Define reliability requirements: The product 
reliability requirements should be defined in a 
realistic way and determined by factors in-
cluding the targeted application conditions 
and performance expectations. The product 
requirements should consider the end-user’s 
needs and the manufacturer’s ability to meet 
those needs. For one-of-a-kind subsea sys-
tems, the end-user will usually specify strict 
reliability requirements, and acceptable out-
age times. 
2) Develop reliability plan: A reliability plan is 
created to document how the reliability re-
quirements will be achieved. It should mainly 
consist of; activities to be performed, required 
resources, schedule, procedures and regula-
tions, required organizations and people for 
performing the activities. 
The reliability plan provides a mean of meas-
uring progress and assuring that require-
ments will be accomplished for both producer 
and end-user. 
Phase 2, System design phase 
This phase includes the following tasks: 
1) Redefine reliability requirement: The re-
quirements should be redefined as they de-
fine the design requirements and form the 
basis for design specification. They need to 
be well-defined and understandable by de-
sign engineers and manufacturers. Require-
ments can be both qualitative (e.g., definition 
of responsibilities and program requirements) 
and quantitative (e.g., mean time between 
failures). Redefining the requirements can be 
done according to the steps provided by IEC 
62347 (2006) for system dependability re-
quirements. 
2) Create system reliability model: A reliability 
block diagram (RBD), or a fault tree analysis 
(FTA) can be used (for more detail see Rau-
sand & Høyland, 2004). 
3) Identify the system problems: Identify the 
potential failure modes, mechanisms, com-
mon cause failure by which the product can 
be expected to fail, and then to prioritize fail-
ure mechanisms for efficient product devel-
opment. Common failure mechanisms for 
mechanical products are corrosion, binding, 
and fracture. Specific root causes, including 
thermal overstress, electrical overstress, con-
tamination, wear out, and mechanical dam-
age must be identified. A precisely completed 
FMECA will help the analysis process and 
save valuable time (IEC 60812, 1985). 
4) Set up a failure reporting analysis and correc-
tive action system (FRACAS): FRACAS is a 
closed loop feedback system used to collect 
and record data, analyze trends, and track 
problems to root cause. It is ensuring the da-
ta integrity and that appropriate data entry 
fields are in place. For most of the new sub-
sea equipment, historical data from previous 
applications is not available. 
5) Conduct evaluation: Evaluation at this stage 
comprises a conceptual design review. 
6) Corrective actions: If the design requirements 
are not met, problems and root causes 
should be identified and corrective actions 
have to be performed. 
Phase 3, Component design 
This phase includes the following tasks: 
1) Expand reliability model: As the product de-
velopment process proceeds, it is required to 
continually change, expand, and improve the 
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reliability model. This allows the model to be 
used throughout the development process of 
the equipment. 
2) Data collection: Since the equipment in the 
design phase has yet not been built, actual 
failure data may not be available. Therefore, 
historical failure data from systems that are 
similar to previous generations of equipment 
should be collected. For systems where no 
historical data is available, expert judgment 
can be used. 
3) Reliability prediction: At this stage the predic-
tion can be done based on the previous 
knowledge of equipment. The main reliability 
prediction methods are discussed in Rahimi 
& Rausand (2013). 
4) Reliability allocation: This involves allocating 
or apportioning the equipment reliability into 
individual subsystems, and components. 
There are several basic models available 
such as the equal-apportionment technique, 
the ARINC apportionment technique and 
AGREE allocation methods which all are de-
scribing in detail in MIL-HDBK-338B (1998). 
5) Vendor/supplier selection (for received 
items): Ensure that the supply-chain partici-
pants have the capability to produce the parts 
(materials) and services necessary to meet 
the final reliability objectives. 
6) Material/part selection: Select the parts (ma-
terials) that have sufficient quality and are 
capable of delivering the expected perfor-
mance and reliability in the application. 
7) Detail design review: A detail design review 
of the proposed design is carried out to eval-
uate the design and how well the design re-
flects the desired performance. The reliability 
requirements and the predicted reliability val-
ues should be compared. If requirements are 
not met, the problems should be identified. 
8) Identify system detail problems: This can be 
performed in the same way as the previous 
phase. 
9) Set reliability improvement goal: Once the 
areas of improvement are known with the 
identified key problem areas, the ways of im-
proving reliability and overcoming the obsta-
cles leading to failure have to be found. 
10) Corrective actions: If the design does not 
comply with the requirements, corrective ac-
tions have to be performed. Some of the 
basic practices according to SEMATECH 
(1995) are: 
• Adding high-level redundancy. Including 
more than one method for accomplish-
ing a function by having particular parts 
or subassemblies in parallel, rather than 
in series. Redundancy is sometimes the 
only cost-effective way to design reliable 
equipment. 
• Using proven high reliability components 
and parts: To the extent possible, the 
components that have history of working 
in the same or similar application areas 
(i.e., proven) should be used. This will 
minimize the analyses and testing re-
quired for demonstrating the reliability of 
the equipment. 
• Simplification. Added parts or aspects 
increase the number of failure modes, 
therefore simplification of equipment 
configuration is one of the substantial 
solutions. A common practice in simplifi-
cation is component integration, which is 
the use of a single component to per-
form multiple functions. 
• Derating. Derating is the practice of us-
ing components or materials at environ-
mental conditions or loads that are less 
severe than their limiting condition. Un-
der these conditions, the component or 
material is expected to be more reliable. 
Phase 4, Component development 
This phase includes the following tasks: 
1) Develop test plan: The aspects that the test 
plan should consider are; test objectives, pa-
rameters, sample size, duration, and envi-
ronments. 
2) Component testing: The component proto-
types tests are intended to explore the engi-
neering characteristics of components such 
as strength, fatigue, fracture, tolerances, cor-
rosion, and aging. The use of physics-of-
failure concepts coupled with mechanistic 
and probabilistic techniques are used to as-
sess the potential problems and trade-offs. 
The examples of standards that can be used 
for reliability testing are: IEC 61163-1 (2006), 
IEC 61163-2 (1998), SEMATECH (1995), 
MIL-HDBK-781A (1996), MIL-STD-810G 
(2008). 
3) Data collection: The test data should be col-
lected and supplemented by expert judg-
ment. If a FRACAS was initiated earlier, it 
needs to be updated.  
4) Update reliability prediction: The previously 
predicted reliability should be updated based 
on the collected data and using a prediction 
method (Rahimi & Rausand, 2012). 
5) Reliability evaluation of received items: Reli-
ability evaluation of received subsystems, 
components and parts allows the producer to 
choose those that are the best and that meet 
the reliability needs of their equipment. 
6) Conduct evaluation: An evaluation should be 
conducted in order to assess the reliability 
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level of equipment or its design. The reliabil-
ity of various prototypes is evaluated based 
on the test data. 
7) Corrective actions: In case of problems, cor-
rective actions have to be developed and 
performed.  
Phase 5, System development 
This phase includes the following tasks: 
1) Product testing: Prototype tests are intended 
to explore the effects of component interac-
tions under relevant loading and environmen-
tal conditions. For subsea equipment, it is not 
possible to perform operational testing of a 
prototype in a real environment. Instead vir-
tual product testing by means of simulation 
can be performed. However, some opera-
tional testing may still be performed under 
similar operational conditions, and some con-
trolling factors may possibly be changed. The 
standards that can be used for prototype test-
ing are mentioned in phase 4. 
2) Data collection: This can be performed in the 
same way as in the previous phase. 
3) Update reliability prediction: This can be per-
formed in the same way as in the previous 
phase. 
4) Conduct evaluation: Reliability of the proto-
type is evaluated based on the test data. The 
results of the testing should be compared to 
the requirements to see if they have been 
met.
5) Corrective actions: If a FRACAS was initiat-
ed, it might identify corrective actions that 
could be implemented to eliminate failures. 
Other possibilities include; procedural and 
process changes. 
6) Develop preventive maintenance plan: A pre-
ventive maintenance (PM) plan can be de-
veloped for subsystems and components that 
degrade equipment performance. Partner-
ships established with suppliers are continu-
ally nurtured and purchased subsystems and 
components are continually evaluated. 
Phase 6, Physical production 
This phase includes the following tasks: 
1) Manufacturer selection: The manufacturing 
and assembly processes must be capable of 
producing the product as specified in the de-
sign. Variability in properties and processes 
will influence the reliability of the product. 
Therefore, the characteristics of the process 
must be identified, assessed, and monitored. 
2) Manufacturing process improvement: The 
defects of manufacturing should be identified 
and corrected. A process FMECA may be 
carried out when there is a new process, a 
modification to an existing process, or when 
an existing process is used in a new envi-
ronment or location. 
3) Performance tracking and analysis: Tracking 
the reliability performance of product and an-
alyzing the data is necessary in order to gen-
erate useful reliability metrics. The end-user, 
producer, and suppliers shall collaborate in 
the development of field performance report-
ing systems. Data shall be collected on sys-
tems, component performance and failures. 
One of the reliability data collection schemes 
is OREDA (2002). 
4) Variation reduction: Quality improvement re-
quires the never-ending reduction of variation 
in product and process performance around 
desired values. 
5) Production hazard management: Hazards 
are required to be identified, assessed and 
controlled when the production processes are 
planned, and whenever any changes are 
made to the system or method of production, 
substances, and also prior to purchase, hire, 
lease, or commissioning of plant or sub-
stances. 
6) Reliability assurance: The contractors, sup-
pliers, and producer are expected to provide 
documentary evidence to assure the end-
user that the required reliability can be and 
will be achieved. The references to evidence 
of reliability achievement will generally come 
from the reliability analysis, calculation, and 
simulations, along with the documents from 
testing and expert opinion 
Phase 7, Installation, commissioning and 
operation 
This phase includes the following tasks: 
1) Installer/commissioner selection: They must 
be capable of their services within the statis-
tical process window required by the design. 
This can be done as described for manufac-
turer selection. 
2) Installation/commissioning process improve-
ment: Defects and failures should be tracked, 
and implementation of corrective actions for 
improving the processes is required. Likewise 
the manufacturing processes, a process 
FMECA can be carried out here. 
Phase 8, Business impacts 
This phase includes the following task: 
1) Realign reliability policies: The key to the 
success or failure of the whole process de-
pends on management’s perception of relia-
bility. Their views should consider competi-
tive advantages, such as reduced down-time, 
maintenance costs and production losses  
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and therefore make a direct contribution to 
profitability. The areas that may need recon-
sideration are such as; end-users’ feedback 
and satisfaction survey, vision and goal, 
business and resources plans, benchmark-
ing, warranty requirements, and etc. 
6. Concluding remarks
There is no magical trick that can be used to de-
velop reliable products overnight nor is there a 
single technique that can optimize the reliability in 
a short period of time. The success lies in con-
scious, systematic, and rigorous efforts conducted 
throughout the entire design and development 
process of the product. 
Reliability improvement takes time and fore-
thought and requires a commitment to change 
and continuous development. It must be an in-
separable part of design and development pro-
cess strategies. 
This paper proposes a framework that integrates 
the reliability improvement into the product devel-
opment process proposed by Murthy et al. (2008).  
The framework provides the required reliability 
related tasks in each phase of the product devel-
opment process. This will also give an insight into 
some of the tools and techniques that are essen-
tial in achieving the right strategy for highly relia-
ble products such as subsea equipment. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain all 
the tools and techniques that are related to the 
provided tasks in each phase. However, the rele-
vant tools are listed and references to recom-
mended literature given. 
The improvement of equipment reliability should 
not finish when the equipment starts operating. 
The reliability improvement can still continue dur-
ing the operational and maintenance phases. It 
requires thorough studies and development of 
suitable strategies that can be considered as fur-
Figure 1 – Reliability improvement framework within product development model by Murthy et al. (2008). 
-433-
ther research areas. Some of the candidates are; 
maintenance strategy, asset care and failures 
analysis plans, reliability based spares strategy. 
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Abstract
The oil and gas industry is currently exploring 
challenging areas, such as ultra-deep waters and 
the Arctic region. These areas require several 
new technological solutions and new systems. 
The oil and gas industry is a conservative industry 
that is skeptical to solutions and systems that 
have not been “proven in use,” and fear that the 
new systems may lead to production downtime, oil 
spills to the environment, and other types of acci-
dents. Before a new technology or a new system 
is accepted for use, the equipment supplier must 
convince the operator that the reliability of the new 
technology/system is sufficiently high. This may 
be accomplished through a technology qualifica-
tion program (TQP). Several TQP approaches 
have been suggested, but only two of these ap-
proaches are used in the Norwegian offshore oil 
and gas industry; one proposed by Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV) in their recommended practice 
DNV-RP-A203 and one based on NASA’s tech-
nology readiness levels (TRLs) approach. Combi-
nations of the two approaches are also used. 
The objective of this paper is to present and dis-
cuss the main TQP approaches and to highlight 
challenges related to methodological and proce-
dural issues. This paper surveys the current TQP 
approaches in the Norwegian oil and gas industry 
and introduces some potential improvements for 
integrating the main TQPs. 
1. Introduction
New technology includes new products, but also 
known products used in a new way. They have 
the potential to create high income, and this is an 
incentive for their development. On the other 
hand, product failures may give harmful conse-
quences when the new products are used in op-
erational activities. Criteria must therefore be pre-
pared with regard to development, testing and use 
in order to fulfil the requirements to health, safety 
and environment. Various qualification processes 
assist in developing the wanted product, and re-
duce the risk of developing a product that is not fit 
for purpose. In some application areas, such as 
the offshore oil and gas industry, it has therefore 
become common to require suppliers of subsea 
equipment to verify and document that the sup-
plied product is able to meet stated requirements 
to functional performance and reliability (Ander-
sen, 2006). The demonstration process and the 
management of the progress are referred to as a 
technology qualification program (TQP). 
A TQP can be accomplished by testing and/or 
analysis. Qualification based on analysis is often 
the only option for one-of-a-kind products, such as 
subsea processing systems. 
One of the commonly used TQPs is described in 
the recommended practice DNV-RP-A203 (2001). 
It is intended for qualification of new technology in 
the offshore oil and gas industry, but the main 
principles can also be used in other application 
areas. A second edition of DNVRP-A203 (2011) 
was issued based on the experiences gained from 
using the first edition. In the new edition, an itera-
tive qualification strategy is implemented in the 
stages of development. 
Another commonly used TQP, based on technol-
ogy readiness levels (TRLs), was introduced by 
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA), in the late 1980s. The Subsea 
Processing Community (SPC) adopted and modi-
fied the method to make it applicable for equip-
ment used in subsea production systems. TRL is 
a metric or measurement system that is used at 
different stages to assess the development status 
and maturity of a specified technology or product 
(Smith, 2005). 
Currently, the companies in the oil and gas indus-
try who use these approaches encounter difficul-
ties, and they try to overcome these by combining 
and adjusting the best features of the two TQPs to 
their own products. 
The objective of this paper is to present and dis-
cuss existing approaches of qualification of new 
technology, and to point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. Thereafter, sup-
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plementary tasks are suggested for the two com-
monly used qualification processes. 
The paper is based on a thorough literature sur-
vey and review of technical reports and papers 
published by companies, describing their long-
term practical experience. Papers from academia 
are also reviewed. 
Qualification of new technology is a broad subject 
that can range from consumer products to cus-
tom-made products. The main focus in this paper 
is on components, equipment, and assemblies 
used in the subsea oil and gas industry. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we describe important concepts regard-
ing classification of technologies, qualification, 
and its approaches. In Section 3, we describe two 
main qualification processes and Section 4 pre-
sents some of their ambiguities and challenges. 
Section 5, introduces some potential improve-
ments for integrating the main TQPs, and section 
6 concludes the paper.
2. Basic concepts  
2.1. Classification of technology 
How detailed and comprehensive the TQP must 
be depends on the level of newness of the tech-
nology. Several classification systems for the 
newness of technology have been developed to 
assist in prioritizing TQP activities. 
In the aerospace industry (TOR-8583-5236, 
2006), new technology is defined as that which (i) 
has never been previously characterized, (ii) has 
limited space heritage, or (iii) is commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) technology. 
In DNV-RP-A203 (2011), technology is new when 
it is not proven. Technology is said to be proven 
when it has a well-documented track record from 
the same environment and application. Such doc-
umentation must provide confidence in the tech-
nology from practical operations, with respect to 
the ability of the technology to meet the specified 
requirements. 
The equipment to be qualified can be classified 
according to: (i) the newness of the technology 
and (ii) the amount of experience from previous 
applications of similar technology in the actual 
operational and environmental context. Based on 
these factors, DNV (2008) classifies technology 
(and products) into four categories with three lev-
els for technological maturity and three levels of 
operational experience as illustrated in Table 1.  
The four degrees of newness listed in Table 1 are: 
1. No new technical uncertainties. This is the 
least demanding category, where proven (i.e., 
well known) technology is used in a known ap-
plication.
Level of technology maturity 
Experience with the 
operating condition Proven 
Limited field 
history or not 
used by com-
pany/ user 
New or 
un-
proven 
Previous experience 1 2 3 
No experience by 
company/user 
2 3 4 
No industry experience 3 4 4 
Table 1 –The degree of newness of technology 
(DNV, 2008). 
2. New technical uncertainties. This category has 
two subcategories: 
(a) Technology with a limited field history 
(i.e., partly known) that is used in a known 
application. 
(b) Proven (i.e., well known) technology that 
is used in a new application for the compa-
ny/user. 
3. New technical challenges. This category has 
three subcategories: 
(c) New or unproven technology that is 
used in a known application. 
(d) Technology with a limited field history 
(i.e., partly known) that is used in a new ap-
plication for the company/user.  
(e) Proven technology that is used for a new 
application for the whole industry. 
4. Demanding new technical challenges. This is 
the most demanding category where: 
(f) New or unproven technology is used in a 
new application both for the company/user 
and the industry. 
(g) Technology with limited field history that 
is used in a new application for the industry. 
This classification applies to the totality of the 
technology as well as to each of its parts, func-
tions, and subsystems. It is used to highlight 
where care must be taken due to limited field his-
tory. Technology in category 1 is proven technol-
ogy where proven methods for qualification, tests, 
calculations, and analysis can be used to docu-
ment margins. Technology in categories 2 to 4 is 
defined as new technology, and must be qualified 
according to a qualification procedure. 
2.2. Qualification 
Andersen (2006) describes qualification as 
“activities in addition to development and 
operational planning activities to ensure that 
products are functional, safe, and reliable”. Quali-
fication may be understood as “confirmation by 
examination and provision of evidence that the 
new technology meets the specified requirements 
for the intended use” (DNV-RP-A203, 2011). 
The qualification can be performed by the producer 
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Figure 1 – Qualification purposes. 
, the end-user, or an independent third party 
(DNV-RP-A203, 2011). The producer provides the 
parts, components, or subsystems for the system 
integrator and the system integrator provides the 
final required systems for the end-users, and they 
all use the qualification process. This summarized 
in Fig. 1 along with the purposes each may have 
by performing qualification. 
When we claim that a product is qualified, this 
should not be misunderstood as a property of the 
product, rather it implies that according to the 
provided evidence, our belief is that the product is 
fit-for-purpose and can start its operational phase. 
Performance criteria for the product and/or the 
technologies may be specified by the producer, 
regulatory bodies, or by the end-user and may be 
related to various reliability measures based on 
the time-to-failure probability distribution and/or 
some defined margins against specified failure 
modes (e.g., see DNV-RP-A203, 2011 and IEC 
60300-3-4, 2007).  
2.2.1. Types of qualification 
Qualification of new technology can be performed 
from several perspectives:  
(i) Proactive versus reactive approach 
In the reactive approach, the close-to-final product 
is examined as a black box by comparing the 
product’s properties with specified requirements 
as final inspection at the manufacturing site (or as 
incoming inspection by the end-user). The ap-
proach is reactive in the sense that it adds an 
additional phase to the development, and hardly 
differentiates in giving focus on those issues that 
really need to be qualified (Gerling et al 2002). 
The proactive approach considers qualification as 
an integrated part of design and development with 
early involvement in this process. In this ap-
proach, technology and design properties com-
mon to all products or product elements are identi-
fied and results gained on similar products are 
considered. 
(ii) Analytical versus experimental qualification 
The analytical approach is a proactive approach 
without testing. The main reason for this type of 
qualification is the need to reduce the time and 
cost associated with the design and development 
of new products as highlighted and exemplified in 
NATO AVT-092 (2009). In the analytical ap-
proach, reliability and quality assessments are 
part of every phase of the product development 
process. This method is mainly applicable for 
specialized, custom-built products (Sunde, 2004). 
The experimental approach typically involves la-
boratory testing under defined conditions, and 
sometimes also field-testing. Some advantages of 
this method are; ease of application and compa-
rable data sets for different products and technol-
ogies (Preussger et al, 2003). The disadvantages 
are more apparent, such as: 
x Increasing efforts related to stress-testing of 
complex products. 
x Excessive testing time required for high-
reliability products. 
x Sample size inconsistent with reliability tar-
gets. 
x Complicated and time-consuming root cause 
analysis of products in case of failures. 
x Reliability results generated at the end of the 
development process. 
Pecht (1993) argues that the TQP should not be 
based solely on testing and it depends on the risk 
level, various risk-reducing factors, the ability or 
inability to test large one-of-a-kind systems opera-
tional environment, and regulatory requirements. 
On the other hand, qualification solely by analyti-
cal methods may not be appropriate to verify the 
reliability and safety of products in high-risk indus-
tries such as nuclear power plants and offshore oil 
and gas platforms. For these industries it may be 
more relevant to qualify products on the basis of 
analysis combined with testing, and by using his-
torical data from tests and field service. 
Therefore, a combination of analytical methods 
with experiments is recommended. A more detail 
discussion on advantages and disadvantages of 
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analytical and experimental qualification is given 
in NATO AVT-092 (2009). 
 (iii) Physical versus actuarial approach 
In the physical approach, the focus is on analyz-
ing the physical phenomena related to the 
strength of the item and the loads applied to it. It 
is mainly used for analysis of structural elements. 
Loads and strengths are modeled as random var-
iables, and failure takes place when the load ex-
ceeds the strength (Choi et al, 2007). 
In the actuarial approach (also called statistical
approach), the explicit loads and strengths are of 
little interest. Instead, it pays attention to the ef-
fects of the interaction between the physical vari-
ables (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). Here, the reli-
ability is expressed in terms of a probability distri-
bution for the time-to-failure, which is often select-
ed based on the properties of the failure rate func-
tion. The actuarial approach is primarily appropri-
ate for multicomponent systems. 
A combination of statistical methods based on 
physical analysis will be appropriate for many new 
products or technologies. 
3.  Qualification processes 
 Several qualification processes are described in 
the literature. A summary of these processes in-
cluding their main application area and a brief 
description is given in Table 2.  
DNV-RP-A203 (2011) and TRL (Smith, 2005) are 
the most commonly used qualification guidelines 
and are discussed in more detail in the following. 
The qualification tasks in these guidelines can be 
carried out independently from the product devel-
opment model of the producer, therefore the end-
users or a third party can also perform them.  
3.1. The DNV qualification process 
 DNV-RP-A203 (2011) defines a set of activities 
that should be iterated through the three stages: 
 (a) concept evaluation, (b) pre-engineering, and 
(c) detailed engineering. Each stage should to be 
successfully concluded before going on to the 
next stage. The activities are illustrated in Fig. 2. 
Qualification methods must be selected to ensure 
that all potential failure modes are identified and 
addressed in a satisfactory manner, so that the 
margins to failure are documented and the reliabil-
ity of the product can be proven. (For qualitative 
methods see Rausand & Høyland, 2004). 
Some companies in the oil and gas industry such 
as FMC Kongsberg Subsea AS, have developed 
their own tailor-made TQP based on the DNV-RP-
A203. The FMC procedure introduces several 
improvements concerning both the specification of 
requirements to which the technology is to be 
qualified, and a flow diagram to ensure that the 
process is carried out in a structured way. The 
main activities of the FMC procedure are de-
scribed by Sunde (2004). The FMC procedure has 
the potential for significant cost saving, since the 
qualification process is more streamlined and 
efficient with reduced requirements for physical 
testing—such that tests are only performed when 
strictly necessary. Potential deficiencies and mal-
functions should be revealed during the design 
and qualification phases, such that the number of 
in-service failures is reduced. This is particularly 
important for subsea oil and gas production and 
processing systems that are not accessible for 
normal maintenance and repair, other than 
through high-cost vessel operation. 
3.2. Technology readiness levels 
The TRL method was initially introduced by NASA 
(Mankins, 1995) and then was adopted by the 
U.S. Department of Defense, and by the U.S. Air 
Force Research Laboratory (Smith, 2005). There-
after SPC modified the TRL method for their 
products, and used this method to determine the 
qualification status for several new technolo-
gies/products. 
Qualification pro-
cesses Main application area Description 
NATO AVT-092 (2009) Military aircraft Reduces time and cost of production through qualification by 
analysis 
Andersen (2006)  Oil and gas well technology Performs qualification in parallel with product development pro-
cess
SEMATECH (1995)  Semiconductor equipment  Includes (1) lifecycle and reliability improvement process; (2) 
management responsibilities; and (3) activities and tools 
API-RP-17N (2008)  Subsea technology Focuses on project execution, by setting a number of integrated reliability and technical risk management activities which derived 
from the 12 key reliability processes in (ISO 20815, 2008) 
Ardebili and Pecht 
(2009)  Mass-produced electronic product 
Divides the qualification process into (1) virtual, (2) product, and 
(3) mass production qualification 
Engel (2011)  Various manufacturing industries, civilian agen-
cies, or the military 
Provides verification, validation and testing activities/ methods 
through the V-model life cycle of systems. 
Table 2 – Qualification processes. 
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Figure 2 – The DNV qualification process (DNV-
RP-A203, 2001). 
The levels are developed as part of an overall risk 
assessment process, to support the assessment 
of a particular product and provide a consistent 
comparison of maturity between different prod-
ucts. 
The TRL method is a systematic metric or meas-
urement system that supports assessment of a 
particular technology/product and a consistent 
comparison of the maturity between different 
types of technologies/products. The TRL assess-
ment may be carried out in two different ways: 
x As a continuous evaluation of the qualifica-
tion status of the project. 
x As a methodology to assess the qualification 
status before the project is going to the next 
phase in the development process. 
The TRL method has nine levels (TRLs), ranging 
from zero to eight. TRL 0 is the lowest level of 
product maturity, while TRL 8 represents the 
proven product. These TRLs are determined by 
tangible evidence identified during the product 
development. Obviously, the tests at each level 
have to be successful to claim that a level is 
reached (Berntsen, 2008). A summary of the 
TRLs is given in Table 3. 
A more comprehensive readiness assessment 
should move from an individual technology con-
text to a system context, where interplays be-
tween multiple technologies are also involved. 
The concepts of system readiness level (SRL) 
and system maturity have been introduced and 
discussed in (Sauser et al, 2008 and Sauser et al, 
2006). 
3.2.1.The TRL calculator 
The TRL calculator is developed by the U.S. Air 
Force Research Laboratory as a tool for applying 
TRLs in technology development programs. 
TRL Definitions 
0 Basic principles observed and reported 
1 Technology concept and/or application formulated 
2  Analytical and experimental critical function 
and/or characteristic proof of concept 
3 Component and/or breadboard validation in la-
boratory environment 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation in rele-
vant environment 
5 System/subsystem model or prototype demon-
stration in a relevant environment 
6 System prototype demonstration in an operational 
environment  
7 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” 
through test and demonstration 
8 Actual system “flight proven” through successful 
mission operations 
Table 3 – Definition of the TRLs (U.S. Department 
of Defense, 2005). 
In its current form, the calculator is a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet application that allows the user 
to answer a series of questions about a technolo-
gy project. When the questions have been an-
swered, the calculator displays the achieved level. 
The calculator provides a formalized and repeata-
ble process for evaluating the readiness of tech-
nology/product under development. 
The TRL calculator can be a helpful tool in a risk 
management plan. It can give the manager a sig-
nificant amount of information about the overall 
program risk. This is because, in general, the 
higher the maturity level, the lower will the risk 
related to implementation of the product be. The 
calculator’s questions and the percent complete 
feature can assist the program manager in track-
ing progress toward accomplishing required tasks 
(Nolte et al 2003). 
4. Ambiguities and challenges related 
to the DNV and TRL approaches
Several companies are currently using the DNV 
and TRL approaches, but encounter several diffi-
culties. The challenges related to the TRL ap-
proach are partly organizational and partly meth-
odological. Several authors (e.g. Graettinger et al, 
2002, Sauser et al, 2006, and Mankins, 1998) 
have discussed these challenges.  
The main challenges related to the TRL approach 
are: 
x Difficult to use for complex product: The 
TRL approach seems more suitable to evalu-
ate the maturity of an individual item. Obtain-
ing the right level of technology maturity lev-
els across multiple subsystems and compo-
nents is rather difficult. 
x Lack of a figure of merit: To develop a fig-
ure of merit that quantifies the uncertainty of 
a new product development and especially 
that allows assessment of anticipated re-
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search and development uncertainty. One 
such figure of merit is the research and de-
velopment degree of difficulty (R&D3), which 
was developed by NASA. The R&D3 classi-
fies the probability of development success 
with “normal” R&D effort into five levels, rang-
ing from 20 to 99% (Graettinger et al, 2002). 
x The ambiguities of levels: It makes it diffi-
cult to define when a TRL has been attained. 
x Insufficient attention to the testing inabil-
ity of some products: The TRL approach 
also ignores the possibility that some proto-
types and products cannot be tested. For 
one-of-a-kind products, a full product testing 
is usually not possible and more analytical 
approaches should be considered. 
x Limited information about higher levels:
The current TRL does not provide enough in-
formation about the development uncertainty; 
nor does it tell anything about the likelihood 
of reaching a higher TRL. The TRLs do not 
evaluate the future uncertainty of TRL matu-
ration. 
x Not enough attention to system and de-
sign verification: They are necessary during 
the detail design, and have to be performed 
before component verification in levels 3 and 
4, but they are not well considered. 
x A lot of documentation: The approach 
leads to more paperwork, reporting, and re-
views. 
The main challenges related to the DNV approach 
are: 
x Complexity of quantitative analysis: The 
DNV approach is divided into a qualitative 
and a quantitative analysis loop. The quanti-
tative analysis loop is, by some practitioners, 
considered to be too complex and also too 
theoretical. 
x Focuses only on technical qualification: 
The DNV approach focuses on reliability and 
also on reducing uncertainty in developing 
new technology, but it does not focus on their 
fit-for-purpose characteristics such as envi-
ronmental issues, noise, user-friendliness, 
and human-machine interface (Corneliussen, 
2006). 
x Considers a poor product development 
process: The process considered in the 
DNV approach is not precise; it has only 
three stages, which obviously is not sufficient 
for complex systems such as subsea equip-
ment. This is important since if a need for 
modification in the design or development is 
revealed, the modification can be implement-
ed before it becomes too late. The better the 
TQP is integrated into the product develop-
ment process, the less problems may occur. 
x Cannot be considered as a united lan-
guage: The DNV approach can be per-
formed by the producer, the end-user, and a 
third party/supplier, but this approach cannot 
be seen as a united language between them.  
The importance of this issue is more obvious 
for a complex product that has several sup-
pliers and subcontractors, and also for a one-
of-a kind product where the end-user and the 
producer are closely interlinked during the 
development of the product (e.g., during de-
velopment of new subsea oil and gas equip-
ment). 
x Similarity of tasks in each product devel-
opment phase: The set of defined activities 
should be iterated through each product de-
velopment phases (see 3.1.), while the char-
acteristics of each phase are quite different. 
Each phase requires specific tasks according 
to its characteristics. 
5. Potential improvements 
This paper has so far examined the qualification 
processes and presented some general challeng-
es related to the DNV and the TRL approaches. 
Several companies have tried to integrate the two 
TQP approaches to overcome these challenges, 
but they are still facing problem. In the following, 
this paper suggests a set of principles for improv-
ing the performance of the integrated TQPs: 
1) Stepwise structure: The integrated ap-
proach should structurally rely on the TRL 
approach, since the TRL approach is inter-
linked with a more detailed product develop-
ment process, and also is a stepwise ap-
proach that easily can be followed.  
2) Detailed design process: The integrated 
approach requires an extra step or level be-
tween TRL 2 and TRL 3 focusing on “sys-
tem/design verification”. Additional tasks for 
this step are: design review, compatibility and 
interface analysis, and verification of system 
architecture. To fulfill the requirements of this 
step, the appropriateness of the system ar-
chitecture and the components and their in-
teractions need to be verified. 
3) Clarity of steps:  Clarification of the steps is 
important in order to avoid ambiguities during 
the project execution. The improved ap-
proach has ten steps. The required tasks for 
the new step are introduced in item 2, and 
the required tasks for the nine remaining 
steps can be found in the TRL approach, but 
needed to be reviewed and combined with 
DNV’s set of activities (see Fig. 2). The rele-
vant methods and tools for the various tasks 
can be found in recommended literature in 
section 3. 
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4) End-users within the design process: 
Many products for the subsea oil and gas in-
dustry are one-of-a-kind products, and re-
quire a more transparent design process 
from the end-user’s point of view. During the 
design process, the producer must ensure 
the end-user that their work has the required 
quality and that the product will be suitable 
for the intended purpose. 
The reliability requirement specification for 
the product is set up in cooperation between 
the end-user and the producer, and provides 
a basis for the design. The specification doc-
ument should be a living document that is fur-
ther developed and maintained through all 
the product development phases. At speci-
fied stages, it must be verified that the prod-
uct design is in agreement with the specifica-
tion document. A reliability analysis report is 
often developed by the producer, as part of 
the detailed engineering and development 
phase, to document compliance with the giv-
en requirements.  
5) Third party involvement: Involvement of a 
third party in the qualification process should 
be considered – to perform independent 
analyses and tests to verify the validity of the 
qualification evidence and conclusions. The 
third party should assess and witness the 
qualification process and also assess anal-
yses and tests performed to confirm compli-
ance with specified standards (DNV-RP-
A203, 2011). 
The third party usually performs functional 
safety assessment (FSA), risk analysis, per-
formance specification, and verification vali-
dation through the determined milestones 
that can be from the initial concept until the 
product has been fully developed. 
6) Milestone determination: Milestones are 
required for involvement of independent third 
parties, and they have to be decided early in 
the product development process. When a 
milestone is reached, the third party performs 
the required assessment and reports to both 
producer and end-user. For example for safe-
ty instrumented systems (SISs), determining 
the milestones is based on the Safety Integri-
ty Level (SIL) whether the assessment can 
be carried out by producer or must be per-
formed by an independent third party (IEC 
61508-1, 2010).
6. Conclusion and future work 
The paper documents a literature survey and has 
presented and discussed a number of approaches 
for technology qualification with focus on the two 
commonly used approaches, the DNV and the 
TRL approaches. Ambiguities and challenges 
related to these approaches, faced by several 
companies, are highlighted. This paper provides a 
set of suggestions for improving the performance 
of the integrated TQPs. By implementation the 
suggested principles, some of the challenges 
presented in section 4 may be eliminated and the 
stakeholders will be more confident about the 
TQP results. 
A main recommendation is to develop a new TQP 
approach by using a more detail product devel-
opment process, such as the V-model (Martin & 
Bahill, 1996) or the model by Murthy et al. (2008). 
The suggestions in this paper do not address all 
relevant challenges, but a new approach should 
take a holistic view and focus on rectifying all the 
identified challenges.  
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